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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

VOLUME XI

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PART I

ORIGINAL PAPERS

GRADES OF EGO-DIFFERENTIATION¹

BY

EDWARD GLOVER

LONDON

Not long after Freud first published his systematization of psychic structure in terms of the Ego, the Super-ego and the Id, a tendency manifested itself amongst psycho-analytic writers, to convert what had been of necessity a fluid presentation into a more rigid and refractory medium. Moreover, in their exposition of this concept of tripartite psychic structure some writers had recourse to terms which, although suggestive enough in themselves, evaded the more disciplined usages of academic statement. One might quote for example phrases such as that coined by Alexander of a 'secret alliance' between Id and Super-ego, or again, the statement that a psychic formation can be 'Id-syntonic'. Useful as such phrases may be for purposes of description, they are unsatisfactory in many other respects: they tend to gloss over the difficulties of a precise statement of mechanism and may ultimately give rise to theoretical misconceptions, particularly in the minds of students. Thus we are left to form our own opinion whether this 'secret alliance' can be contained within the more familiar concept of 'regression', and if so, whether we can or must postulate some degree of Id organization in order to express the idea of regression to some common point in development or to some common functional reaction.

Another rather slipshod usage, due in all probability to some anthropomorphizing tendency, is that whereby we speak of severe

¹ Read before the Eleventh International Psycho-Analytical Congress at Oxford, July 27, 1929.

Super-egos, imperious Ids and helpless Egos. Here again the idea of mechanism, of the control and regulation of instinctual tensions, gives place to a more or less lax descriptive process, one which, in the case of the Id, is totally alien to the conception of the impersonal. As usual Freud himself was the first to foresee this danger: in his original essay he warned us that from the topographical point of view, although the Id and Ego systems could be illustrated by a conventional diagram, a system such as that of the Super-ego did not lend itself to diagrammatic representation; and again he entered a mild caveat against taking abstractions too seriously when (in *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*) he warned us against regarding the mental systems as armed camps. It may be profitable therefore to review the existing structural conceptions to see to what extent their manifest advantages are offset by certain difficulties in formulation.

The first step in such a review is to consider *what advantages are actually obtained by the formulation of an Id concept*. To begin with, the concept of the Id made an end once and for all with the confusion arising from the use of the same term (i.e. unconscious) to designate a special mental system and a characteristic applicable to two out of three mental systems. It enabled us not only to distinguish between the old *ucs* and the unconscious components of the Ego but between the 'repressed' and the remainder of the *ucs* system. Further, it clarified the position of what up to then had been called the Ego instincts, a somewhat urgent matter since, as Mitchell² has pointed out, the use of the term Ego instinct had become somewhat precarious after the separation of the Ego libido, and more so after the self-preservative instincts were assigned to the Eros group. Indeed, whatever view one might hold as to the clinical usefulness of postulating Life and Death instincts, it was impossible to make theoretical use of these postulates, without formulating the concept of an instinct reservoir such as the Id. Naturally once the Id concept had been established, the ego was necessarily reduced to the status of a regulating institution, formed originally on a reactive pattern, with a capacity for exploiting perceptual function and an adequate sensitiveness to affective danger signals. Incidentally it may be noted that the modern concept of the Ego is in the deterministic sense as impersonal as that of the Id itself. Finally the concept of an Id matrix provided an asylum for the preservation of phylogenetic imprints

² *Problems in Psycho-pathology*, London (Kegan Paul), 1927.

and temporarily at any rate rescued the theory of primal impressions from some unclarities with which it was beset.

As far as the Ego was concerned it was an organization derived from this psychic matrix but without any clear line of demarcation from the Id. At a later date the fact that the Id itself was no organization had to be restated in *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Now the necessity for this reminder itself suggests that the Id system was being credited with some features more characteristic of an Ego system, in other words, that an anthropomorphizing tendency was eating into a scientific concept. After all, study of primitive animistic systems together with some reflection on the use of rationalization as a late Ego defence against anxiety should serve to remind us that any attempt to strip the Ego of its dignity and independence even in the name of objective science is bound to provoke some attempt at restitution, no matter how unobtrusively this may be effected by anthropomorphising the concept of the Id.

Now the pre-Id view of the relation of the Ego to instinct and stimuli prevented this anthropomorphizing tendency, in so far as it related the development of the Ego to a primary separation of Inner and Outer world based on experiences of instinct tension and of the mastering of stimuli. This primary functioning is gradually complicated by the expansion of the pleasure-pain principle. This in turn leads to exploitation of the special reactive function of projection and hence to the formation of the Primary Pleasure Ego as distinct from a painful outer world. With the clearer differentiation of objects and the consequent frustration and foundering of impulses directed towards those objects, Ego differentiation receives much stronger impetus. It is at this point that we are justified in speaking of a Super-ego system and in describing its function. By the development of the Super-ego system, the Ego is placed in the advantageous position of being able to delegate some of its primary activities: the Super-ego becomes the instigator though not the executant of inner inhibition. At this point also we are entitled to speak of the Real Ego. Having delegated the exhausting task of scutinizing certain instinct derivatives, the Real Ego can exploit its capacity for watchfulness as an organ of adaptation to external stimuli.

The formulation of the Id concept does not involve any alteration in these fundamental views of Ego development, but the postulate that the Ego had no sharp line of demarcation from the Id has resulted in some blurring of the *concept of the primary pleasure Ego*. As has been

suggested, in spite of the fact that the Id is to be regarded as an unorganized psychic mass, the tendency exists to attribute to it characteristics which imply some degree of organization, and hence are more appropriately reserved for a primary pleasure Ego. Moreover, it has the delayed result of obscuring what are the ontogenetic and functional relationships between the Ego and the Super-ego. Thus, for example, even if we ignore the infiltration of Ego by the Id and content ourselves with the rough formulation of distinct Id, Ego and Super-Ego systems, we are bound to assume that since the Ego is a structure imprinted on the Id by external necessity, and since the Super-Ego is a differentiated part of the Ego, there is a sort of historical precedence of the Ego over the Super-Ego.

Now in view of the close connection (inferred from clinical data), between the Id and Super-Ego systems, this is a precedence which can by no means be taken for granted.

At this stage it might be inquired whether much of the confusion which arises on this and other problems does not depend on the *latitude allowed in definition of the Ego*. This is undoubtedly true: for example, if we take a broad enough view of the Ego we are bound to maintain that all instincts the aims of which are apparent—and after all we know of the existence of instincts only through the expression of their aims—form an integral part of the Ego. This is particularly obvious in the case of certain self-preservative aims, and in the case of the restricted aims of the libido. Incidentally it is this all-embracing view of the Ego which gives rise to so much difficulty when attempts are made to define what is meant by ‘character’. On the other hand we may take a limited view of the Real Ego focussed round perceptual consciousness and having a range extending through memory systems to the margins of the preconscious. Beyond that margin we have to deal with the territories of the Id and of the unconscious Ego, which latter tends to be regarded in practice as mostly super-ego. In spite of these fairly clear-cut distinctions a good deal of confusion exists, due to the fact that perceptual consciousness and the instruments of projection are at the service of the most primitive Ego formations. In the sense of organized reactive function we are entitled to say that a ‘Real’-Ego system exists from shortly after birth. In spite of hallucinatory and other pleasure aberrations which obscure its reality function, this system is maintained unbroken down to the final formation of the actual Real-Ego. That battles are fought for the possession of these instruments is seen in the phenomena of split-

personality and is implied in, for example, paranoid personalities, to say nothing of the personalities of primitives.

But apart from these sources of confusion I think it can be shown that *our interpretation and formulation of infantile stages of development has been affected by our theoretical conceptions*. Mrs. Isaacs has reminded us in her paper on 'Privation and Guilt'³ that according to the accustomed view there is a definite temporal relationship between the passing of the Œdipus complex, the formation of the Super-Ego and the onset of latency. According to this view we have an approximate date of *completion* of Super-Ego formation, viz. the onset of latency (leaving out of account of course the processes of consolidation which take place during latency and after). The *onset* of super-ego formation is not so precisely indicated, but is nevertheless bound by the view that true castration anxiety cannot occur until the phallic phase of infantile organization has set in. Even if we allow for precocity in attaining the phallic phase, this view gives rise to certain difficulties. The analysis of obsessional neurotics has shown that it is possible for the Ego to achieve a high degree of differentiation (in the Super-Ego sense) under the primacy of the anal-sadistic phase, and the presence of distinct obsessional traits in a large number of so-called 'normal' individuals suggests that this early differentiation is a common occurrence. In the second place there has long been clinical evidence to support the view that in certain cases (until recently regarded as exceptional) organized Œdipus impulses could manifest themselves in the first year,⁴ that is to say, at a time when the Real-Ego is obviously undeveloped. If then the existing views are strictly adhered to, we must assume that Super-Ego differentiation of unconscious components of the Ego takes place only at the stage of final renunciation of the Œdipus wishes—a time when by ordinary standards the Real Ego is already developed. But if the Real-Ego is the end result of renunciation of the pleasure principle it is difficult to see how it can take proper

³ INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, 1929, X, p. 335.

⁴ It is often forgotten that, although Mrs. Klein deserves all the credit of having adduced evidence in favour of the view that Œdipus conflict commences *as a rule* in the first two years of life, it is many years since sporadic observations proved that it was possible for typical Œdipus reactions to occur at an extremely early stage, e.g. during the oral phase. The mere coining of terms such as that of Ferenczi of 'Sphinkter-Moral' was at the same time a confession of uncertainty concerning the date of origin of the Super-Ego and a concession to existing theory.

shape until incest wishes are renounced, i.e. until the new reality principle has been finally established. If this contradiction is something more than a mere nosological confusion we are thrown back on certain assumptions. We may say for example that the Super-Ego develops simultaneously with the Ego, a differentiation in function becoming more obvious with each stage of development. Or if we prefer it, we can say that both Super-Ego and Ego are struck out of a primitive pleasure Ego, itself derived from the Id, or we may say that the Super-Ego is first differentiated from the primitive pleasure Ego, the Real-Ego being as it were an important byproduct of conflict between the Super-Ego and the Primitive Pleasure Ego. What seems to cause confusion and difficulty is the postulation of an unorganized Id, and an organized Ego from which the Super-Ego is ultimately differentiated.

The final resolutions of these problems must obviously depend on the results of future psycho-analytical research, but there are three particular lines of investigation which appear especially promising in this connection. These are, first, direct analysis of young children; second, analysis of borderline psychotic personalities and, third, the working hypotheses of psycho-analytical anthropology.

Although there have been in the past many isolated observations of the behaviour of young children, as far as the *analysis of young children* is concerned, the only available evidence at the moment is that derived from the findings of Klein⁵ and her school. This can be divided into (a) the material of observation together with primary interpretations of such material, and (b) inferences as to Ego structure and dynamics drawn from this interpreted material.

Concerning the clinical data we need only say that Klein's observations compel us to reassess certain facts which we had always been inclined to neglect or gloss over. The fact that the Oedipus situation occurs regularly at an early stage of development compels us to reconsider the early processes of Super-Ego formation; secondly, although emphasis had long been laid on the existence of sadism in early stages of libido development, the developmental significance of high and continued sadistic charges had never been properly estimated, especially their effect in stimulating the inhibiting side of Ego activity.

The most important of Klein's inferences can be stated as follows:—

⁵ I am indebted to Mrs. Klein for the privilege of reading her as yet unpublished lectures on this subject. The digest given below was prepared from these lectures, but the responsibility for error (if any) is mine.

(a) That Super-Ego formation commences in the second half of the first year of life,—and that at first the Super-Ego is hardly differentiated from the Id. (b) That the growth of this system is stimulated by an early efflorescence of primary sadistic charges which, when linked to purely libidinal charges, set up a vicious circle of frustration and tension. (c) That this reactive system, patterned on unreal primitive object-imagines, can itself promote tension, and that as the result of these primary tensions an impetus is given to real Ego and real object formation.

From the structural point of view the logical outcome of her views might be put rather crudely in this way: *So far from the Super-Ego being a later differentiation of an organized Ego, the Ego in its relation to real objects is hammered out of the Id by the Super-Ego.*

Now as we are dealing here with inferences we are bound to ask whether the developments indicated are sufficiently plausible to justify their being made the basis of working hypotheses. I will recapitulate here only the most essential stages as described by Klein. Normally oral deprivation activates sadism (in the order—deprivation, anxiety, sadism). This sadism is directed *via* the libido to the object, but is thwarted, produces fresh anxiety, a cumulative charge of sadism and a stronger drive towards the object on which the sadism is projected. The existence of a sadistic vicious circle increases libidinal excitation, sets the Œdipus situation going, and Œdipus expression through the oral sadistic mode of incorporation leads to the early introjection of Œdipus objects, which are nevertheless, by virtue of projected characteristics, unreal distorted objects. These constitute the nucleus of the primitive Super-Ego.

With regard to the *validity of these views*, it seems to me that there is one weighty argument in favour of their acceptance, provided of course we admit, as I think we are to a very large extent bound to admit, the accuracy of Klein's primary observations, and the correctness of most of her primary interpretations. It is that, apart from the special time relationship between Super-Ego and Real-Ego implied by her, and apart from the fact that she derives the Super-Ego almost directly from the Id, the early processes of Super-Ego formation she describes differ in no fundamental respect from the processes described and accepted by all analysts for what Klein would call later stages. For example, it might appear that the processes of object introjection she describes would be vitiated by the partial and rudimentary nature of these objects, and that the decisive element of abandonment of object cathexes cannot be presumed. Now whilst it may be true that in Abraham's sense real object formation does not commence

until the second of the anal sadistic phases, this does not invalidate the conception of introjection of part objects. The term part object is after all an object's view of an object. The completeness of an object depends on the whole-heartedness of instinctual aims. The only true sense in which early pregenital objects are part objects is in so far as libidinal strivings are polymorphous. If we agree that the primacy of the earliest stages of libido development is an oral primacy, then the object of that libido is correspondingly as complete as the object of genital libido. Similarly if we agree that one primacy gives way to later primacies, whether by frustration or as the result of processes inherent in development or both, we are bound to concede that the abandonment of this libidinal aim is as complete and as liable to give rise to introjection as a later abandonment of genital aims to a 'complete' Oedipus object. The difficulty is due to a confounding of perceptual syntheses with the objects of libidinal aims.

In short, I believe that when all due corrections have been made⁶ the most important of Klein's findings will remain unchallenged, viz. the pre-phallic Oedipus phase, and the pregenital phase of Super-Ego formation. Even granting this, we are no better off as far as the primitive phases of the Ego are concerned. Indeed the tendency of her work is one of Super-Ego aggrandisement at the expense of the concept of the primitive ego. The primitive Ego is suggested simply as a weak Ego as little differentiated from the Id as the Super-Ego.

Now the mere suggestion that the early Super-Ego is very little differentiated from the Id necessitates careful examination. *Is it permissible to say that a Super-Ego is an immediate derivative of the Id?* The reply might be made that if it is justifiable to regard the Ego system as a whole as being a differentiated part of the Id, it is at any rate conceivable that the Super-Ego system represents some of the more direct modifications. To do so however is to put a certain amount of strain on the topographical aspect of Freud's psychic systematizations. An Id concept is after all the expression of ideas concerning instinct and concerning phylogenetic ego inheritance; apart from its special relationship to the 'repressed' its main justification in theoretical description is the extent to which it simplifies and clarifies the concept of an organized Ego system, and Freud has been content so far to represent the idea of an Id-Ego boundary in the most elastic terms.

⁶ E.g., free use of the term 'sadism' is liable to obscure our understanding of early modifications of the destructive impulses, together with their influence on development.

The expression of the aims of Id instincts and the record of Id tensions automatically constitute the groundwork and reckoning apparatus of the primitive Ego. To put the matter crudely: if we did not already possess the concept of a primitive Ego it would be as necessary to invent one as it is to postulate a primal Ego in anthropological study.

If now we define the function of the Ego as that of regulating psychic tension, involving primarily the employment of reactive instincts for this purpose, and proceed to re-examine the course of events sketched by Klein as leading up to the formation of the Primitive Super-Ego, it will be observed that the *primitive Ego* not only plays a large part in this process but that it must itself have attained a relatively high degree of organization before it could play this part. What is described briefly as the cumulative charge of sadistic impulses leading to Super-Ego formation can be translated in terms of the primitive Ego as a turning point in a *protracted history of reactive Ego functions*. These have arrived at the stage where they tend to defeat their own aim of reducing tension, and in face of defeat the primitive Ego develops in self-defence a specialized protective and inhibiting institution, viz. the Super-Ego. The ultimate factor responsible for this threatened defeat is the failure of the primitive mechanism of projection. But projection is by no means the only protective measure of the primitive Ego. To mention only two other systems, the discharge through the sensory end of the psychic apparatus is constantly exploited and continues to be exploited throughout the dream life of the individual. Again the distribution of reactive tensions through systems other than the oral system performs a protective function.

Apart from these considerations, if we view the actual processes of object formation and introjection as described by Klein, it appears that these would be liable to founder but for peculiarities of primitive Ego organization, e.g. *primary identification*. Like the concept of the Id, primary identification is a necessary descriptive formula. It forms the basis of all later systems of identification and introjection by virtue of the fact that for the primitive mind all states having the same pleasure tone tend to bring about identification of the objects connected with these states. But we must not treat this primary identification in a one-sided way—for although by wrongly including the object, primary identification leads the way to introjection, it is also true that by faulty differentiation of the Ego the primitive Ego arrives at object formation. Indeed it might be held that the concept of a primitive Ego itself requires further elaboration. It is conceivable that at the stage we

usually describe as that of primary identification, there are as many primary Egos as there are combinations of erotogenic zones with reactive discharge systems: in other words, it is conceivable that the so-called primitive Ego is originally a polymorphous construction.

Finally, with regard to the *rôle of the super-ego in promoting object formation* the views held by Klein seem to imply that the early formation of the super-ego with the resultant loosening of anxiety promotes closer adaptation to reality, hence stimulates real object formation. That under favourable circumstances an early super-ego ultimately promotes objectivity cannot I think be denied, but the processes of adaptation remain essentially Ego processes, and in this sense are simply reinforced varieties of mechanism already put in operation by the primitive Ego. Possessed as it is of the instruments of cognition, the primitive Ego is driven by inner tension to make sharper perceptions of objects. It is moreover the primitive Ego which by virtue of its tendency to aversion gradually develops the system of denial which, as Freud points out, is the first step in the acceptance of objects associated with pain. It is the primitive Ego's first libidinal drive towards incorporation, which is the first step in adaptation to the outside world, and, as Ferenczi has suggested, it is the fusing or refusing of libidinal and destructive drives which promotes objectivity as distinct from the mere recognition of objects. Lastly, it is the primitive Ego's capacity for identification on a pleasure or pain basis which promotes displacement and maintains a sufficient spread of discharge. In short, it is difficult to avoid the presumption that the primitive Ego has attained a highly complicated stage of organization before the development of more complicated aims towards objects necessitates a subdivision of labour, which is achieved by the formation of the Super-Ego and the splitting of libidinal drives.

Considerations of space prevent more than a cursory review of the two other sources of evidence I have mentioned. A *study of psychotic personalities* shows however that in every case *two* factors have to be estimated,—first the amount of disorder of Super-Ego formation and, second, the extent of regression to a primitive Ego organization. In a paper given at the Innsbruck Congress on suicidal mechanisms I endeavoured to show that the suicidal act, although primarily the result of destructive forces directed through the Super-Ego, *could not* come about without a regression of the Ego to primitive animistic levels and the adoption of primitive autoplasmic methods of dealing with tension based on the processes of primary identification.

With regard to the third group of data the evidence of *psycho-analytical anthropology* is so familiar as hardly to require recapitulation. Nevertheless it is curious to note how little attention has been paid to a discrepancy between anthropological views and the customary teachings of a temporal relation between Ego and Super-Ego. If we had no evidence to consider other than the evidence of anthropological data, one would have presumed from the sequence animism, and magic, religion and objective science that the Super-Ego was a decisive factor in Real-Ego formation and real object formation. But we would also have to realize from the finished product of the primitive personality how far the primitive Ego had advanced in organization and in the exploitation of primitive mechanisms before the development of guilt finally instituted a drive towards culture.

To conclude: it would seem that a number of difficult theoretical problems can be resolved provided we do not set out on investigation with too rigid preconceptions as to psychic structure. For example, the apparent contradiction between Klein's views and the more familiar accepted teachings of psycho-analysis would seem to be due not so much to any fundamental incompatibility between the mechanisms involved as to a bias of interest in favour of one or other of the organized psychic constructions. There would appear to be a certain overestimation of the Ego in the customary teaching and an underestimation of the primitive Ego in Klein's teaching. It is true to say that forces directed by the Super-Ego drive the Ego to the grindstone of objectivity, but it can still be held that the Super-Ego is a differentiated part of the primitive Ego, through which it maintains its close connection with the Id. The alternative to this view is to postulate a readiness for differentiation in the Id, whereby early Super-Ego formations gather impetus directly from racial impressions in the Id.

A few comments may perhaps be added as to the *specific obstacles to objectivity about psychic structure*. The most natural tendency is to aggrandize the concept of the Real-Ego at the expense of those of the Super-Ego and of the Primitive Ego. In the second place I think we may safely assume that the tendency to scotomise early stages of Super-Ego formation is a final attempt on the part of the individual to screen guilt. Lastly the anthropomorphizing tendency which manipulates the concept of the Id is one more example of the system whereby Ego irritation is solved by the same projective processes as originated animistic systems in the phylogenesis of the Ego.

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SUBLIMATION AND DELUSION ¹

BY

ELLA SHARPE

LONDON

In 1879, a Spaniard, interested in problems of the evolution of culture, was exploring a cave on his estate at Altamira, in Northern Spain. He was searching for new examples of flint and carved bone of which he had already found specimens. His little daughter was with him. The cave was dark and he worked by the light of an oil lamp. The child was scrambling over the rocks and suddenly called out 'Bulls, Bulls!' She pointed to the ceiling, so low that he could touch it with his hand. He lifted the lamp and saw on the uneven surface numbers of bison and other animals drawn with great realism and painted in bright colours. These drawings are now accepted as the work of the Hunter Artists of the Reindeer Age, computed to be 17,000 years ago.

To execute these drawings, paleolithic man penetrated to the cave and must have burned animal fat in a stone lamp in order to see. It was a purposeful act and a purposeful journey, for the people actually lived at the entrance to the cave or under shelving rocks near the entrance.

Seventeen thousand years later a man by the aid of a lamp penetrates to those recesses. A child sees the animals first and points them out to her father.

At that dramatic moment of recognition in the bowel of the cave a common impulse unites the ancient hunter artist and modern man. Between them lies the whole evolution of civilization, but the evolution that separates them springs from the impulse that unites them. By which I mean that the Spaniard is driven to the far recesses of the caves by the same inner necessity that sent the hunter artist there. The hunter-artist goes to make life-like representations. The Spaniard goes to find flints and carved bones, in order to piece together evidence of the life of primitive peoples. In other words to reconstruct, to make a representation of, life that has passed away.

My intention in this short paper is to deal with certain aspects of this many-sided complicated subject of sublimation, viz. in dancing, singing, painting and historical research, since my clinical experience

¹ Read at the Eleventh International Congress of Psycho-Analysis, Oxford, July 31, 1929.

has enabled me to see that these sublimations have a common root, an inner necessity that is in essence in no wise different from the necessity that animated the first artists. The dawn of civilization is the dawn of art. The two are inseparable. From the moment man began to carve his flints and make drawings on the walls of his cave, there begins recorded history and civilization has started on its intricate development.

Behind that first appearance of man with whom we claim our kinship, that is when man appears as Hunter Artists, there is conjecture and dispute. Mousterian Man, it is computed, says Falaize in *Origins of Civilisation*, lived 50,000 years B.C. He says evidences of cannibalism practised by Mousterian Man are afforded by human remains found in Croatia. Behind the appearance of the mummification rites of ancient Egypt, Flinders Petrie has deduced the age of cannibalism. From dismemberment of bodies which accompanies cannibalism we pass to the age of mummification in Egypt, to the building of tombs and to ceremonies for the dead. Eliot Smith sees in the tombs of the Egyptians the beginnings of architecture in stone, and the beginnings of overseas trade in the search for wood and spices for embalming purposes. The death mask in ancient Egypt was followed by the making of the statue.

Sublimation and civilization are mutually inclusive terms: cannibalism and civilization mutually exclusive. Civilization begins with the first art forms, and these first art forms are inseparable from the problems of food (life) and death.

The first drawings were those of the animals that primitive hunters killed for food. The explanation given is that it was a magical way of producing and ensuring the food supply. Draw a bison and bison will be plentiful. But this does not explain why the first artists crept to the recesses of the cave to draw their pictures. Other hunter artists followed, driven by the same necessity, and superimposed their drawings over the ones they found in these hidden places. We see here an inner compulsion first to make a vividly realistic drawing, secondly to place that drawing within the bowels of a cave. The problems of food and of death are implicit in these cave drawings, for the animals drawn were the food supply of the hunters. The drawings are life-like representations.

I would next recall to your memory the fact that the figure of man appearing in these cave drawings of paleolithic times often wears an animal mask. Behind the animal we have the man. So I see in the

drawings of primitive man, in the animals, and men with animal masks, the first attempt in art to resolve a conflict raging around the problem of food and of death.

The first dancer in Europe, perhaps in the world, was the cave dweller. The cave drawings of paleolithic man illustrate dancers. In the earliest rock drawing of a ritual dance, the figures appear in processional formation in connection with a slain bison.

Dancing, like drawing, was a magical performance. Like drawing it is, from its origin, associated with the same problems of food (or life) and death. The dance was part of ancient Egyptian funerary rites. The cave dweller wearing an animal mask imitated the movements of the creature he had slain. The impersonation of ghosts, the enacting of the resurrection of the dead person by the dancer, point to the same motivations in the origin of dancing as in the origin of drawing. The dead are made alive again by magical acts.

From the dramatic dances, which the world over are connected with ceremonies for the dead, arose the beginnings of drama. Ridgeway contends that wherever they are found tragedy and serious drama have their roots in the world-wide belief in the continued existence of the soul after the death of the body. Drama began, not as entertainment, but as ceremony. This aspect is voiced in modern times by Bernard Shaw, who considers art as a department of social hygiene.

'The swaddling clothes of drama are the winding-sheets of the hero king' (Ivor Brown). The masks worn by early actors were for the purpose of portraying the dead. The persons who wore the masks were for the time being the incarnations of the spirits of the dead.

A modern writer has said, 'At least we need not relate our play-going to our food supply or regard our actor as the most likely guarantor of our survival after death'. I believe that art rises to its supreme height only when it performs the service—first for the artist, and unconsciously for ourselves—that it did in ancient times. That service is a magical re-assurance. Great art is a self-preservative functioning. A vital communication is made to us in picture, statue, drama, novel. It is *life* that is danced, a world that is built in music. When these things are supreme, are perfection, we rest satisfied in contemplation. From a world of apprehension and anxiety, a world of temporal things, of vicissitudes and death, we temporarily escape. In those few moments of conviction, immortality is ours. 'Because I live, ye shall live also'.

The word 'drama' is derived from the Greek, 'a thing done'.

'To do' is the characteristic of the artist in distinction to the philosopher, whose necessity is 'to think'. In ancient days these 'doings' were vital to the prosperity of the community. More complicated, more subtly interwoven in our lives, they remain as vital to-day. The great artist must 'do'—driven by an inner need. It is the actual painting, the actual doing, that is the vital thing for him.

An analysis which removed an inhibition against dancing revealed the following: The patient knew within herself *how* to dance. She knew how to have control over her muscles. To see new steps, a new dance, was to receive a picture through her eyes. She could then practise 'in her head'. Like a negative she had taken the image. Then it could be re-produced as a picture taken from a negative. She was the negative and she re-produced the picture. Sounds of music suggested dance. Sound and movement went together naturally. The body bent this way and that, swayed and moved as though it were one thing—all one thing—as a bird in flying is all one thing. She was like a bird, was a bird. She was it and it was herself. That is, she was the magical phallus. The dancing was in her. She had become the thing she once saw through eyes of desire, love and hate. She had incorporated it and after the manner of cannibalistic beliefs she had become endued with the power of the thing incorporated.

The ancient dancer became the dead of whom he was afraid. He imitated the movements of the thing he had slain and eaten. The mourner at the ceremonial funeral in Rome imitated the dead. The white face of the clown even yet testifies to the ghost he once impersonated of intent.

A delusion of omnipotence finds a reality channel. Eyes have seen and ears heard and body felt, and the ego in some cases uses its functioning and says 'I can do that'. In the stress of anxiety this 'can' becomes 'must'. The phallic personification in dancing is a 'must be,' 'am' as powerful as the father, psychically 'I am the father'—a delusion and yet an ego-functioning result.

One has to search further to understand why this magical personification was for my patient a talisman for prosperity, a talisman against an evil fate, for herself, even as dancing was in ancient times for the community. I found that men's admiration and approval were a support for her, but it was clearly not to secure it that her dancing was unconsciously a necessity. It secured no release from anxiety. She needed their support and admiration for precisely the same reason that she needed to identify herself with the father's phallus.

Perfect dancing released her; reaching a standard that satisfied an inexorable demand within her gave her security. In reaching this standard, she had then gone beyond anything expected of her; that is, she had more than satisfied her ballet mistress. At that moment she felt care-free, could snap her fingers at one of whom she was in constant dread, until she left that mistress in a state of ecstatic approval. I came thus to a certainty that the person of whom she stood in terror was unconsciously the mother. On to the mother had been projected those wishes that were inimical to life itself. As she would have taken those things from her mother she desired and envied, from milk to children and the father's penis, so there had been projected on to the mother intents as destructive to herself.

From this terrifying situation she is saved by perfect dancing. She becomes the magical phallus. She restores in herself what her hostility wished to take away, to destroy. It is an omnipotent restitution, an assurance of life. You will remember the bison were drawn in the recesses of a cave. The father is restored to the mother; the penis, the child, are back again magically in the womb.

Dancing is a magical control of the parents by becoming the father. The need for it is anxiety due to hostility which itself derives from frustration. By this delusion of omnipotence, the dancer is the father, and dancing is an atonement, a restitution. It is life that is being danced, and the evil that the hostile wishes to the mother would bring is averted.

A singer revealed this. Analysis enabled her to get rid of bad habits in her voice that she had contracted through trying to follow the instructions of various singing teachers. She is now able to say 'But I knew *how* to produce it quite naturally myself, all the time, ever since I was a child. Their instruction has made me go wrong always. I *knew* instinctively, but teachers assume you don't know; they alone know; you know nothing—as if it were wrong to know. When they said, "Your voice is so big, we must be careful nothing spoils it", I thought, "How big? How can it be spoilt? Is it so big it can't get through"?'

Now that she has lost her voice-tricks she says: 'The voice is inside you. All you need to do is to relax. Breathing takes care of itself if you let your diaphragm work in and out, up and down. The voice pours out like water, like cream. You remember you are not *really* reaching up higher and higher, only pretending to do so, for the notes are all in one place. You put them where you like, *control* them.

You are a bird flying up in your voice. It draws people to you. They feel as you feel, sad or gay. The Pied Piper drew children from their homes by music. Orpheus drew stocks and stones. The Sirens drew men to destruction'.

She is, in singing then, the powerful parents. Her very body is the breast and the penis. The voice is the milk, the water, the fructifying semen. She has identified by incorporating the power of both parents. By the magical singing she is reproducing, externalising again what is incorporated. It is a delusion of control over those whom she feared. As they made her feel sorrow and joy, now she has the power to make others feel these emotions.

The ego secures release from the anxiety of the incorporated hostile parents by a power of externalising it into an art form, and this art form is an omnipotent life-giving, a restoration, milk, water, semen, a child.

The way in which an artist worked revealed this: She said in effect: 'It is strange people have to learn perspective, rules for foreshortening. If you see a flower looking as if it were coming towards you, you draw it as you see it. That is all. The eyes take it in just as it is. The pictures in my mind, I see on the blank paper, or canvas, and I just put outlines round them and paint'. That is, the pictures were outer realities once, the images of infancy. They are incorporated. Then they are projected on to a blank sheet, like the bison in the cave.

Thus the hostility of the incorporated object no longer menaces the ego, for the omnipotence has become an adjunct to the ego. Eye and hand deal with it. Every stroke of the brush is a power over the parents. To paint a picture, no less than to have a piece of toe-nail, is to have the real person magically in one's power. Yet painting is a restitution too. The blank space is filled. All those things which the child would wrest from the mother are restored, the food eaten, the children, the father's penis. The first drawing at the age of three this patient did was intended to represent a mother holding a baby under a bower of roses.

I would gather up these arguments briefly:

A patient bordering on a delusion of persecution is obsessed by a prophecy of a woman palmist that she will have a child who will die. The patient cannot rid herself of this fearful future. She harbours and plans revenge on the palmist. Analysis speedily transferred thoughts of the palmist to the analyst. The analyst, she thought, was doing

magical evil against her. Further analysis revealed that she believed her voice had been spoilt by a singing mistress. The patient had previously given up painting because she thought her originality was being taken from her. Dancing had been abandoned in late childhood. Out of twelve months' brooding she emerged into high states of excitement, and activity gradually became a necessity. Anxiety broke out, and with it bursts of hostility which became most marked against a mistress on whom was projected her own hostility to the mother-imago. The repressed hostility to her mother in childhood has become quite accessible. Meanwhile, her voice has broken loose from all the tricks she acquired. The delusion of persecution has disappeared, and anxiety has become more manageable. It disappears entirely when she sings. Then she is care-free. That is, a delusion of being persecuted is resolved when sublimation goes forward. *The sublimation springs from the same root as the delusion of persecution.* It is worked out from inside into a form of art. This form of art is a bringing back of life, a reparation, an atonement, a nullification of anxiety. It is an omnipotent phantasy of control, of security from evil, in a world of reality, because it finds expression in ego functioning.

The delusion serves the purposes of the super-ego. The hostility is *felt* as emanating from another. The patient feels persecuted. It is the other person who is wrong, not herself who is to blame. Analysis brings to consciousness the repressed hostility to the mother. The super-ego is modified to the degree that the repressed hostility (and its causes) becomes conscious. The delusion disintegrates. In its place sublimation occurs. The hostility is worked out from inside, externalised into a form of art.

A state of unstable equilibrium was reached and maintained for a period of years by a psychotic patient under the following system :—

1. The crystallization of a fixed delusion.
2. The operation of an intense super-ego severity in the rest of her psychic life.
3. The carrying on of routine work which was clearly punitive. It called for diligence and loyalty. It was a 'making good' for childhood misdemeanours and offered psychically as a propitiation to the mother-imago.
4. The last stabilizing factor in this system was the possession of a doll. The period from twenty to twenty-nine years of age in her life was covered by the power of this doll. It was a lady doll, holding a baby. During these years the doll was reverently treated. Every week it was

taken out and looked at to see that it was intact, without harm or blemish, and then gently laid by again, wrapped up and put in a drawer.

The fixed delusion was in essence the Œdipus fulfilment, a belief that a doctor had made sexual overtures. There was no affect, no feeling of guilt. The super-ego was served because the overtures were projected on to the doctor delusionally. Anxiety was held in check and controllable through the doll, for since the Œdipus wishes are inseparable from hostility to the mother and the desire to get rid of her and to have the father's child, the patient had provided for the projected menace of the mother by a magical assurance. The doll was the uninjured, unbereft mother.

It has taken seven years to disintegrate the delusion and reach the embedded memory traces and childhood wishes. It has taken seven years for the doll to shrink down to the proportion of a real doll. This doll was the magical talisman, the mask, the statue of primitive times.

The slow disintegrating of the delusion, the shrinking of the doll, the loss of interest in routine work, the lessening of super-ego severity went on simultaneously with the emergence of hidden interests that had been latent since childhood. The major of these was a confession of interest in history. This became the main avenue of the subsequent analysis. The first figures elaborated were those which in the closest way were representative of her unconscious phantasies concerning her father and mother and herself. She began to dramatise, to project her own identification on to figures that represented the mother and father in the world of history. These figures became extraordinarily real. She lived their lives and no searching out of detail was too fatiguing in order that they might be completed.

The pursuit of this led eventually to the patient leaving routine work and becoming a university student in history.

The interest here lies in what happened during analysis. I do not think there was any diminution of omnipotent phantasy, but a different disposal of it. Briefly I would track the path in this way :—

1. An extremity of anxiety in childhood due to real frustration. An actual trauma that exacerbated anxiety.
2. This led to violent aggressiveness. Analysis showed that owing to her own hostility in frustration her safety lay in being omnipotent over her parents. This was delusionally accompanied by a male identification and played out by being a warrior. She massacred her dolls and so symbolically she had power of life and death over her parents.

3. At puberty the super-ego reinforcement brought a complete change of behaviour, complete suppression and condemnation of her former misdemeanour. This was another form of omnipotent control. 'Honour thy father and mother that thy days may be long in the land'. The good behaviour achieved the same end omnipotently as the previous violence, viz., self-preservation. At the same time there was a *postponement*, not a relinquishing, of id wishes—one day, if not now, there, if not here, in Heaven, if not on earth.

4. The Œdipus wishes then emerged in a delusion of fulfilment. This delusion fulfilled demands of both id and super-ego, for it was projected on to the doctor, whose guilt it now was. The delusion of the doll went alongside, a magical restoration of the mother and therefore a guarantee of her own safety.

The disintegration of the delusion laid bare the Œdipus wishes and brought back memories of her violent childhood. This brought about a diminution of the super-ego severity, and a corresponding strengthening of the ego. This ego-strengthening led to increase of social contacts, and self-confidence. This was accompanied by giving up of routine work and a sublimation in the study of history. The omnipotence that found a pathway to a delusion and expressed itself in a magic doll now found a pathway in terms of reality, a sublimation vested in the ego. The first figures in history were parent imagos. From them interest passed to the period of time in which they were set and gradually, as anxiety lessened, the historical interest broadened and deepened in its range.

In history the people are all dead. They are brought to life again by the vital interest put into them. Their lives are re-lived, re-constructed. Their lives are first absorbed by the student. There is an imbibing of knowledge, symbolically no separation from the parents. In the essays and theses written there is an externalising of what has been incorporated, a re-creation, and therefore a nullification of anxiety.

The sublimation has at its roots the same phantasy of omnipotence as the delusion, it has become an ego-adjunct, has found a pathway into reality.

Behind the ego-ideal, says Freud, 'there lies hidden the first and most important identification of all, the identification with the father'. Perhaps it would be safer to say 'with the parents'. Later he says, 'At the beginning, in the primitive oral phase of the individual's existence, object cathexis and identification are hardly to be dis-

tinguished'. Mrs. Isaacs² pertinently says in her paper on 'Privation and Guilt' 'that Freud's primary identification may perhaps play in the total drama a greater part than was originally thought'.

Freud says the relation of super-ego to ego is not exhausted by the precept, 'You ought to be such and such' (like your father): it also comprises the prohibition 'You must not be such and such (like your father), that is, you may not do all that he does'. Many things are his prerogative. One form of this prohibition, 'Thou shalt not' is embodied in Mosaic law. 'Thou shalt not make unto thyself any graven image, nor any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth, for I, the Lord thy God, am a jealous God'. The artist has clearly not succumbed to this prohibition. I think the reason for this is to be found in the primal identification with the parents, where Freud says object cathexis is hardly distinguishable from identification. These parents are the active sexual parents. They are very human beings, permitting themselves much in the infant's presence, because of its infancy.

In the stress of anxiety caused by super-ego severity and the claims of the id I see three extreme contingencies.

1. The ego may be rent from reality and overwhelmed by the id.

2. The ego may remain true to reality, but its functioning impaired by severity of the super-ego. Sublimation will be curtailed by a 'Thou shalt not'.

3. We have the artist. Hanns Sachs has said, 'in spite of his specially developed sense of guilt, the artist has found an unusual way, closed to most men, of reconciling himself to his super-ego'. He suggests that this escape from super-ego severity is through the mediation of his work.

Art, I suggest, is a sublimation rooted in the primal identification with the parents. That identification is a magical incorporation of the parents, a psychical happening which runs parallel to what has been for long ages repressed, i.e. actual cannibalism. After the manner of cannibalistic belief psychically the same magical thing results, viz. an omnipotent control over the incorporated objects, and a magical endowment with the powers of the incorporated.

² This JOURNAL, Vol. X.

The safety of the ego will depend upon its ability to deal with the incorporated imagos. We know from the mechanism of melancholia that when the ego itself becomes identified with the reproached love object, super-ego sadism, reinforced by id sadism, may destroy the ego.

At the oral level the ego must magically control the seemingly hostile parent, because of the infant's inadequate knowledge of reality.

Then everything depends upon the ability of the ego to eject this hostile incorporation from itself. This means in effect an ego control, in the outer world, of *something* which can represent the primarily introjected hostile imago.

The artist externalizes that hostility into a work of art. In that work of art he is making, controlling, having power over—in an external form—an introjected image or images. During creative periods omnipotence is vested in the ego, not in the super-ego. At the same time that he is externalizing the introjected hostile image, controlling it in a definite form, moulding, shaping it, he is re-creating symbolically the very image that hostility has destroyed.

Should we find, if we looked deep enough, that all sublimation depends upon the power of the ego to externalize the incorporated imagos into some form, concrete or abstract, which is made, moulded, and controlled by the ego in a reality world?

If for us the idea of the dead is freed from the cruder superstitions and fears of past ages, it is because we are phalanxed right and left, behind and before, by a magical nullification of fear in *sublimation* that is the very woof and weft of civilization. The past lives in our consciousness, in history, which is the living past, in anthropology, in archæology. Music, art, drama, creative literature, perform their age-long service. Of all arts, the last, the moving picture, is destined for the widest human appeal. The resources of science and art here converge in answer to man's deepest necessity and will consummate the most satisfying illusion the world has known. Future generations will be able to see the past as it really was. The great figures will move and live before them as they did even in life. They will speak with their authentic voices. There, in that darkened theatre, with all our knowledge and enlightenments we will not hesitate to reach out a hand through time to the first artist painting his bison in the dim recesses of the cave.

' If the red slayer think he slay,
If the slain think he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep, and pass, and turn again.'

or as the English magician puts it :—

' Graves, at my command,
Have waked their sleepers, op'd and let them forth
By my so potent art.'

THE IMPORTANCE OF SYMBOL-FORMATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EGO¹

BY

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My argument in this paper is based on the assumption that there is an early stage of mental development at which sadism becomes active at all the various sources of libidinal pleasure.² In my experience sadism reaches its zenith in this phase, which is ushered in by the oral-sadistic desire to devour the mother's breast (or the mother herself) and passes away with the earlier anal stage. At the period of which I am speaking, the subject's dominant aim is to possess himself of the contents of the mother's body and to destroy her by means of every weapon which sadism can command. At the same time this phase forms the introduction to the Œdipus conflict. The genital is beginning to exercise an influence, but this is as yet not evident, for the pre-genital impulses hold the field. My whole argument depends on the fact that the Œdipus conflict begins at a period when sadism predominates.

The child expects to find within the mother (a) the father's penis, (b) excrement, and (c) children, and these things it equates with edible substances. According to the child's earliest phantasies (or 'sexual theories') of parental coitus, the father's penis (or his whole body) becomes incorporated in the mother during the act. Thus the child's sadistic attacks have for their object both father and mother, who are in phantasy bitten, torn, cut or stamped to bits. The attacks give rise to anxiety lest the subject should be punished by the united parents, and this anxiety also becomes internalized in consequence of the oral-sadistic introjection of the objects and is thus already directed towards the budding super-ego. I have found these anxiety-situations of the early phases of mental development to be the most profound and overwhelming. It is my experience that in the phantasied attack on the mother's body a considerable part is played by the urethral and anal sadism which is very soon added to the oral and muscular sadism. In phantasy the excreta are transformed into dangerous weapons:

¹ Read before the International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Oxford, July, 1929.

² Cf. my 'Early Stages of the Œdipus Conflict', INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, Vol. IX, 1928.

wetting is regarded as cutting, stabbing, burning, drowning, while the faecal mass is equated with weapons and missiles. At a later stage of the phase which I have described, these violent modes of attack give place to hidden assaults by the most refined methods which sadism can devise, and the excreta are equated with poisonous substances.

The excess of sadism gives rise to anxiety and sets in motion the ego's earliest modes of defence. Freud writes³: 'It may well be that, before ego and id have become sharply differentiated and before a super-ego has been developed, the mental apparatus employs different modes of defence from those which it practises after these levels of organization have been reached'. According to what I have found in analysis the earliest defence set up by the ego has reference to two sources of danger: the subject's own sadism and the object which is attacked. This defence, in conformity with the degree of the sadism, is of a violent character and differs fundamentally from the later mechanism of repression. In relation to the subject's own sadism the defence implies expulsion, whereas in relation to the object it implies destruction. The sadism becomes a source of danger because it offers an occasion for the liberation of anxiety and also because the weapons employed to destroy the object are felt by the subject to be levelled at his own person also. The object of the attack becomes a source of danger because the subject fears similar, retaliatory attacks from it. Thus, the wholly undeveloped ego is faced with a task which at this stage is quite beyond it—the task of mastering the severest anxiety.

Ferenczi holds that identification, the forerunner of symbolism, arises out of the baby's endeavour to re-discover in every object his own organs and their functioning. In Jones' view the pleasure-principle makes it possible for two quite different things to be equated because of a similarity marked by pleasure or interest. Some years ago I wrote a paper, based on these statements, in which I drew the conclusion that symbolism is the foundation of all sublimation and of every talent, since it is by way of symbolic equation that things, activities and interests become the subject of libidinal phantasies.

I can now add to what I said then⁴ and state that, side by side with the libidinal interest, it is the anxiety arising in the phase that I have described which sets going the mechanism of identification.

³ *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst.*

⁴ 'Infant Analysis', *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS*, Vol. VII, 1926.

Since the child desires to destroy the organs (penis, vagina, breast) which stand for the objects, he conceives a dread of the latter. This anxiety contributes to make him equate the organs in question with other things; owing to this equation these in their turn become objects of anxiety, and so he is impelled constantly to make other and new equations, which form the basis of his interest in the new objects and of symbolism.

Thus, not only does symbolism come to be the foundation of all phantasy and sublimation but, more than that, upon it is built up the subject's relation to the outside world and to reality in general. I pointed out that the object of sadism at its zenith, and of the epistemophilic impulse arising and co-existing with sadism, is the mother's body with its phantasied contents. The sadistic phantasies directed against the inside of her body constitute the first and basic relation to the outside world and to reality. Upon the degree of success with which the subject passes through this phase will depend the extent to which he can subsequently acquire an external world corresponding to reality. We see then that the child's earliest reality is wholly phantastic; he is surrounded with objects of anxiety, and in this respect excrement, organs, objects, things animate and inanimate are to begin with equivalent to one another. As the ego develops, a true relation to reality is gradually established out of this unreal reality. Thus, the development of the ego and the relation to reality depend on the degree of the ego's capacity at a very early period to tolerate the pressure of the earliest anxiety-situations. And, as usual, it is a question of a certain optimum amount of the factors concerned. A sufficient quantity of anxiety is the necessary basis for an abundance of symbol-formation and of phantasy; an adequate capacity on the part of the ego to tolerate anxiety is necessary if it is to be satisfactorily worked over and if this basic phase is to have a favourable issue and the development of the ego to be successful.

I have arrived at these conclusions from my general analytical experience, but they are confirmed in a remarkably striking way by a case in which there was an unusual inhibition of ego-development.

This case, of which I will now give some details, is that of a four-year-old boy who, as regards the poverty of his vocabulary and of his intellectual attainments, was on the level of a child of about fifteen or eighteen months. Adaptation to reality and emotional relations to his environment were almost entirely lacking. This child, Dick, was largely devoid of affects, and he was indifferent to the presence or

absence of mother and nurse. From the very beginning he had only rarely displayed anxiety, and that in an abnormally small degree. With the exception of one particular interest, to which I will return presently, he had almost no interests, did not play, and had no contact with his environment. For the most part he simply strung sounds together in a meaningless way, and certain noises he constantly repeated. When he did speak he generally used his meagre vocabulary incorrectly. But it was not only that he was unable to make himself intelligible: he had no wish to do so. More than that, one could clearly perceive that Dick was antagonistic to his mother, an attitude which expressed itself in the fact that he often did the very *opposite* of what was expected of him. For instance, if she succeeded in getting him to say different words after her, he often entirely altered them, though at other times he could pronounce the same words perfectly. Again, sometimes he would repeat the words correctly, but would go on repeating them in an incessant, mechanical way until everyone round him was sick and tired of them. Both these modes of behaviour are different from that of a neurotic child. When the neurotic child expresses opposition in the form of defiance and when he expresses obedience (even accompanied by an excess of anxiety), he does so with a certain understanding and some sort of reference to the thing or person concerned. But Dick's opposition and obedience lacked both affect and understanding. Then too, when he hurt himself, he displayed very considerable insensibility to pain and felt nothing of the desire, so universal with little children, to be comforted and petted. His physical awkwardness, also, was quite remarkable. He could not grip knives or scissors, but it was noteworthy that he could handle quite normally the spoon with which he ate.

The impression his first visit left on me was that his behaviour was quite different from that which we observe in neurotic children. He had let his nurse go without manifesting any emotion, and had followed me into the room with complete indifference. There he ran to and fro in an aimless, purposeless way, and several times he also ran round me, just as if I were a piece of furniture, but he showed no interest in any of the objects in the room. His movements as he ran to and fro seemed to be without co-ordination. The expression of his eyes and face was fixed, far-away and lacking in interest. Compare once more the behaviour of children with severe neuroses. I have in mind children who, without actually having an anxiety-attack, would on their first visit to me withdraw shyly and stiffly into a corner or sit motionless

before the little table with toys on it or, without playing, lift up one object or another, only to put it down again. In all these modes of behaviour the great latent anxiety is unmistakable. The corner or the little table is a place of refuge from me. But Dick's behaviour had no meaning or purpose, nor was any affect or anxiety associated with it.

I will now give some details of his previous history. He had had an exceptionally unsatisfactory and disturbed time as a sucking infant, for his mother kept up for some weeks a fruitless attempt to nurse him, and he nearly died of starvation. Artificial foods were then resorted to. At last, when he was seven weeks old, a wet-nurse was found for him, but by then he did not thrive on breast-feeding. He suffered from indigestion, *prolapsus ani* and, later, from hæmorrhoids. Undoubtedly his development was affected by the fact that, though he had every care, no real love was lavished on him, his mother's feeling for him being from the very beginning cold.⁵

As, moreover, neither his father nor his nurse gave him any tenderness, Dick grew up in an environment unusually poor in love. When he was two years old he had a new nurse, who was skilful and affectionate, and, shortly afterwards, he was for a considerable time with his grandmother, who was very loving to him. The influence of these changes was observable in his development. He had learnt to walk at about the normal age, but there was a difficulty in training him to control his excretory functions. Under the new nurse's influence he acquired habits of cleanliness much more readily. At the age of about three he had mastered them, and on this point he actually showed a certain amount of ambition and apprehensiveness. In one other respect he showed himself in his fourth year sensitive to blame. The nurse had found out that he practised masturbation and had told him it was 'naughty' and he must not do it. This prohibition clearly gave rise to apprehension and to a sense of guilt. Moreover, in his fourth year Dick did in general make a greater attempt at adaptation, but principally in relation to external things, especially to the mechanical learning of a number of new words. From his earliest days the question of feeding had been abnormally difficult. When he had the wet-nurse he showed no desire at all to suck, and this disinclination persisted. Next, he would not drink from a bottle. When the time came for him to have more solid food, he refused to bite it up and absolutely

⁵ By the end of his first year it struck her that the child was abnormal, and this had a still worse effect on her attitude towards him.

rejected everything that was not of the consistency of pap; even this he had almost to be forced to take. Another good effect of the new nurse's influence was an improvement in Dick's willingness to eat, but even so, the main difficulties persisted.⁶ Thus, although the kindly nurse had made a difference to his development in certain respects, the fundamental defects remained untouched. With her, as with everyone else, Dick had failed to establish friendly contact. Thus neither her tenderness nor that of his grandmother had succeeded in setting in train the lacking object-relation.

I found from Dick's analysis that the reason for the unusual inhibition in his development was the failure of those earliest steps of which I spoke at the beginning of this paper. In Dick there was a complete and apparently constitutional incapacity of the ego to tolerate anxiety. The genital had begun to play its part very early; this caused a premature and exaggerated identification with the object attacked and had contributed to an equally premature defence against sadism. The ego had ceased to develop phantasy-life and to establish a relation with reality. After a feeble beginning, symbol-formation in this child had come to a standstill. The early attempts had left their mark in one interest, which, isolated and unrelated to reality, could not form the basis for further sublimations. The child was indifferent to most of the objects and playthings around him, and did not even grasp their purpose or meaning. But he was interested in trains and stations and also in door-handles, doors and the opening and shutting of them.

The interest in these things and actions had a single source: it really had to do with the penetration of the penis into the mother's body. Doors and locks stood for the ways in and out of her body, while the door-handles represented the father's penis and his own. Thus what had brought symbol-formation to a standstill was the dread of what would be done to him (particularly by the father's penis) after he had penetrated into the mother's body. Moreover, his defences against his destructive impulses proved to be a fundamental impediment to his development. He was absolutely incapable of any act of aggression, and the basis of this incapacity was clearly indicated at a very early period in his refusal to bite up food. At four years old he could not hold scissors, knives or tools, and was remarkably clumsy in all his movements. The defence against the sadistic

⁶ In Dick's analysis, moreover, this symptom has hitherto been the most difficult to overcome.

impulses directed against the mother's body and its contents—impulses connected with phantasies of coitus—had resulted in the cessation of the phantasies and the standstill of symbol-formation. Dick's further development had come to grief because he could not bring into phantasy the sadistic relation to the mother's body.

The peculiar difficulty I had to contend with in the analysis was not his defective capacity for speech. In the play-technique, which follows the child's symbolic representations and gives access to his anxiety and sense of guilt, we can, to a great extent, dispense with verbal associations. But this technique is not restricted to an analysis of the child's play. Our material can be derived (as it has to be in the case of children inhibited in play) from the symbolism revealed in details of his general behaviour.⁷ But in Dick symbolism had not developed. This was partly because of the lack of any affective relation to the things around him, to which he was almost entirely indifferent. He had practically no special relations with particular objects, such as we usually find in even severely inhibited children. Since no affective or symbolic relation to them existed in his mind, any chance actions of his in relation to them were not coloured by phantasy, and it was thus impossible to regard them as having the character of symbolic representations. His lack of interest in his environment and the difficulty of making contact with his mind were, as I could perceive from certain points in which his behaviour differed from that of other children, only the effect of his lack of a symbolic relation to things. The analysis, then, had to begin with this, the *fundamental*, obstacle to establishing contact with him.

The first time Dick came to me, as I said before, he manifested no sort of affect when his nurse handed him over to me. When I showed him the toys I had put ready, he looked at them without the faintest interest. I took a big train and put it beside a smaller one and called them 'Daddy-train' and 'Dick-train'. Thereupon he picked up the train I called 'Dick' and made it roll to the window and said 'Station'. I explained: 'The station is mummy; Dick is going into mummy'.

⁷ This applies only to the introductory phase of the analysis and to other limited portions of it. When once access to the Ucs has been gained and the degree of anxiety has been diminished, play-activities, speech-associations and all the other modes of representation begin to make their appearance, alongside of the ego-development which is made possible by the analytic work.

He left the train, ran into the space between the outer and inner doors of the room, shut himself in, saying 'dark' and ran out again directly. He went through this performance several times. I explained to him: 'It is dark inside mummy. Dick is inside dark mummy'. Meantime he picked up the train again, but soon ran back into the space between the doors. While I was saying that he was going into dark mummy, he said twice in a questioning way: 'Nurse'? I answered: 'Nurse is soon coming', and this he repeated and used the words later quite correctly, retaining them in his mind. The next time he came, he behaved in just the same way. But this time he ran right out of the room into the dark entrance hall. He put the 'Dick' train there too and insisted on its staying there. He kept constantly asking: 'Nurse coming'? In the third analytic hour he behaved in the same way, except that besides running into the hall and between the doors, he also ran behind the chest of drawers. There he was seized with anxiety, and for the first time called me to him. Apprehension was now evident in the way in which he repeatedly asked for his nurse, and, when the hour was over, he greeted her with quite unusual delight. We see that simultaneously with the appearance of anxiety there had emerged a sense of dependence, first on me and then on the nurse, and that at the same time he had begun to be interested in the words I used to soothe him and, contrary to his usual behaviour, had repeated and remembered them. During the third hour, however, he also, for the first time, looked at the toys with interest, in which an aggressive tendency was evident. He pointed to a little coal-cart and said: 'Cut'. I gave him a pair of scissors, and he tried to scratch the little pieces of black wood which represented coal, but he could not hold the scissors. Acting on a glance which he gave me, I cut the pieces of wood out of the cart, whereupon he threw the damaged cart and its contents into a drawer and said, 'Gone'. I told him that this meant that Dick was cutting faeces out of his mother. He then ran into the space between the doors and scratched on the doors a little with his nails, thus showing that he identified the space with the cart and both with the mother's body, which he was attacking. He immediately ran back from the space between the doors, found the cupboard and crept into it. At the beginning of the next analytic hour he cried when the nurse left him—an unusual thing for him to do. But he soon calmed down. This time he avoided the space between the doors, the cupboard and the corner, but concerned himself with the toys, examining them more closely and with obviously dawning curiosity.

Whilst doing this he came across the cart which had been damaged the last time he came and upon its contents. He quickly pushed both aside and covered them with other toys. After I had explained that the damaged cart represented his mother, he fetched it and the little bits of coal out again and took them into the space between the doors. As his analysis progressed it became clear that in thus throwing them out of the room he was indicating an expulsion, both of the damaged object and of his own sadism (or the means employed by it), which was in this manner projected into the external world. Dick had also discovered the wash-basin as symbolizing the mother's body, and he displayed an extraordinary dread of being wetted with water. He anxiously wiped it off his hand and mine, which he had dipped in as well as his own, and immediately afterwards he showed the same anxiety when urinating. Urine and fæces represented to him injurious and dangerous substances.⁸

It became clear that in Dick's phantasy fæces, urine and penis stood for objects with which to attack the mother's body, and were therefore felt to be a source of injury to himself as well. These phantasies contributed to his dread of the contents of his mother's body, and especially of his father's penis which he phantasied as being in her womb. We came to recognize the father's penis and a growing feeling of aggression against it in many forms, the desire to eat and destroy it being specially prominent. For example, on one occasion, Dick lifted a little toy man to his mouth, gnashed his teeth and said 'Tea daddy', by which he meant 'Eat daddy'. He then asked for a drink of water. The introjection of the father's penis proved to be associated with the dread both of it, as of a primitive, harm-inflicting super-ego, and of being punished by the mother thus robbed: dread,

⁸ Here I found the explanation of a peculiar apprehensiveness which Dick's mother had noticed in him when he was about five months old and again from time to time at later periods. When the child was defecating and urinating, his expression was one of great anxiety. Since the fæces were not hard, the fact that he suffered from *prolapsus ani* and hæmorrhoids did not seem enough to account for his apprehensiveness, especially as it manifested itself in just the same way when he was passing urine. During the analytic hour this anxiety reached such a pitch that when Dick told me he wanted to urinate or defecate he did so—in either case—only after long hesitation, with every indication of deep anxiety and with tears in his eyes. After we had analysed this anxiety his attitude towards both these functions was very different and is now almost normal.

that is, of the external and the introjected objects. And at this point there came into prominence the fact which I have already mentioned, and which was a determining factor in his development, namely, that the genital phase had become active in Dick prematurely. This was shown in the circumstance that such representations as I have just spoken of were followed not by anxiety only, but by remorse, pity and a feeling that he must make restitution. Thus he would proceed to place the little toy men on my lap or in my hand, put everything back in the drawer, and so on. The early operation of the reactions originating on the genital level was a result of premature ego-development, but further ego-development was only inhibited by it. This early identification with the object could not as yet be brought into relation with reality. For instance, once when Dick saw some pencil shavings on my lap he said 'Poor Mrs. Klein'. But on a similar occasion he said in just the same way, 'Poor curtain'. Side by side with his incapacity for tolerating anxiety, this premature *empathy* became a decisive factor in his warding-off of all destructive impulses. Dick cut himself off from reality and brought his phantasy-life to a standstill by taking refuge in the phantasies of a dark, empty, vague womb. He had thus succeeded in withdrawing his attention also from the different objects in the outside world which represented the contents of the mother's womb—the father's penis, fæces, children. His own penis, as the organ of sadism, and his own excreta were to be got rid of (or denied) as being dangerous and aggressive.

It had been possible for me, in Dick's analysis, to gain access to his unconscious by getting into contact with such rudiments of phantasy-life and symbol-formation as he displayed. The result was a diminution of his latent anxiety, so that it was possible for a certain amount of anxiety to become manifest. But this implied that the working-over of this anxiety was beginning by way of the establishment of a symbolic relation to things and objects, and at the same time his epistemophilic and aggressive impulses were set in action. Every advance was followed by the releasing of fresh quantities of anxiety and led to his turning away to some extent from the things with which he had already established an affective relation and which had therefore become objects of anxiety. As he turned away from these he turned towards new objects, and his aggressive and epistemophilic impulses were directed to these new affective relations in their turn. Thus, for instance, for some time Dick altogether avoided the cupboard, but thoroughly investigated the wash-basin and the

electric radiator, which he examined in every detail, again manifesting destructive impulses against these objects. He then transferred his interest from them to fresh things or, again, to things with which he was already familiar and which he had given up earlier. He occupied himself once more with the cupboard, but this time his interest in it was accompanied by a far greater activity and curiosity and a stronger tendency to aggression of all kinds. He beat on it with a spoon, scratched and hacked it with a knife and sprinkled water on it. He then briskly investigated the hinges of the door, the way in which it opened and shut, the lock, etc., climbed up inside the cupboard and asked what the different parts were called. Thus as his interests developed he at the same time enlarged his vocabulary, for he now began to take more and more interest not only in the things themselves but in their names. The words which before he had heard and disregarded he now remembered and applied correctly.

Hand in hand with this development of interests and an increasingly strong transference to myself, the hitherto lacking object-relation has made its appearance. During these months his attitude to his mother and nurse has become affectionate and normal. He now desires their presence, wants them to take notice of him and is distressed when they leave him. With his father, too, his relation shows increasing indications of the normal Oedipus attitude, and there is an increasingly firm relation to objects in general. The desire to make himself intelligible, which was lacking before, is now in full force. Dick tries to make himself understood by means of his still meagre, but growing, vocabulary which he diligently endeavours to enlarge. There are many indications, moreover, that his relation to reality is becoming established.

So far we have spent six months over his analysis, and his development, which has begun to take place at all the fundamental points during this period, justifies a favourable prognosis. Several of the peculiar problems which arose in his case have proved soluble. It has been possible to get into contact with him with the help of quite a few words, to activate anxiety in a child in whom interest and affect were wholly lacking, and it has further been possible gradually to resolve and to regulate the anxiety released. I would emphasize the fact that in Dick's case I have modified my usual technique. In general I do not interpret the material until it has found expression in various representations. In this case, however, where the capacity to represent it was almost entirely lacking, I found myself obliged to make my interpretations on the basis of my general knowledge, the representations in

Dick's behaviour being relatively vague. Finding access in this way to his unconscious, I succeeded in activating anxiety and other affects. The representations then became fuller and I soon acquired a more solid foundation for the analysis, and so was able gradually to pass over to the technique that we generally employ in analysing little children.

I have already described how I succeeded in causing the anxiety to become manifest by diminishing it in its latent state. When it did manifest itself, I was able to resolve part of it by interpretation. At the same time, however, it became possible for it to be worked over in a better way, namely, by its distribution amongst new things and interests; in this manner it became so far mitigated as to be tolerable for the ego. Whether, if the quantities of anxiety are thus regulated, the ego can become capable of tolerating and working over normal quantities, only the further course of the treatment can show. In Dick's case, therefore, it is a question of modifying a fundamental factor in his development by means of analysis.

The only possible thing to do in analysing this child, who could not make himself intelligible and whose ego was not open to influence, was to try to gain access to his unconscious and, by diminishing the unconscious difficulties, to open up a way for the development of the ego. Of course, in Dick's case as in every other, access to the unconscious had to be by way of the ego. Events proved that even this very imperfectly developed ego was adequate for establishing connection with the unconscious. From the theoretical point of view I think it is important to note that, even in so extreme a case of defective ego-development, it was possible to develop both ego and libido simply by analysing the unconscious conflicts, without bringing any educational influence to bear upon the ego. It seems plain that, if even the imperfectly developed ego of a child who had no relation at all with reality can tolerate the removal of repressions by the aid of analysis, without being overwhelmed by the id, we need not fear that in neurotic children (i.e. in very much less extreme cases) the ego might succumb to the id. It is also noteworthy that, whereas the educational influence exercised by those about him previously glided off Dick without any effect, now, when owing to analysis his ego is developing, he is increasingly amenable to such influence, which can keep pace with the instinctual impulses mobilized by analysis and quite suffices to deal with them.

There still remains the question of diagnosis. Dr. Forsyth diagnosed the case as one of dementia præcox and thought it a suitable one

in which to attempt analysis. His diagnosis would seem to be corroborated by the fact that the clinical picture agreed in many important points with that of advanced dementia præcox in adults. To summarize it once again: it was characterized by an almost complete absence of affect and anxiety, a very considerable degree of withdrawal from reality and of inaccessibility, a lack of emotional *rapprochement*, negativistic behaviour alternating with signs of automatic obedience, indifference to pain, perseveration—all symptoms which are characteristic of dementia præcox. Moreover, this diagnosis is further corroborated by the fact that the presence of any organic disease can be certainly excluded, firstly, because Dr. Forsyth's examination revealed none and, secondly, because the case has proved amenable to psychological treatment. The analysis showed me that the idea of a psycho-neurosis could be definitely dismissed.

Against the diagnosis of dementia præcox is the fact that the essential feature of Dick's case was an inhibition in development and not a regression. Further, dementia præcox is of extraordinarily rare occurrence in early childhood, so that many psychiatrists hold that it does not occur at all at that period.

From the standpoint of clinical psychiatry I will not commit myself on the subject of diagnosis, but my general experience in analysing children enables me to make some observations of a general nature on psychosis in childhood. I have become convinced that schizophrenia is much commoner in childhood than is usually supposed. I will give some of the reasons why it is not in general recognized: (1) Parents, especially in the lower classes, mostly consult a psychiatrist only when the case is desperate, that is, when they can do nothing with the child themselves. Thus a considerable number of cases never come under medical observation. (2) In the patients whom the physician does see, it is often impossible for him in a single rapid examination to establish the presence of schizophrenia. So that many cases of this sort are classified under indefinite headings, such as 'arrested development', 'mental deficiency', 'psychopathic condition', 'asocial tendency', etc. (3) Above all, in children schizophrenia is less obvious and striking than in adults. Traits which are characteristic of this disease are less noticeable in a child because, in a lesser degree, they are natural in the development of normal children. Such things, for instance, as a marked severance from reality, a lack of emotional *rapprochement*, an incapacity to concentrate on any occupation, silly behaviour and talking nonsense do not strike us as so remarkable

in children and we do not judge of them as we should if they occurred in adults. An excess of activity and stereotyped movements are quite common in children and differ only in degree from the hyperkinesia and stereotypy of schizophrenia. Automatic obedience must be very marked indeed for the parents to regard it as anything but 'docility'. Negativistic behaviour is usually looked upon as 'naughtiness', and dissociation is a phenomenon which generally escapes observation in a child altogether. That the phobic anxiety of children often contains ideas of persecution which are of a paranoid character⁹ and hypochondriacal fears is a fact which requires very close observation and can often be revealed only through analysis. (4) Even more commonly than psychoses we meet in children with psychotic character-traits which, in unfavourable circumstances, lead to disease in later life.

Thus, in my opinion fully-developed schizophrenia is more common and, especially, the occurrence of schizophrenic traits is a far more general phenomenon, in childhood than is usually supposed. I have come to the conclusion—for which I must give my full reasons elsewhere—that the concept of schizophrenia in particular and of psychosis in general as occurring in childhood must be extended, and I think that one of the chief tasks of the children's analyst is to discover and cure psychoses in children. The theoretical knowledge thus acquired would doubtless be a valuable contribution to our understanding of the structure of the psychoses and would also help us to reach a more accurate differential diagnosis between the various diseases.

If we extend the use of the term in the manner which I propose, I think we shall be justified in classifying Dick's illness under the heading schizophrenia. It is true that it differs from the typical schizophrenia of childhood in that in him the trouble was an inhibition in development, whereas in most cases there has been regression after a certain stage of development has been successfully reached.¹⁰ Moreover the severity of the case adds to the unusual character of the clinical

⁹ Cf. my paper on 'Personification in the Play of Children', *THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS*, Vol. X, 1929.

¹⁰ The fact, however, that analysis made it possible to establish contact with Dick's mind and brought about some advance in so comparatively short a time suggests the possibility that there had already been some latent development as well as the slight development outwardly manifest. But, even if we suppose this, the total development was so abnormally meagre that the hypothesis of a regression from a stage already successfully reached will hardly meet the case.

picture. Nevertheless, I have reason to think that even so it is not an isolated one, for recently I have become acquainted with two analogous cases in children of about Dick's age. One is therefore inclined to conjecture that, if we observed with a more penetrating eye, more cases of the kind would come to our knowledge.

I will now sum up my theoretical conclusions. I have drawn them not from Dick's case only but from other, less extreme, cases of schizophrenia in children between the ages of five and thirteen and from my general analytic experience.

The early stages of the Œdipus conflict are dominated by sadism. They take place during a phase of development which is inaugurated by oral sadism (with which urethral, muscular and anal sadism associate themselves) and terminates when the ascendancy of anal sadism comes to an end.

It is only in the later stages of the Œdipus conflict that the defence against the libidinal impulses makes its appearance; in the earlier stages it is against the accompanying *destructive* impulses that the defence is directed. The earliest defence set up by the ego is directed against the subject's own sadism and the object attacked, both of these being regarded as sources of danger. This defence is of a violent character, different from the mechanism of repression. In boys this violent defence is also directed against his penis as the executive organ of his sadism and it is one of the deepest sources of all disturbances of potency.

Such are my hypotheses with regard to the development of normal persons and neurotics; let us now turn to the genesis of the psychoses.

The first part of the phase when sadism is at its zenith is that in which the attacks are conceived of as being made by violence. This I have come to recognize as the fixation-point in dementia præcox. In the second part of this phase the attacks are imagined as being made by poisoning, and the urethral and anal-sadistic impulses predominate. This I believe to be the fixation-point in paranoia.¹¹ I may recall that Abraham maintained that in paranoia the libido regresses to the earlier anal stage. My conclusions are in agreement with Freud's hypotheses, according to which the fixation-points of dementia præcox and paranoia are to be sought in the narcissistic stage, that of dementia præcox preceding that of paranoia.

¹¹ I will cite elsewhere the material upon which I am basing this view and will give more detailed reason in support of it.

The ego's exaggerated and premature defence against sadism checks the establishing of a right relation to reality and the development of phantasy. The further sadistic appropriation and exploration of the mother's body and of the outside world (the mother's body in an extended sense) are brought to a standstill, and this causes the more or less complete suspension of the symbolic relation to the things and objects representing the contents of the mother's body and, hence, of the relation to the subject's environment and to reality. This withdrawal becomes the basis of the lack of affect and anxiety, which is one of the symptoms of dementia præcox. In this disease, therefore, the regression would go right back to the early phase of development in which the sadistic appropriation and destruction of the interior of the mother's body, as conceived of by the subject in phantasy, together with the establishing of the relation to reality, was prevented or checked owing to anxiety.

DREAMS—AS RESISTANCE¹

BY

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None here will dispute that the interpretation of dreams is the *via regia* to an understanding of the unconscious. But there may be less complete unanimity if one asks whose understanding is in question, that of the dreamer or that of the interpreter, analysand or analyst. Again I think there will be general agreement that, to the analyst, the patient's dreams are indeed a *via regia* to the latter's unconscious ; even when the associations are scanty or altogether absent dreams give a considerable insight into the deeper workings of the patient's mind ; where the association material is generous, the analyst's understanding is all the more rapid and penetrating.

All this is perfectly obvious, almost banal, and I only allude to it here to point out that this does not, by any means, imply that the analysand's understanding of their own unconscious is necessarily easily reached or reached at all through the interpretation of their dreams.

I rather think that there is some difference in the attitude of the analysand to-day from what obtained in the earlier days of psycho-analysis.

When nearly twenty years ago I began the analysis (very imperfectly of course) of my own dreams, and that of my first patient, associations were liberal—we knew nothing. Nowadays it is rare to find analysands who have not had some previous information about psycho-analysis through reading of psycho-analytic literature, through the Press or from friends ; they knew enough to be certain that the meaning of dreams plays a large part in the work of analysis and they have some knowledge of this procedure. Freud pointed out that the more the patient has learnt of the method of dream interpretation during analysis the more obscure, as a rule, do his later dreams become. We are somewhat in the same position in regard to the earliest dreams of our patients nowadays—that is—all the possible ways of resistance are marked out.

That any copious supply of dreams is itself a form of resistance

¹ Read at the Eleventh International Congress of Psycho-Analysis, Oxford, July 28, 1929.

was long ago pointed out by Freud in the paper to which I have just referred. I have had a common experience of a patient producing dreams and several dreams every day from the very beginning of analysis without any request on my part, whilst the supply of dreams from other persons is extremely meagre. I may say here that I often have observed to my patient, that so far as the purposes of analysis are concerned, a dream means a remembered dream.

The patient sometimes says 'I had a dream, but I have forgotten it'. I have personally had the same experience as many of my patients of dreaming, waking up, associating to the dream and interpreting it, then of sleeping again and re-awakening.

Everything, dream, association dream material and interpretation have vanished, all that is remembered being that I did go through those processes. I have never personally, nor from one of my patients, been able to discover the motive of the forgetting without bringing back the dream itself.

Speaking generally, I cannot recall that such dreams were exceptional in their latent content or relation to current conflicts as compared with other dreams which were easily brought up. I am unable to say why some dreams are subject to this fading away and others not. Nor can I offer any explanation of the quantitative differences of people with regard to dreaming.

One patient I have in mind never closed the eyes for a minute's sleep without producing an elaborate dream; every night there were several dreams. This has been the case since her childhood and continued after the analysis had been brought to a successful conclusion. On the other hand there are patients whose analysis is conducted throughout with few or no dreams at all. The difference is not due to the symptoms nor to the nature of the illness. At one time I thought it might be shown that persons whose phantasies are largely lived out, persons with marked and peculiar erotic phantasies which they carried into execution, such as bizarre fetichisms, might perhaps have a less vivid dream life, but that is not the case, nor do obsessionals for instance dream less than hysterics. The dream life of schizophrenics and of schizoids may or may not be abundant. It is not correct, as I have learned, that dry, reserved, shut-in individuals—people who seem common-sensical, whose characters are so frequently formed by reactive formations, entirely negative people, dream little; they vary in the quantity of dream life, both in and outside of analysis. Personally I find that I have remembered some of my dreams when I

have been paying special attention to my unconscious—during periods of auto or allo-analysis—but dreams may be remembered at any time when I am very occupied with analytical work or when I have been engaged in so-called practical work, during times of great and active preoccupation with political affairs, in times of physical activity, on holiday, or in times of holiday-resting.

I confess I can throw no light on the question; any analytical theory that I have formed I have had to reject after further experience.

Just as too copious a supply of dreams may be simply a manifestation of the patient's resistances perceiving and taking advantage of the inability of the method to master adequately what is thus brought to analysis, so are long and elaborate dreams frequently a similar manifestation of resistance.

I recall a patient who would take the whole of the session in narrating his dream. The dream was sometimes composed of entirely visual elements, but very often only partly scenic and with great elaboration of the auditory elements. Conversation and reflexion proceed in the dream as they do in the patient's waking hours, with a series of parentheses and qualifications.

'Then G. remarked, though it was not quite in his usual emphatic tones; so far as I could make out he seemed to be placing more stress than usual upon his want of consideration. However, although it was not exactly what I had set out to overcome I allowed him to proceed with the revolver—or was it a revolver? Or perhaps, but I began to think, or perhaps I ought rather to say, the uppermost, if it was the uppermost thought', etc., etc.

We know that the process of rationalization goes on in dream work and were warned by Freud in his *Interpretation of Dreams* that the emotion in the dream furnished a principal clue to its understanding. Many patients exhibit anxiety if they have brought no dreams. The session begins with a prolonged silence; then 'I have forgotten my dream'. And then again silence; 'If I have not got a dream' a patient remarked 'I feel I would rather not come'. This is a very common formula, which may take on many different aspects.

Variations of this anxiety state are seen when (1) the patient strives for great accuracy, reproaching himself because he is not sure whether he is reproducing the dream accurately; perhaps he is misleading the analyst. Some patients are clever enough to spend a great deal of time in this way. Needless to say, in such cases quite unheeded goes the analyst's explanation that the accuracy of reproduc-

tion or working is relatively unimportant. We explain that we are not here concerned with the theory of dreams, where it would be of course valuable to know the exact response to a given stimulus. In our therapeutic analyses we are concerned with the ideas, thoughts, feelings that flow from the patient; whether at one particular period of time or another, i.e. during the night or during the waking hours, is relevant.

(2) When there is poverty of association to the dream; sometimes there are no associations at all, although the analyst may guess from previous sessions many of the associations or the material that the dream work has fused into the dream.

I need scarcely say that in one sense dreams and their associations are not intended to be remembered—the function of the dream is to safeguard sleep. And quite especially the disguises in the dream work are to prevent the dreamer having insight into his own dream. It is of secondary importance that persons other than the dreamer have such insight. The censorship is not primarily concerned with these others, although this factor does come to play during analysis where pains are taken by the censorship to conceal the meaning from the analyst, identification between the patient's ego and the analyst then occurring. In these cases of resistance the analysand is often full of self-reproaches; 'I suppose I'm up to my old tricks; it's too bad, no associations. I'm stuck', and so on. If allowed the patient could go harping on this string for an unlimited time.

It is not infrequent for the dreamer to narrate his dream with much satisfaction, and then await the analyst's interpretation. The patient, as it were, throws his dream at the analyst's head, a feeling that he has now done his duty and can retire. He has done all that is required of him. Haven't you asked him to bring his dreams? To some it is as if he has said his lesson correctly and is awaiting enlightenment from the master; to others, it is burden enough to have dreamt and to have remembered the dream. 'It's your turn to do some work now. What do I pay you for—just to sit in an armchair whilst I do everything?' remarked one patient.

Another having told me his dream turned over on his side and curled himself up comfortably on the couch. After I had attempted to obtain associations to some parts of the dream without success he finally burst out petulantly: 'I expect you to tell me all about it. Do you know, I went over the dream several times to try and remember it *for you*? When you ask me questions about the dream, it sounds just like my mother asking me questions about a book she had given

me to read, or a picture she had given me to look at. I hear her voice saying, "Well, what did you think of the story? What does the picture tell you?" or "Now take the jug in both hands; be careful or you'll spill it. Put it on the centre of the table, not on the edge where it will fall off".

I offer an interpretation for some portion of the dream; my patient tries to listen. He yawns several times despite himself as he says, shews signs of irritation as my voice drones on, to use his words. He then turns over on to the other side and begins to fidget, makes noises with his watch-chain, or tappings with a pencil on the couch or floor. He is almost asleep—on some occasions does actually sleep. In any case there follows a prolonged silence, and I begin with the analysis of the little scene an interpretation which sometimes meets with success and sometimes not. His pencil is a dagger to stab me; his watch-chain a chain to tie me up. He had done his bit, and my interpretation was nothing to do with him, no doubt I would learn something from his dream. He was not interested, or rather he was too interested.

In quite a number of analyses the disadvantage of the narrated dream is that it is a convenient theme which really offers an obstacle to free association. It is, for the patient, a useful opening gambit, displacing the anxiety of the opening of the session and sheltering him from any expression of transference towards the analyst. In such cases the dream which the patient has been carefully storing up since sleep has, when narrated, little more affect than were he to get by heart some verse or story for the purpose of reproduction during the analysis; the analysis of such an activity or the failure of emotion is of course a valuable asset, but it is not the dream as such which gives this value. In other cases the dream offers to the patient a greater freedom from responsibility than do his waking phantasies or activities. He recognizes that these latter do belong to him; their interpretation he expects will stir him. He endeavours to avoid bringing up such things in the analysis, fearing his closer scrutiny and in terror of the unconscious motivations they shall reveal. He saves himself by having a dream for which he feels less responsible, even some of the contempt of advanced intellectual opinion for such manifestations in a dream—well he need not concern himself about that.

Even with anxiety dreams and when the anxiety persists into the complete waking state it is remarkable how strenuously the patient will cling to the manifest content thwarting endeavour to arrive at the latent content. We must remember that the censorship invoked

during the night to form the dream carried on its activities during the waking hours.

Some patients shew an almost humorous attitude towards the relating of their dreams. 'I realize quite well that I am only using the dream as a topic and I know you only want my free associations. Therefore I shall not tell you my dream, although I remember it quite well. But that would be making analysis too easy and cheap for me. So really it is much fairer towards what you want if I don't tell you my dream.'

Analysands in many cases will end the relation of their dreams with 'Now you will tell me what it means, won't you?' For them, the analyst is either an oneirocritic with an invaluable key or the dream is regarded as an intellectualistic process. The interpretation of the dream is as interesting and significant as any other piece of knowledge, say, Cantor's Refutation of Zeno's Arguments against Motion, or the Chemical Composition of the suns and planets, or Allelomorphism. I mention these subjects because they have been variously brought to me by patients interested in mathematical philosophy, astro-chemistry or biology as parallels to shew their great interest in their dream.

That this interest in dream interpretation is not the outcome of scientific curiosity, that it is entirely intellectualistic, that it is a disguise in the name of reason for emotional inhibition will be betrayed during the session or at some later period of the analysis by change in voice and gesture. When interpretations of dreams and the meaning of the symbols in the dreams are explained to the patient there is found no affective penetration. Should the symbol turn up again in a later dream, the dreamer may say, 'Ah, I know what that means. Castration of course', in a tone 'Don't I know my lesson well? Don't I deserve patting on the head?' Or it will be remarked, 'Well according to your scheme', and then some far-fetched fantastic idea of a 'scheme' will be furnished; with other persons the meaning of the symbols for which the interpretation has been pleaded is entirely forgotten in the next few minutes. Some patients make use of their knowledge of symbols, a knowledge acquired either from reading or during analysis, to forego all attempts at producing free association. The dream is interpreted on the model of one of the many Keys to dreams; the associations which alone can bring forth incidents and memories with emotional tension, perhaps confirming the rendering of the symbols, are passed over.

It is often difficult to get any value out of the dream when this

process has been begun: the interest flags. There are, of course, typical dreams where associations are not to be expected directly to the dream; but if association becomes free there will often arise during the hour material in corroboration of the dream interpretation. The interpretation of symbols to typical dreams is of no value unless there is marked positive transference.

It will be seen then that the dream is often cleverly used as resistance because it can be made to contradict the fundamental principles of analytic technique. The related dream is no longer a spontaneous association; the analysand is directing his ideas in a particular groove, not holding them loosely in solution. He is exercising a form of self-criticism in his narration, giving a direction to his ideas and thought and justifying himself by the value he assumes the analyst attaches to dreams. Disappointment is often real and not entirely suppressed when the analyst explains that he attaches no more value to dreams than to any other material that is brought up during the hour. When the analyst proceeds to interpret all that has been supplied during the hour, passing events, plays seen, books mentioned, just as if they were the associations to a dream, ignoring the dream itself—and of course the associations are often brought up in this way without apparently direct reference to the dream—the complaint is made, 'But I thought you wanted me to tell you my dreams. Professor Freud says'

In passing I may remark that patients are of course not free from the common foible of undervaluing what has been discovered and over-estimating what remains to be discovered. They will minimize the significance of what is known about dreams in the light of Freud's work, whilst expressing their conviction that what is really valuable is, say, the prophetic aspect of dreams. 'It's a pity you analysts haven't gone into that'.

I suppose most English-speaking analysts have had quoted to them approvingly Dunn's *An Experiment with Time* and been asked whether they agree or not with it. 'Doesn't that book show that the Freudian analysis is not necessary', etc. I say of course this is a common human foible, when it has been shown that although the art of medicine can both prevent and cure syphilis, can both prevent and cure malaria, no effective steps are taken by the people or their government to act upon the knowledge placed at their disposal; rather will medicine be reproached about its ignorance in regard to cancer. No doubt if prophylactic measures for this disease were found which were either expensive or irksome to carry out, the knowledge

would be passed over and science be found wanting on some other score. Because not all the problems of dreams and their interpretation are not as yet solved, although I think not a single statement of Freud's original essay has been refuted by the experience of over thirty years, it will still be made a reproach that this or that question remains unanswered.

I am aware that in what I have said here there will be nothing new to you. I have only dwelt with the experiences that will be common to all analysts, but it is sometimes useful for ourselves to bring together some very simple and some very general experiences.

The resistances that proceed from dreams have to be overcome in the same way as other resistances by disclosing their sources. At times it is good practice to interdict the telling of dreams altogether, if these are too copious, too long or the associations wanting if dream narration forms a major resistance. I pointed out at the beginning that dreams may themselves suggest to the analyst the nature of the resistance and even when the patient gets no direct help from them.

When dreams are used as what I have called an intellectualistic resistance, it is generally advisable for a time to forego all interpretation ; to let the dream be stored up by the analyst for future reference. In a phase of positive transference the repetition of dreams and their interpretation can be resumed. It will be clear, of course, that it is no part of my intention to undervalue the part played by dreams and dream associations in analysis. It is quite superfluous for me here to dwell on their value in any numbers of cases. I should not like it to be thought for a moment that dreams are always used and consistently used by any one patient throughout analysis as resistance. But I do think that resistance arising from this technique occurs perhaps more often than we recognize and may be in more danger of going unrecognized by the analyst owing to the historical part dream analysis has played in our young science.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MASOCHISM IN THE MENTAL LIFE OF WOMEN

BY

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PART I

'FEMININE' MASOCHISM AND ITS RELATION TO FRIGIDITY.¹

In the analysis of women we became familiar with the masculinity-complex before we learnt much about the 'femininity' which emerges from the conflicts accompanying development. The reasons for this later recognition were various. First of all, analysis comes to know the human mind in its discords rather than in its harmonies, and, when we turn the microscope of observation upon the woman, we see with special distinctness that the main source of her conflicts is the masculinity which she is destined to subdue. It followed that we were able to recognize the 'masculine' element in women earlier and more clearly than what we may term the nucleus of their 'femininity'. Paradoxical as it may sound, we approached the feminine element with greater interest when it formed part of a pathological structure and, as a foreign body, attracted a closer attention. When we encountered in men that instinctual disposition which we designate feminine and passive-masochistic, we recognized its origin and the weighty consequences it entailed. In the case of women we discovered that, even in the most feminine manifestations of their life—menstruation, conception, pregnancy and parturition—they had a constant struggle with the never wholly effaced evidences of the bisexuality of their nature. Hence, in my earlier writings² I shewed with what elemental force the masculinity-complex flares up in the female reproductive functions, to be once more subdued.

My aim in this paper is different. I want to examine the genesis of 'femininity', by which I mean the feminine, passive-masochistic disposition in the mental life of women. In particular I shall try to elucidate the relation of the function of feminine instinct to the function of reproduction, in order that we may first of all clarify our ideas

¹ Read at the Eleventh International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Oxford, July 27, 1929.

² Helene Deutsch: *Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualfunktionen*. Neue Arbeiten zur ärztlichen Psychoanalyse, Nr. V.

about sexual inhibition in women, that is to say, about frigidity. The discussion will concern itself with theoretical premises rather than with the clinical significance of frigidity.

But first let us return to the masculinity-complex.

No one who has experience of analysis can doubt that female children pass through a phase in their libidinal evolution, in which they, just like boys, having abandoned the passive oral and anal cathexes, develop an erotogenicity which is actively directed to the clitoris as in boys to the penis. The determining factor in the situation is that, in a certain phase, sensations in the organs, which impel the subject to masturbate, tend strongly towards the genital and effect cathexis of that zone which in both sexes we have called the 'phallic'.

Penis-envy would never acquire its great significance were it not that sensations in the organs, with all their elemental power, direct the child's interest to these regions of the body. It is this which first produces the narcissistic reactions of envy in little girls. It seems that they arrive only very gradually and slowly at the final conclusion of their investigations: the recognition of the anatomical difference between themselves and boys. So long as onanism affords female children an equivalent pleasure they deny that they lack the penis, or console themselves with hopes that in the future the deficiency will be made good. A little girl, whom I had the opportunity of observing, reacted to the exhibitionistic aggression of an elder brother with the obstinate and often repeated assertion: 'Susie *has* got one', pointing gaily to her clitoris and labia, at which she tugged with intense enjoyment. The gradual acceptance of the anatomical difference between the sexes is accompanied by conflicts waged round the constellation which we term penis-envy and masculinity-complex.

We know that, when the little girl ceases to deny her lack of the penis and abandons the hope of possessing one in the future, she employs a considerable amount of her mental energy in trying to account for the disadvantage under which she labours. We learn from our analyses what a large part the sense of guilt connected with masturbation commonly plays in these attempts at explanation. The origin of these feelings of guilt is not quite clear, for they already exist in the phase in which the Oedipus complex of the little girl does not seem as yet to have laid the burden of guilt upon her.³

³ Freud: 'Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Difference between the Sexes' (This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII, 1927). The argu-

Direct observation of children shows beyond question that these first onanistic activities are informed with impulses of a primary sadistic nature against the outside world.⁴ Possibly a sense of guilt is associated with these obscure aggressive impulses. It is probable that the little girl's illusion that she once had a penis and has lost it is connected with these first, sadistic, active tendencies to clitoral masturbation. Owing to the memory-traces of this active function of the clitoris, it is subsequently deemed to have had in the past the actual value of an organ equivalent to the penis. The erroneous conclusion is then drawn: 'I once did possess a penis'.

Another way in which the girl regularly tries to account for the loss is by ascribing the blame for it to her mother. It is interesting to note that, when the father is blamed for the little girl's lack of a penis, castration by him has already acquired the libidinal significance attaching to this idea in the form of the rape-phantasy. Rejection of the wish that the father should have been the aggressor generally betokens, even at this early stage, that rejection of the infantile feminine attitude to which I shall recur.

In his paper 'Some Consequences of the Anatomical Difference between the Sexes', Freud sees in the turning of the little girl to her father as a sexual object a direct consequence of this anatomical difference. In Freud's view, development from the castration to the Oedipus complex consists in the passing from the narcissistic wound of

ment in this paper of Freud's is that the Oedipus complex does not develop in girls until after the phase of phallic onanism. Cf. also Deutsch: *Op. cit.*

⁴ In his paper on 'The Economic Problem in Masochism' (*Collected Papers*, Vol. II), Freud points out that the important task of the libido is to conduct into the outside world the instinct of destruction primarily inherent in living beings, transforming it into the 'instinct of mastery'. This is effected by means of the organ of motility, the muscular system. It appears to me that part of these destructive tendencies remains attached to the subject's own person in the earliest form of masturbation, which has as yet no libidinal object, and that it is thus intercalated between organic pleasure and motor discharge into the outside world. At any rate I have been able with some degree of certainty to establish the fact that children who are specially aggressive and active have a particularly strong urge to masturbation. (I am speaking here of the earliest masturbation, which is as yet autoerotic). We see too that in little children frustration may provoke an outburst of rage and at the same time attempts at masturbation.

organ-inferiority to the compensation offered: that is to say, there arises the desire for a child. This is the source of the Œdipus complex in girls.

In this paper I shall follow up the line of thought thus mapped out by Freud. After the phallic phase, where the boy renounces the Œdipus complex and phallic masturbation, there is intercalated in the girl's development a phase which we may call 'post-phallic'; in this the seal is set upon her destiny of womanhood. Vaginal cathexis, however, is as yet lacking.

In spite of my utmost endeavours, I am unable to confirm the communications that have been made with reference to vaginal pleasure-sensations in childhood. I do not doubt the accuracy of these observations, but isolated exceptions in this case prove little. In my own observations I have had striking evidence in two instances of the existence of vaginal excitations and vaginal masturbation before puberty. In both, seduction with defloration had occurred very early in life.⁵ If there were in childhood a vaginal phase, with all its biological significance, it surely could not fail to appear as regularly in our analytical material as do all the other infantile phases of development. I think that the most difficult factor in the 'anatomical destiny' of the woman is the fact that at a time when the libido is still unstable, immature and incapable of sublimation, it seems condemned to abandon a pleasure-zone (the clitoris as a phallic organ) without discovering the possibility of a new cathexis. The narcissistic estimation of the non-existent organ passes smoothly (to use a phrase of Freud's) 'along the symbolic equation: penis—child, which is mapped out for it'. But what becomes of the dynamic energy of the libido which is directed towards the object and yearns for possibilities of gratification and for erotogenic cathexes?

We must also reflect that the wish-phantasy of receiving a child from the father—a phantasy of the greatest significance for the future of a woman—is, nevertheless, in comparison with the reality of the

⁵ Even if further observations should prove the occurrence of vaginal sensations in childhood, the subsequent cathexis of the vagina as a sex-organ would still seem to be scarcely affected by the question of whether it had transitorily been a zone of excitation, very soon repressed so as to leave scarcely a trace, or whether it were only in later years of development that it assumed for the first time the rôle of the genital apparatus. The same difficulties arise in either case.

penis, for which it is supposed to be exchanged, a very unreal and uncertain substitute. I heard of the little daughter of an analyst mother who, at the time when she was experiencing penis-envy, was consoled with the prospect of having a child. Every morning she woke up to ask in a fury: 'Hasn't the child come *yet*'? and no more accepted the consolation of the future than we are consoled by the promise of Paradise.

What, then, does happen to the actively directed cathexis of the clitoris in the phase when that organ ceases to be valued as the penis? In order to answer this question we may fall back on a familiar and typical process. We already know that, when a given activity is denied by the outside world or inhibited from within, it regularly suffers a certain fate—it turns back or is deflected. This seems to be so in the instance before us: the hitherto active-sadistic libido attached to the clitoris rebounds from the barricade of the subject's inner recognition of her lack of the penis and, on the one hand, regressively cathects points in the pregenital development which it had already abandoned, while, on the other hand, and most frequently of all, it is deflected in a regressive direction towards masochism. In place of the active urge of the phallic tendencies, there arises the masochistic phantasy: 'I want to be castrated', and this forms the erotogenic masochistic basis of the feminine libido. Analytic experience leaves no room for doubt that the little girl's first libidinal relation to her father is masochistic, and the masochistic wish in its earliest distinctively feminine phase is: 'I want to be castrated by my *father*'.⁶

In my view this turning in the direction of masochism is part of the woman's 'anatomical destiny', marked out for her by biological and constitutional factors, and lays the first foundation of the ultimate development of femininity, independent as yet of masochistic reactions to the sense of guilt. The original significance of the clitoris as an organ of activity, the masculine-narcissistic protest: 'I won't be castrated' are converted into the desire: 'I want to be castrated'. This desire assumes the form of a libidinal, instinctual trend whose object is the father. The woman's whole passive-feminine disposition, the entire genital desire familiar to us as the rape-phantasy, is finally explained if we accept the proposition that it originates in the castra-

⁶ That 'feminine' masochism has its origin in this regressive deflection of the libido is clear evidence of the identity of 'erotogenic' and 'feminine' masochism.

tion-complex. *My view is that the Œdipus complex in girls is inaugurated by the castration-complex.* The factor of pleasure resides in the idea of a sadistic assault by the love-object and the narcissistic loss is compensated by the desire for a child, which is to be fulfilled through this assault. When we designate this masochistic experience by the name of the wish for castration, we are not thinking merely of the biological meaning—the surrender of an organ of pleasure (the clitoris)—but we are also taking into account the fact that the whole of this deflection of the libido still centres on that organ. The onanism belonging to this phase and the masochistic phantasy of being castrated (raped) employ the same organ as the former active tendencies. The astonishing persistency of the feminine castration-complex (including all the organic vicissitudes with which is associated a flow of blood) as we encounter it in the analyses of our female patients is thus explained by the fact that this complex contains in itself not only the masculinity-complex, but also the whole infantile set towards femininity.

At that period there is a close connection between the masochistic phantasies and the wish for a child, so that the whole subsequent attitude of the woman towards her child (or towards the reproductive function) is permeated by pleasure-tendencies of a masochistic nature.

We have an illustration of this in the dream of a patient whose subsequent analysis unequivocally confirmed what had been hinted in the manifest content of her dream ; this occurred in the first phase of her analysis before much insight had been gained.

'Professor X. and you (the analyst) were sitting together. I wanted him to notice me. He went past my chair and I looked up at him and he smiled at me. He began to ask me about my health, as a doctor asks his patient ; I answered with reluctance. All of a sudden he had on a doctor's white coat and a pair of obstetrical forceps in his hand. He said to me : " Now we'll just have a look at the little angel ". I clearly saw that they were obstetrical forceps, but I had the feeling that the instrument was to be used to force my legs apart and display the clitoris. I was very much frightened and struggled. A number of people, amongst them you and a trained nurse, were standing by and were indignant at my struggling. They thought that Professor X. had specially chosen *me* for a kind of experiment, and that I ought to submit to it. As everyone was against me, I cried out in impotent fury : " No, I will not be operated on, you shall not operate on me ".'

Without examining the dream more closely here, we can see in its manifest content that castration is identified with rape and parturition, and the dream-wish which excites anxiety is as follows: 'I want to be castrated (raped) by my father and to have a child'—a three-fold wish of a plainly *masochistic character*.

The first, infantile identification with the mother is always, independently of the complicated processes and reactions belonging to the sense of guilt, *masochistic*, and all the active birth-phantasies, whose roots lie in this identification, are of a bloody, painful character, which they retain throughout the subject's life.⁷

In order to make my views on frigidity intelligible I had to preface them with these theoretical considerations.

I will now pass on to discuss those forms of frigidity which bear the stamp of the masculinity-complex or penis-envy. In these cases the woman persists in the original demand for possession of a penis and refuses to abandon the phallic organization. Conversion to the feminine-passive attitude, the necessary condition of vaginal sensation, does not take place.

Let me mention briefly the danger of the strong attachment of all sexual phantasies to clitoris-masturbation. I think I have made it clear that the clitoris has come to be the executive organ, not only of active but of passive masochistic phantasies. By virtue of its past phase of masculine activity, a kind of organ-memory constitutes it the great enemy of any transference of pleasure-excitation to the vagina. Moreover, the fact that the whole body receives an increased cathexis of libido (since it has failed to find its focus) brings it about that, in spite of an often very vehement manifestation of the sexual instinct, the libido never attains to its centralized form of gratification.

In far the largest number of cases, feminine sexual inhibition arises out of the vicissitudes of that infantile-masochistic libidinal development which I have postulated. These vicissitudes are manifold, and every form they assume may lead to frigidity. For instance, as a result of the repression of the masochistic tendencies a strong narcissistic cathexis of the feminine ego may be observed. The ego feels that it is threatened by these tendencies, and takes up a narcissistic

⁷ In the second section of this paper I will revert to the part that the sense of guilt plays in feminine masochistic phantasies. In the present argument I am indicating the purely libidinal origin of feminine masochism, as determined by the course of evolution.

position of defence. I believe that, together with penis-envy, this is an important source of so-called feminine narcissism.

Akin to this reaction of repression is another reaction-formation which Karen Horney calls 'the flight from femininity,' and of which she has given a very illuminating description. This flight from the incest-wish is, in my view, a shunning not only of the incestuous object (Horney), but most of all of the masochistic dangers threatening the ego which are associated with the relation to this object. Escape into identification with the father is at the same time a flight from the masochistically determined identification with the mother. Thus there arises the masculinity-complex, which I think will be strong and disturbing in proportion as penis-envy has been intense and the primary phallic active tendencies vigorous.

Repression of the masochistic instinctual tendencies may have another result in determining a particular type of object-choice later in life. The object stands in antithesis to the masochistic instinctual demands and corresponds to the requirements of the ego. In accordance with these the woman chooses a partner whose social standing is high or whose intellectual gifts are above the average, often a man whose disposition is rather of an affectionate and passive type. The marriage then appears to be peaceful and happy, but the woman remains frigid, suffering from an unsatisfied longing—the type of the 'misunderstood wife'. Her sexual sensibility is bound up with conditions whose fulfilment is highly offensive to her ego. How often do such women become the wretched victims of a passion for men who ill-treat them, thus fulfilling the women's unconscious desires for castration or rape.

I have also observed how frequently—indeed, almost invariably—women whose whole life is modelled on the lines of masculine sublimation-tendencies are markedly masochistic in their sexual experiences. They belong to that reactive masculine type which yet has failed to repress its original masochistic instinctual attitude. My experience is that the prospect of cure in these cases of relative frigidity, in which sexual sensation depends on the fulfilment of masochistic conditions, is very uncertain. It is peculiarly difficult to detach these patients from the said conditions and, when analysis has given them the necessary insight, they have consciously to choose between finding bliss in suffering or peace in renunciation.

The analyst's most important task is, of course, the abolition of the sexual inhibition in his patients, and the attainment of instinctual

gratification. But sometimes, when the patient's instincts are so unfortunately fixed and yet there are good capacities for sublimation, the analyst must have the courage to smooth the path in the so-called 'masculine' direction and thus make it easier for the patient to renounce sexual gratification.

There are women who have strong sexual inhibition and intense feelings of inferiority, the origin of which lies in penis-envy. In such cases it is evidently the task of analysis to free these patients from the difficulties of the masculinity-complex and to convert penis-envy into the desire for a child, i.e. to induce them to adopt their feminine rôle. We can observe that during this process the 'masculine aims' become depreciated and are given up. Nevertheless we often find that, if we can succeed in making it easier for such women to sublimate their instincts in the direction of 'masculine tendencies' and so to counter the sense of inferiority, the capacity for feminine sexual sensibility develops automatically in a striking manner. The theoretical explanation of this empirically determined fact is self-evident.

It is but rarely in analytic practice that we meet with such cases of conditioned frigidity as I have described or indeed with any cases of frigidity unaccompanied by pathological symptoms, i.e. of sexual inhibition without symptoms of suffering. When such a patient comes to us, it is generally at the desire of the husband, whose narcissism is wounded, and who feels uncertain of his masculinity. The woman, actuated by her masochistic tendencies, has renounced the experience of gratification for herself, and, as a rule, her desire to be cured is so feeble that the treatment is quite unsuccessful.

As we know, hysteria which expresses itself in symptom-formation is extraordinarily capricious and varied as regards the nature of the sexual inhibition displayed. One type of hysterical patient is driven by an everlasting hunger for love-objects, which she changes without inhibition: her erotic life appears free, but she is incapable of genital gratification. Another type is monogamous and remains tenderly attached to the love-object, but without sexual sensibility; she exhibits other neurotic reactions which testify to her morbid state. Such women often dissipate the sexual excitation in the fore-pleasure, either owing to the strong original cathexis of the pregenital zones or because by a secondary and regressive reaction they are endeavouring to withhold the libido from the genital organ which prohibitions and their own anxiety have barricaded off. Here one often receives the impression that all the sense-organs, and indeed the whole female

body, are more accessible to sexual excitation than is the vagina, the organ apparently destined for it. But conversion-symptoms turn out to be the seat of false sexual cathexes. Behind the hysterical, pleasure-inhibiting, genital anxiety we discover the masochistic triad: castration, rape and parturition. The fixation of these wish-phantasies to the infantile object here becomes, as we know, the motive factor in the neuroses. If this attachment is resolved by analysis, sexual sensibility as a rule develops.

In touching briefly on the question of frigidity accompanying phobias and obsessions, mention must be made of the remarkable fact that in these cases the sexual disturbance is emphatically not in direct ratio to the severity of the neurosis. There are patients who remain frigid long after they have overcome their anxiety, and even after they have got rid of the most severe obsessional symptoms, and the converse is also true. The uncertainty of obsessional neurosis—in so far as the genital capacity of female patients is concerned—is most plainly manifested in certain cases (several of which have come under my observation) in which the most violent orgasm may result from hostile masculine identifications. The vagina behaves like an active organ, and the particularly brisk secretion is designed to imitate ejaculation.

At the beginning of this paper I endeavoured to show that the masochistic triad constantly encountered in the analyses of women corresponds to a definite phase of feminine libidinal development and represents, so to speak, the last act in the drama of the vicissitudes of the 'feminine castration-complex'. In neurotic diseases, however, we meet above all with the reactions of the sense of guilt, and hence we find this primary-libidinal feminine masochism already so closely interwoven and interlocked with the moral masochism, originating under pressure of the sense of guilt, that we miss the significance of that which is in origin libidinal. Thus many obscure points in connection with the feminine castration-complex become clearer if we recognize that, behind the castration-anxiety, there is further the repressed masochistic wish characteristic of a definite infantile phase of development in the normal feminine libido.

The task of psycho-analysis is to resolve the conflicts of the individual existence. The instinctual life of the individual, which is the object of analytical scrutiny, strives towards the ultimate goal, amidst conflicts and strange vicissitudes, of *attainment of pleasure*. The preservation of the race lies outside these aims, and, if there be a deeper significance in the fact that the same means are employed to achieve

the racial aim as to subserve the pleasure-tendency of man's instincts, that significance is outside the scope of our individualistic task.

Here I think we have a fundamental and essential difference between 'feminine' and 'masculine'. In the woman's mental life there is *something* which has nothing at all to do with the mere fact of whether she has or has not actually given birth to a child. I refer to the psychic representatives of motherhood which are here long before the necessary physiological and anatomical conditions have developed in the girl. For the tendency of which I am speaking the attaining of the child is the main goal of existence, and in woman the exchange of the racial aim for the individual one of gratification may take place largely at the expense of the latter. No analytical observer can deny that in the relation of mother to child—begun in pregnancy and continued in parturition and lactation—libidinal forces come into play which are very closely allied to those in the relation between man and woman.

In the deepest experience of the relation of mother to child it is masochism in its strongest form which finds gratification in the bliss of motherhood.

Long before she is a mother, long after the possibility of becoming one has ended, the woman has ready within her the maternal principle, which bids her take to herself and guard the real child or some substitute for it.

In coitus and parturition the masochistic pleasure of the sexual instinct is very closely bound up with the mental experience of conception and giving birth; just so does the little girl see in the father, and the loving woman in her beloved—a child. For years I have traced out in analyses this most intimate blending of the sexual instinct with that of the reproductive function in women, and always the question has hovered before my mind: When does the female child begin to be a woman and when a mother? Analytic experience has yielded the answer: *Simultaneously*, in that phase when she turns towards masochism, as I described at the beginning of this paper. Then, at the same time as she conceives the desire to be castrated and raped, she conceives also the phantasy of receiving a child from her father. From that time on, the phantasy of parturition becomes a member of the masochistic triad and the gulf between instinctual and the reproductive tendencies is bridged by masochism. The interruption of the little girl's infantile sexual development by the frustration of her desire for the child gives to the sublimation-tendencies of the woman a very definite stamp of masochistic maternity.

If it is true that men derive the principal forces which make for sublimation from their sadistic tendencies, then it is equally true that women draw on the masochistic tendencies with their imprint of maternity. In spite of this symbiosis, the two opposite poles, the sexual instinct and the reproductive function, may enter into conflict with one another. When this occurs, the danger is the greater in proportion as the two groups of tendencies are in close proximity.

Thus, a woman may commandeer the whole of her masochistic instinctual energy for the purpose of direct gratification and abandon sublimation in the function of reproduction. In the relation of the prostitute to the *souteneur* we have such an unadulterated product of the feminine masochistic instinctual attitude.

At the opposite end of the pole, yet drawing upon the same source, we have the *mater dolorosa*, the whole of whose masochism has come to reside in the relation of mother to child.

From this point I return to my original theme. There is a group of women who constitute the main body figuring in the statistics which give the large percentage of frigidity. The women in question are psychically healthy, and their relation to the world and to their libidinal object is positive and friendly. If questioned about the nature of their experience in coitus, they give answers which show that the conception of orgasm as something to be experienced by themselves is really and truly foreign to them. During intercourse what they feel is a happy and tender sense that they are giving keen pleasure and, if they do not come of a social environment where they have acquired full sexual enlightenment, they are convinced that coitus as a sexual act is of importance only for the man. In it, as in other relations, the woman finds happiness in tender, maternal giving.

This type of woman is dying out and the modern woman seems to be neurotic if she is frigid. Her sublimations are further removed from instinct and therefore, while on the one hand they constitute a lesser menace to its direct aims, they are, on the other, less well adapted for the indirect gratification of its demands. I think that this psychological change is in accordance with social developments and that it is accompanied by an increasing tendency of women towards masculinity. Perhaps the women of the next generation will no longer submit to defloration in the normal way and will give birth to children only on condition of freedom from pain.

And then in after-generations they may resort to infibulation and to refinements in the way of pain—ceremonials in connection with

parturition. It is this masochism—the most elementary force in feminine mental life—that I have been endeavouring to analyse.

Possibly I have succeeded in throwing light on its origin and, above all, on its importance and its application in the function of reproduction. This employing of masochistic instinctual forces for the purpose of race-preservation I regard as representing in the mental economy an act of sublimation on the part of the woman. In certain circumstances it results in the withdrawal from the direct gratification of instinct of the energy involved and in the woman's sexual life becoming characterized by frigidity without entailing any such consequences as would upset her mental balance and give rise to neurosis.

Let me now at the close of my paper give its main purport: *Women would never have suffered themselves throughout the epochs of history to have been withheld by social ordinances on the one hand from possibilities of sublimation, and on the other from sexual gratifications, were it not that in the function of reproduction they have found magnificent satisfaction for both urges.*

INSTINCTUAL MECHANISMS IN THE NEUROSES¹

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Within the last few years, psycho-analytical theories on the neuroses have been modified by a reduction of the multiplicity of instinctual phenomena to a bipolar simplification, that is, the doctrine of the life instinct (Eros) and the death or destructive instinct. These instinctual mechanisms were formulated by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and later more widely utilized in the *Ego and the Id* and in *Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety*. This change in the classification of the instincts has tended to transform the dynamic conceptions of the neuroses both from the theoretical and practical aspects, as an inevitable psycho-biological development from earlier viewpoints. The primary significance of the death instinct has been questioned by other investigators, who contend that it is derived from an inward turning of a destructive tendency which was originally directed outwardly (sadism). It appears that the neuroses are produced by a defusion of the death instinct, that is, a discharge of deeply seated death impulses into the ego, and neurotic suffering so produced is determined almost solely by the impression of a fantasied danger to the afflicted individual.

Stimulated by Freud's recent conceptions which are partly theoretical and speculative and partly clinical, a wider analytical experience has emphasized a previously immature suspicion that the neuroses are caused by a disturbance in the balance of these instincts. These two antagonistic instincts under normal conditions fuse and neutralize each other ; it is only under special influences that a defusion of the instinctual components occurs, that is, a mastery of the death or destructive instincts over the Eros or life instincts. It is then that a neurotic disorder develops. This defusion is nearly always incomplete, and even in the severe neuroses or psychoses the death instinct seldom becomes absolutely isolated and completely masterful ; there always remains a state of partial fusion and neutralization.

These two instincts are the dynamic and organic basis of all living processes ; they are revealed not only in the psychoses and neuroses, but likewise in myths, folklore and in the mediæval symbolism of the

¹ Read at the Eleventh International Congress of Psycho-Analysis at Oxford, July 28, 1929.

Dance of Death. The chief function of the life instinct is the neutralization of the death instinct, it brings the sexes together in procreation and is the cement of the family and society.

In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*,² the following passage occurs, which may be interpreted as the forerunner of a later elaboration of the concept.

'There is a group of instincts that care for the destinies of these elementary organisms which survive the individual being, that concern themselves with the safe sheltering of these organisms as long as they are defenceless against the stimuli of the outer world, and finally bring about their conjunction with other reproductive cells. These are collectively the sexual instincts. They are conservative in the same sense as the others are, in that they reproduce earlier conditions of the living substance, but they are so in a higher degree in that they shew themselves specially resistant to external influences; and they are more conservative in a wider sense still, since they preserve life itself for a longer time. They are the actual life-instincts, the fact that they run counter to the trend of the other instincts which lead towards death indicates a contradiction between them and the rest, one which the theory of neuroses has recognized as full of significance. There is as it were an oscillating rhythm in the life of organisms: the one group of instincts presses forward to reach the final goal of life as quickly as possible, the other flies back at a certain point on the way to traverse the same stretch once more from a given spot and thus to prolong the duration of the journey. Although sexuality and the distinction of the sexes certainly did not exist at the dawn of life, nevertheless it remains possible that the instincts which are later described as sexual were active from the very beginning and took up the part of opposition to the rôle of the "ego-instincts" then, and not only at some later time'.

In *The Ego and the Id*,³ this hypothesis is more definitely applied to the special clinical problem of the neuroses. 'Once we have admitted the conception of a fusion of the two classes of instincts with each other, the possibility of a—more or less complete—"defusion"—of them forces itself upon us. The sadistic component of the sexual instinct would be a classical example of instinctual fusion serving a useful purpose: and the perversion in which sadism has made itself

² Pp. 50-51 (English translation), London, 1922.

³ Pp. 57-58 (English translation), London, 1927.

independent would be typical of defusion, though not of absolutely complete defusion. From this point we obtain a new view of a great array of facts which have not before been considered in this light. We perceive that for purposes of discharge the instinct of destruction is habitually enlisted in the service of Eros ; we suspect that the epileptic fit is a product and sign of instinctual defusion ; and we come to understand that defusion and the marked emergence of the death-instinct are among the most noteworthy effects of many severe neuroses, e.g. the obsessional neuroses. Making a swift generalization, we might conjecture that the essence of a regression of libido, e.g. from the genital to the sadistic-anal level, would lie in a defusion of instincts, just as, conversely, the advance from an earlier to the definitive genital phase would be conditioned by an accession of erotic components. The question also arises whether ordinary ambivalence, which is so often unusually strong in the constitutional disposition to neurosis, should not be regarded as the product of a defusion ; ambivalence, however, is such a fundamental phenomenon that it more probably represents a state of incomplete fusion'.

A theory and an analytical therapy of the neuroses can according to a tentative formulation, be based upon a defusion theory of these two fundamental instincts as proposed by Freud. In a wider sense, the mechanism of the neuroses can be explained by this modification of the original libido theory, for the life instinct may be termed the positive libido and is therefore erotic, nutritional and propagative, whereas on the contrary, the death instinct may be designated a negative libido, that is, regressive and destructive, a break with the self-preservation tendencies of the ego and consequently a regression to primal, inanimate narcissism. Thus both instincts, whether in the positive or negative sense, are libidinal in nature and origin and consequently are libiditized processes and mechanisms. It was formerly held that the repressed libido was converted into neurotic anxiety or directly discharged in this form, but if this newer classification of instincts is emphasized, neurotic anxiety can be interpreted as a flight reaction of the ego from the danger of being overwhelmed by a death or destructive tendency. It seems as if the ego gratifies the need for punishment through developing an excessive domination by the menacing, guilt-laden super-ego, consequently producing an anxiety-ridden ego.

According to this conception, the object of analysis would be to fuse and amalgamate the death instinct and the life instinct as they

normally exist in well-balanced individuals, thus neutralizing their opposing tendencies : or make the life instinct (Eros) dominant again through utilizing it to its fullest extent in the positive transference situation. This interpretation of the positive transference, as identical with the life instinct, would harmonize with Ferenczi's statement that ' The Eros liberated by instinctual defusion converts destruction into growth, into a further development of the parts that have to be protected '.⁴ These two instincts are antagonistic to each other ; they find expression in the bipolarity of love and hate, or life and death, and in so-called normal individuals they are about evenly balanced and fused, the latter condition constituting what Freud terms the confluence of instincts.

As an individual grows older, the death instinct is liable to predominate and unfold itself through a defusion which is probably organically conditioned ; consequently in the neuroses and psychoses of the involutional and pre-senile periods, there often appears a hypochondriacal death anxiety, such as the somatic delusions of destruction or ' rotting away ' of certain organs or fear of impotence, the latter being essentially a castration anxiety, a destruction of the genitalia, which is synonymous with an ego destruction or fear of death. It seems as though every anxiety state was a form of castration anxiety, a type of psychical anchoring of the defused death instinct to the super-ego. Castration anxiety forms the basis of all anxiety ; it is an annihilation or destructive mechanism directed against the ego and emanating from the guilt feeling which has been introjected into the super-ego.

In one of the most primitive forms of object relationship to the mother (the oral), there already exists an admixture of these two opposing instincts :—

First : The oral, nutritional, or life instinct.

Second : The sadistic, biting, cannibalistic (relating to the nipple) or death or destruction instinct.

In this early pre-genital stage of development it seems as though the life component was already fused with the death or destructive component. These two components enter later into the formation of the Œdipus-complex (having evolved and developed from the

⁴ S. Ferenczi : ' The Problem of Acceptance of Unpleasant Ideas '. *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psychoanalysis*. ch. LXXIII, London, 1926.

pre-Œdipus stage), such as love (Eros) directed towards the mother and hate (death or destruction) directed towards the father. It appears that these two instincts act as mechanisms for precipitating the conflicts initiated by the Œdipus wishes.

The death instinct and the life instinct are mobilized in the unconscious (the id), as a fused precipitate of early organization and retained there under normal conditions by a repressive process. The effect of repression is to prevent these opposing instincts from becoming defused and thus transformed into the dominance of one over the other. When this defusion takes place, a neurosis develops, whose symptom-formation is usually either a literal or symbolic destructive tendency or death anxiety. The death instinct becomes liberated only when it has grown sufficiently powerful through special precipitating circumstances to master the instinctual forces of life.

It is this inner unloading tendency working against the resistance of the life components which makes the death instinct predominant in the neuroses through a tendency to secure gratification of the masochistic guilt feelings. This guilt feeling enters into the formation of the super-ego and has its origin in the pre-genital stage as a nursery prohibition and requirement, producing either sphincter morality or genital morality. The former evolves into anal hate, seen clinically in the obsessional neuroses, the latter into love-object hate, as disclosed in melancholia (benign affective depression). It seems then, that the super-ego possesses all the characteristics of early introjected persons and thus is a direct inheritance from the Œdipus-complex. It does not respond to the reality test, but represents an instinctual reaction to earlier object choices and the reaction-formation dependent upon these choices. It is so often hostile and inexorable in its demands, because so dependent upon the Œdipus organization in its formative stages.

In the id, which is the collective precipitate of primitive, instinctual impulses originating in the pre-genital organization, there lies both the death and the life instincts. When the desexualized death instinct becomes defused, it penetrates into the super-ego; the ego then feels endangered through a castration threat to its integrity emanating from the destructive tendencies of the super-ego and strives to defend itself by attempting to utilize the life instincts which remain mobilized in the reservoir of the id. Out of this conflict and defusion, this absorption in the ego, a neurosis develops as a form of punishment emanating from the super-ego. The guilt-overladen super-ego, through

a sort of positive cathexis, attracts the death instinct from its original fusion with the life instinct and discharges it into the ego. All death instincts are therefore a threat to the ego, which defends itself by means of the libidinal (or life) impulses or instincts.

Freud⁵ has very brilliantly described these tendencies of the life and death instincts: 'The relation of hate to objects is older than that of love. It is derived from the primal repudiation by the narcissistic ego of the external world whence flows the stream of stimuli. As an expression of the pain-reaction induced by objects, it remains in constant intimate relation with the instincts of self-preservation, so that sexual and ego-instincts readily develop an antithesis which repeats that of love and hate. When the sexual function is governed by the ego-instincts, as at the stage of the sadistic-anal organization, they impart the qualities of hate to the instinct's aim as well'.

In the renouncing of adult sexual love (the life instinct), the interest is withdrawn from the external world, and the libido regresses to the fixation point of the inanimate stage (the death instinct). Under these circumstances a depression or stupor develops which is clinically synonymous with the primal narcissism of intra-uterine existence. The benign stupors as described by August Hoch⁶ are examples of this regressive death instinct occurring in certain psychotic states. According to Hoch 'Stupor represents, psychologically speaking, the simplest and completest regression. . . . One can look on stupor as being a profound regression'.

In certain of the manic-depressive states, the manic phase is the defused life instinct; in the depression with its inhibition and inanitation there is a triumph of the death instinct over the life instinct, while in the so-called normal intervals there is a mixture or amalgamation of both instincts held in a perfect balance. In epilepsy, during the period of coma following a seizure, there can be conjectured an almost complete but temporary defusion of the death instinct.

In certain works of art, these opposing instincts may be seen at work as an emergence from the unconscious of the artist, for instance, in Arnold Boecklin's *The Island of Death*. In this picture birth and death are symbolized as a fusion or amalgamation of both instincts: the entrance into the Island of Death has a similar symbolism to the emergence from the birth canal.

⁵ 'The Instincts and their Vicissitudes', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV.

⁶ *Benign Stupors*, New York, 1921.

Among the Trobriand Islanders⁷ a life-death myth has been described as a fragment of unconscious thinking of the race and so is important for an understanding of the formation of the manifest content of myths. It bears a striking resemblance to Boecklin's picture in demonstrating the psychical reality of the ambivalence of unconscious thinking. According to Malinowski, 'The Spirit after death moves to Tuma, the Island of the Dead, where he leads a pleasant existence analogous to terrestrial life, only much happier. In the Island of the Dead, the spirit possesses the power of rejuvenation. When a spirit becomes tired of constant rejuvenation, after he has had a long existence "underneath" as the natives call it, he may want to come back to life again. And then he leaps far back in age, and becomes a small, unborn infant. . . . These rejuvenated spirits, these little pre-incarnated babies or spirit children are the only sources from which humanity draws its new supplies of life. An unborn infant, somehow or other finds its way back to the Trobriands, and there into the womb of some woman'. This myth is an excellent example of the racial counterpart of the subjugation of the individual death instinct by the libido or life instinct.

In the mediæval iconography of the Dance of Death, there is a distinction between the death instinct and the life instinct. All the living female figures seem to be pregnant. The skeletal figures of death symbolize the living ego-component whose fate is destruction. The mediæval Dance of Death is a study in contrasts, the effort of the life instinct to overcome the death or destructive instinct, the pregnant women being as in a dream a reinforcement of the contrasting element. It is an attempt to solve the riddle of life rather than of death, by picturing symbolically the two instincts striving for mastery, a tendency toward the preservation of the Ego.⁸ In the Indian Dance of Siva (cosmic dance of Nataraja), there is represented both creation (the life instinct) and destruction (the death instinct).⁹

Hysterical stupor represents a regression to the death instinct and only develops when life has become unbearable. Sleep is also a death instinct regression, in fact, sleep as Freud has indicated, not only re-

⁷ B. Malinowski: *The Father in Primitive Psychology*, New York, 1927.

⁸ Sometimes, as in a neurosis, the symbolism is reversed, as portrayed in a woodcut (dated 1514), of 'Death Felling the Tree of Life' (see *The Black Death*, by Johannes Nohl, 1925, p. 45).

⁹ See *The Dance of Siva*, by Ananda Coomaraswamy, New York, 1918.

animates the primitive narcissism, but is also a narcissistic withdrawal of the libido back from its external life attachments. Thus it is seen that both the life and death instincts are biologically useful amalgamations or fusions existing in a balanced form side by side in all so-called normal individuals, and from this standpoint both sadism and masochism are separations or defusions of this mixture. In fact, masochism is the recoil of sadism upon the ego; the ego is being punished by the monitor of the super-ego because of the guilt attached to destructive wishes or tendencies.

In the traumatic neuroses, the life instincts have become separated from the mixture and the individual partially regresses to the death instinct level, that is, to a neurotic fear or anxiety over ego-annihilation, which is synonymous with death. In these traumatic neuroses, the dreams are those of the precipitating trauma which has temporarily shattered the sense of ego security and threatens to annihilate it. The compulsive-repetition mechanisms of these dreams is an attempt at mastery by the death instinct. The precipitating effect of the trauma suddenly releases the death instinct and separates it from its amalgamation with the life instinct. As there is always a tendency in life processes to return to the inanimate, the death instinct, now separated and defused, gains a mastery over the life instinct.

The suicidal impulses in the affective depressions are liberations or temporary triumphs of the death instinct directed against the ego, because in these cases object-love does not possess sufficient libidinal cathexis to hold the death instinct in check, in fact, the life instinct for the time being has become strongly anti-cathectized. As Freud¹⁰ writes: 'Following our view of sadism, we should say that the destructive component has intrenched itself in the super-ego and turned against the ego. What is now holding sway in the super-ego is, as it were, a pure culture of the death instinct and in fact it often succeeds in driving the ego into death'. It is particularly in melancholia that the super-ego 'can become a kind of gathering place for the death instincts. . . . The fear of death in melancholia only admits of one explanation, that the ego gives itself up because it feels itself hated and persecuted by the super-ego, instead of loved'.

In intra-uterine existence these two instincts are psychically unbroken and fused and remain so after birth, at least through the pregenital stage, in all healthy individuals. The ego is synonymous

¹⁰ *The Ego and the Id*, p. 77, London, 1927.

with the death instinct and the libido with the life instinct. In health, the struggle between the two is balanced ; in the neuroses, there is a separation of these two instincts and a conflict arises between the ego organization and the libido organization. Every neurosis is therefore a conflict between the two instincts. One of the objects of analysis is again to amalgamate them or to make the life instinct triumphant. The ambivalence and polarity of love and hate are equivalent to the ambivalence and polarity of life and death, such as in the compulsive ideas to injure a beloved one, which is an emergence or temporary mastery of the death or destruction instinct. In every analysis, the Œdipus situation corresponds to the life instinct, in the sense of the original psycho-libidinal binding to the mother, whereas on the contrary, the castration complex is identical with the death instinct. This castration complex lies at the basis of all death instincts and fantasies in the neuroses, because castration is symbolically a death or destruction of the ego. In a successful analysis, there is a repetition of the Œdipus-complex in the transference relationship, that is, a successful mastery of the life instinct over the death instinct.

All death anxiety is synonymous with castration anxiety, that is, fear experienced by the ego resulting from a threat of punishment by the menacing super-ego. Under these conditions there develops an excessive psychical anchoring of the death instinct to the super-ego because of a punishment mechanism produced by the feeling of guilt. In certain cases it seems as though the Œdipus-complex may itself succumb to the castration tendency of the death instinct as a form of punishment for the feelings of guilt concerning the mother-fixation with its incestuous fantasies. A super-ego punishment is a castration anxiety, because, at least in males, the super-ego is linked up with the fear of losing the phallic member of the body, which his narcissism so highly prizes.

That the anxiety-state is a castration threat to the ego is shown by the associations of a case of anxiety-hysteria under analysis. 'In my fear, I fear to lose my personal self, to lose the power of doing and performing and the use of my limbs and eyes'. In other words, the ego is threatened with destruction (loss of personal self) or he will lose his limbs (phallic symbols) or his eyes (castration symbols). Thus neurotic anxiety is a fear of something happening to the ego, the ego will be destroyed (death) or weakened (fainting) or shattered. The threat of the ego with destruction (castration) is endangered through punishment by the moral prohibition of the super-ego, resulting from feelings of guilt.

The super-ego criticizes and menaces the ego, producing pain, anxiety or a sense of tension as a direct punishment mechanism from forbidden impulses which originate from the id. This critical faculty of the super-ego is a form of death or castration anxiety generated from guilt feelings: hence all 'consciousness of guilt' or 'sense of guilt' is a form of punishment by the death instinct. The super-ego is consequently essentially sadistic in nature and therefore in the depressions there is found an incorporating oral cannibalistic tendency, an emergence of the death or destruction instinct directed towards the ego and which so often leads to suicide.

In *Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety*, Freud remarks: 'Fear is the basic phenomenon and chief problem of the neurosis. We now see that we are not in danger if we explain castration-fear as the sole motif for the defensive processes which lead to the neurosis. . . . The fear of the Zoophobias is the castration fear of the ego, that of the less fundamentally studied agoraphobia seems to be fear of temptation, which must cohere genetically with castration fear'.¹¹

At least some of the resistances encountered in analytical work belong to an aggressive (sadistic) tendency toward the analytical situation and consequently are synonymous with the death or destructive impulses, in the sense of symbolically castrating what is felt to be the omnipotence of the analytical situation. This negative phase of the transference, clinically a negative therapeutic reaction, is assuming increasing importance in psychoanalysis. If the neuroses are caused by excessive defusion of the death instinct this tendency must be neutralized in psychoanalytical treatment. In cases of psychosexual impotence, which is a self-punishment mechanism, a symbolic castration based on feelings of guilt, the neurotic symptom is a partial death instinct or destruction of the psychosexual potency. This partial death instinct must be neutralized in the analysis and rendered harmless, that is, changed from a negative transference, a sadistic attitude toward the analytical situation, to a life instinct in the sense of a positive transference. This subjugation enables the life instinct to resume its primacy and thus re-establish potency through overcoming the resistance in the transference situation. In this positive transference the aggressiveness of the death instinct is neutralized and the liberated life libido becomes available again for normal object cathexis.

¹¹ See also *The Infantile Animal Phobia of Little Hans* (1909), and *The Analysis of the Infantile Neurosis* (1918).

As Freud has pointed out,¹² 'To the libido falls the task of making the destructive instinct harmless. . . . We are entirely without any understanding of the psychological ways and means by which this subjugation of the death instinct by the libido can be achieved. In the psychoanalytical world of ideas we can only assume that a very extensive coalescence and fusion, varying according to conditions, of the two instincts takes place, so that we never have to deal with pure life-instincts and death instincts at all, but only with combinations of them in different degrees'. When the libido makes the destructive instincts harmless, this is synonymous with a fusion of the life instincts with the death instincts to their previous amalgamation, balancing or neutralizing of the opposing instincts, a form of positive transference, which is the object of all psychoanalytical work in the therapy of the neuroses.

As the stimulus to the present theory was based upon psychoanalytical experience, it may be helpful for a clearer elucidation to outline a few examples without going into details of actual clinical material.

In one instance the psychoneurotic symptoms took the form of attacks of acute anxiety, in which the predominant fear was that of a loss of consciousness through fainting or of sudden death. The patient was overwhelmed by the idea of being mastered by death in the midst of life, for loss of consciousness was synonymous with a fear of annihilation of the ego, linked up in this instance, based on the strong *Œdipus* fixation, with a regression to the primal narcissism of intrauterine existence. The idea of death, as a masochistic self-punishment feeling, an eroticized death instinct, tended to precipitate an anxiety attack, which was synonymous with ego destruction. This neurotic masochism would seem to harmonize with what has been described by Freud¹³ in the following terms: 'Moral masochism thus becomes the classical piece of evidence for the existence of "instinctual fusion". Its dangerousness lies in its origin in the death instinct and represents that part of the latter which escaped deflection on to the outer world in the form of an instinct of destruction'. The entire neurosis was a self-punishment-mechanism: he had offered up his well-being as an atonement for unconscious incestuous fantasies. This was clearly

¹² 'The Economic Problem in Masochism', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II.

¹³ *Ibid.*

shown in one literal incestuous dream concerning his mother, which was followed the next day by a punishment conversion-symptom, in the form of pain in the eyeballs and fear of blindness, a typical castration or death symbol in a twentieth-century Oedipus. He thus reacted to a situation as if castration were still a definite punishment to be inflicted upon him, for which in the Oedipus phase he might have actually feared such a punishment. The neurotic reaction prevailed because the old danger still existed for his thoughts, as if the past anxiety determinants were still active.

In certain cases of periodic alcoholism, particularly those dependent upon latent homosexuality, the suicidal impulses are produced by a super-ego punishment based on feelings of guilt. Under these conditions when in a sober state, the vague feelings of destruction are held back by repression, but when intoxicated, there results a release of these fantasies; in fact, the use of alcohol may be for the purpose of an ego regression to the inanimate and this regression is complete in alcoholic torpor. It seems that a similar mechanism takes place in lethargic encephalitis, where the toxic process releases the mobilized death instinct producing a deep stupor which externally resembles death.

The fear of insanity, which is so frequent in the neuroses, is an ego-castration anxiety, and like all anxiety is synonymous with the death instinct. It appears that when the ego has given up its narcissistic libido (the life instinct) possessions, it then becomes threatened with destruction of itself through the unneutralized power of the death instinct in the form of castration fear or anxiety. The acute or slow development of a neurosis becomes then an excessive emergence of the death instinct turning upon the ego. A neurosis becomes precipitated through any mechanism or special influence which reinforces the death instinct and throws it into independent activity, producing a defusion in place of the normal neutralization and amalgamation.

In every neurosis this death instinct may be demonstrated, producing that ego terror and conflict which is so characteristic of the clinical aspects of a neurosis. One of the objects of analysis is to make this life-instinct again dominant; so to bind the two instincts together, that the death instinct is prevented from resuming its former activity. When during the analytical situation the life instinct becomes dominant, there is unravelled a positive transference; or the death instinct may become temporarily triumphant, and this is synonymous with the negative transference or resistance. If during the analytical situation

the negative transference continues, this constitutes a temporary mastery by the death instinct, and the neurosis cannot be cured or even ameliorated until a positive transference develops, that is, a triumph of the life instinct.

Every neurosis is an attempt at mastery by the death instinct over the life instinct, a loosening of the binding of the aggressive tendencies of the death principle from the vivifying life principle. The death instinct becomes discharged into the ego from the super-ego, and as an effect of this discharge there results that anxiety or obsessional conflict which is clinically characteristic of the neuroses. The need of punishment in certain types of neuroses is pre-eminently an introjection into the ego, of the defused death instincts from the super-ego, and assumes the form of morbid anxiety, depression or an obsessional pre-occupation with a fear of death. According to Alexander's observations on dreams in pairs and series,¹⁴ 'In the first of the pairs of dreams the super-ego has its account paid, it even receives more than is owing. . . . It can give undue play to its punishment-tendencies and inflicts unjust punishments, in order that it may be disregarded in the second dream'. Under these conditions there results a liberation of the death or destructive instinct which has been repressed in the id: the need for punishment releasing this instinct, or it has become so all-powerful that it attracts the death instinct by a positive cathexis.

The understanding of the neuroses has evolved from the earlier conception of repression of the sexual impulses to their interpretations as a defusion of the death instinct, punishing the ego because the sense of guilt, a concept of causality which is based on genetic, biological and psychological principles. The life instinct is synonymous both biologically and psychologically with the sexual impulses. This sexual impulse may give rise to a consciousness of guilt, which in its turn punishes the ego by a defusion of the repressed death instinct to the super-ego, the abode of genital morality. When this punishment mechanism arises, a neurosis results. Possibly at the basis of this destructive tendency which emanates from the super-ego, there may also be elements of moral and ethical principles and threats of punishment derived from early parental impressions.

In every neurosis there can be analytically demonstrated a com-

¹⁴ F. Alexander: 'Dreams in Pairs and Series', *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS*, VI, 1925, pp. 446-452.

plete or partial defusion of the death instinct, either as literal activity or in a disguised symbolic form, as a variant of the castration-complex. Under these circumstances the objective of psychoanalysis should be directed towards a neutralization of the destructive impulses by fusing them again with the antithetical life instinct, this fusion taking place in the positive transference manifestation, as a negative transference represents a continued triumph of the destructive impulse, in the sense of a sadistic aggression towards the analytical situation. The analytical transference process provides a protective or defensive mechanism from the destructive attacks initiated from a defusion of the death instinct. This death fear is symbolically analogous to castration fear: it attacks the ego as a form of punishment from the super-ego, and because of this punishment mechanism the neurotic acts as if the death determinants still possessed an objective reality and validation.

RESISTANCE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS IN ANALYSIS

BY

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Patients undergoing analytic treatment have various methods of calling up resistances to the interpretation of their dreams, thus making it impossible, sometimes for long periods at a time, for the dreams to be utilized for the purpose of the analysis. In such a situation we follow Freud's advice¹ and, giving up the attempt to co-operate with the dreamer in working out his dreams, we do not trouble about their interpretation, but try to make progress with the analysis in other ways. This was the course I myself adopted when analysing a certain young man, till I suddenly realized that in his mind dreams and the effort to interpret them were equated with the unprofitable and tedious prayers of his childhood.² Further and more exhaustive observation has taught me that a resistance of this sort can probably very often be recognized and interpreted as the repetition of former attitudes, which were the patient's reactions to his childish conflicts connected with intellectual work. For instance, in another analysis I found that dreams and the associations to them were equated with daily prayers, and, having realized this, I was able to trace the transference-resistance which was thus manifesting itself back to quite early religious conflicts, and so to master it. This time I was already acquainted with the direct technique for handling this form of resistance, for I had had experience of it in treating a case, which I shall describe in detail in this paper, a case in which an analogous difficulty was cleared up in a very striking manner, and, I think, completely.

A patient, who had always been regarded as having a gift for phantasy and poetry, in her analysis treated the dream-material as equivalent to the phantasies which she wove in her childhood and youth, and repeated in the transference the blows to her narcissism to which this mental tendency had exposed her. Either she recounted such long dreams that the whole hour was too short for us to arrive

¹ 'The Employment of Dream-Interpretation in Psycho-Analysis', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, ch. XXVII.

² Cf. 'Über die Forcierung blasphemischer Phantasien', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Vol. XIII, 1927.

at their meaning or, if the dreams were shorter, her associations were so meagre that no interpretation resulted. I adopted towards this behaviour an attitude of passive observation, but, of course, I constantly showed her in other ways that it was still quite possible to discover what was being concealed. She, on her side, soon reproached me with failing to find any meaning in her dreams (and phantasies) and with making fun of her efforts. This attitude of hers in the transference corresponded to an experience of her early childhood. She was one day standing by the window, lost in phantasy, when one of her brothers came up and asked what she was doing. 'I am talking to God', she replied, an answer which he greeted with cynical derision. Other similar wounds to her feelings were thoroughly probed and discussed in this connection, but her characteristic attitude remained unchanged. Analysis of the transference showed that even her father, whom she loved passionately, had likewise hurt her in this very sensitive spot; her resistance to the interpretation of her dreams was still unbroken. We had yet to rout it out of its final lurking place.

On one occasion at the beginning of the analytic hour the patient produced some dream-material. Then she spoke of one thing and another and finally came to a standstill. After a pause she asked me to tell her how to go on. I replied somewhat abruptly: 'How should I know?' Again there was a long pause. Finally she began to tell me about an evening at the theatre when a new play by a young author had been received by the public with groans. Speaking with deep emotion, she said what a shame it was thus to ridicule an author's honest attempt. This was intended as a hit at me for likewise failing to understand and making fun of her dreams (and, of course, her phantasy-life and creative literary work). But the original occurrence, which we were finally able to bring to her recollection, was an episode in her girlhood. At that time she wrote some tender love-poems to a certain young man. One of these verses, which was meant to express in allegorical fashion the difficulty of making spiritual contact with the beloved, fell into the hands of the brother I mentioned before. The lines contained references to a 'garden' whose 'barred gate' was 'closed' to the man she loved. Her brother, who was as prosaic as he was malicious, derided her sentimentality unmercifully, and, although he had no knowledge of analysis, he quite instinctively made open allusions to the sexual-symbolic meaning underlying her imagery. She was forced to undergo the deeply wounding experience of having her pure, poetic thought and creative work thus dragged in the dirt.

And so it became clear in the analysis that this woman had long cherished an invincible distaste for sexual symbolism and defended this feeling with obstinate resistance against every attempt at dream-analysis. For, if she had allowed it, she would have had always to be prepared for interpretation on symbolic lines.

Once this solution had been arrived at, the analyst was soon able to say to himself that at last he had succeeded in understanding aright, with the patient's help, one of her dreams. It was a real triumph of the technique he had employed when subsequently two results ensued. First, when one of her dreams was being analysed, there emerged certain recollections of the later part of her childhood, recollections hitherto completely forgotten and now highly charged with emotion. (So far nearly all her memories had been reached by working at a different kind of material from that of dreams.) And secondly, as a result of its being now possible to penetrate more quickly into the period of early infancy, the patient reproduced an extraordinarily important recollection which enabled us at a single stride to arrive at the meaning of frequently recurring, typical dreams of hers about water, in which the danger of drowning played a big part. In her analysis she had soon ceased to have any associations to them, and we could make almost nothing of them unless we resorted to the easy symbolic interpretation, which was in this case probably correct and sufficient. The recollection in question was this: When she was quite a little girl she had, while bathing, been forcibly dragged into the water by a woman whom she had good reason to regard as her rival with her father. This experience, which had aroused tremendous anxiety, was the nucleus of the *Œdipus* complex, which in her took a peculiar form, and was the unconscious source from which were derived the elements of the hitherto mysterious dreams about water.

In conclusion, I may point out that the quite specific and individual determinations of the connections which we have investigated in this case, though they stamp it as an extreme example, make it for that very reason specially instructive. As regards the cases upon which I briefly touched at the beginning of this paper, I may say similar mechanisms of resistance are by no means rare in analysis, however varied the individual content of each case may be.³ In all such cases

³ Conversely, we must assume (as I find by experience over and over again) that most people, as children, meet with analogous experiences

what we have to try to do is not to be content with simply combating the resistance, but to go deeper and get rid of it altogether by resolving it through analytical interpretation.

to that here described in regard to their dreams, phantasies, etc. Their sense of guilt prompts them to keep these experiences secret, to conceal them and hide them from strangers. They have, moreover, other motives which are in some sense of an exactly opposite nature (i.e. of which the underlying import is in the main a reproach against others). Here we have what might be termed the individual or ontogenetic contribution (as distinct from the contributing tactics with which we are already familiar) to the motivation of the general cultural resistance to dreams.

TECHNICAL PROCEDURE IN THE ANALYTIC TREATMENT OF CHILDREN

BY

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In the early days of psycho-analysis its critics proclaimed and protested that the material which the analyst claimed to discover in his patients' minds was essentially the product of his own imagination. The psycho-analytic school really corroborated to a limited degree this contention when it began to insist that analysts themselves submit to analysis in order to clear up their own resistances to accepting some of the material spread before them by the patients, and to obviate as far as possible the unconscious projection of their own complexes upon the patients. This step to free the analyst of his own unconscious limitations was followed by another vital procedure in his training, namely, the control analysis, and with the introduction of the latter it has been reported by the controlling teachers that usually the novice sees only a repetition of the salient mechanisms of his own analysis in the first few cases he treats. The tendency to projection is therefore stubborn and persistent even after long analytic training, and is constantly in evidence in daily life, especially in the play, conversation and quarrels of children.

It is generally agreed by those who treat the problems of children on the basis of psycho-analytic interpretation that the ordinary technique of the recumbent position used with adults cannot be followed. Instead, it is customary for the analyst to rely upon the direct, usually artificial conversational or play approach in order to elicit some of the secrets the child so carefully guards. The technical procedure to be described attempts to utilize the material gained through the projection, directly and indirectly.

The Hebrew Sheltering Guardian Orphanage at Pleasantville, New York, established a psychiatric clinic over three years ago in the hope that a psychiatric approach might assist the institution personnel in solving some of the conduct problems which had been baffling them for many years, and had virtually brought educational progress to a standstill in certain of the children. Many of these institution children, who feel that society has wilfully wronged them in denying them the usual home associations which they once experienced and which they

know other children are still enjoying, tend to magnify the solaces of home life in face of its deprivation. Having been exposed prematurely to intense domestic emotional traumas, they are particularly suspicious, uncommunicative, apprehensive and resistive to any inquiry into their attitudes and secret thoughts.

From its inception the clinic has been conducted by physicians analytically well trained, and the head psychiatric social worker, Miss Julia Goldman, has herself been analysed and has had long association with psycho-analysis. The handling of the children has always been on the basis of analytic interpretation rather than punishment or coercion. Notwithstanding her extraordinary talent in securing the confidence of the children, Miss Goldman found that certain of the little girls who were referred to her could not be induced to reveal their difficulties, although she resorted to all of the usual methods of play, persuasion, games and mothering. She then hit upon the technique of allowing the child to play the dominant rôle, pretending that she was not feeling very well and reclining upon a couch. She soon found that the child began to be solicitous, inquiring, and before long was in the rôle of teacher (parent, doctor), projecting upon or revealing to her volubly many long-suppressed difficulties. With a *rapprochement* thus established and still in the recumbent position (worker), she found herself able, through relegating the rôle of mother to the child, to ascertain and discuss freely many of the child's jealously guarded problems.

As time progressed, Miss Goldman found that it was no longer necessary for her even to remark to the child that she was not feeling well; but the child readily accepted the inverted situation, and it has been customary for her to conduct many of her interviews recumbent and passive. Although the method was used at first only with the girls, it proved so serviceable that the male psychiatric social worker attempted it with refractory boys, with whom it was also more effective than any other means previously used.

The following case illustrates very pointedly a projection phenomenon such as a child constantly produces in this method:—

A girl, aged fourteen and a half, was referred to the Child's Guidance in October, 1926, after she had threatened to commit suicide. The attempts at contact with the girl on the part of the psychiatric social worker had not been very fortunate. The child had met with an accident in early childhood which resulted in a slight disfigurement of the face. She became very unhappy over this deformity, which was

accentuated by the mother's prediction that because of it she would never get a husband. The worker used the recumbent method, and soon after the beginning of the interview the child asked the worker why she had not married, and then expressed the opinion that 'men were fools' because they did not realize that the worker 'had a beautiful soul in spite of her homely face.' Immediately thereafter conversation switched to the child's accident, the possibility of face lifting to correct the deformity of her own face, etc. A firm and long enduring feeling of friendship was in this case established between the child and the worker on the basis of the identification of maidenhood and homely faces—a thing which in all probability the child would not have dared to mention to the worker had she not been given the authority to express herself.

Among other cases which had been inaccessible was a girl, aged thirteen and a half, committed by the Children's Court to the Orphanage at Pleasantville after six months in an institution for delinquent children because of unmanageability and truancy. She had also been under observation in the Psychopathic Ward at Bellevue Hospital for violent temper tantrums, 'absolute defiance of authority, stealing, fears of being with strange people, etc.'. She suffered from an intense feeling of not being wanted by her mother and being an outcast from society in general. Neither the psychiatrist nor the psychiatric social worker were able to make anything more than a superficial contact with this extremely suspicious girl. Finally, when the recumbent method was employed, the child, upon entering the room, immediately asked the worker if she were indisposed and whether she could be of any assistance to her. She became demonstrative in her affection, and then, in a low hesitating voice, began to relate the intimate history of her early life—a thing which heretofore the worker had been unable to stimulate in spite of continuous efforts for five months. The material gained in this interview concerned primarily the close attachment which she felt to her father and his love for her; the feelings of unhappiness and insecurity which had taken hold of her since his death, and the embitterment to her mother with all its extensive ramifications. Following this interview, the child again lapsed into reticence, and, although there are times when she is unwilling or unable to discuss her conflicts freely, she has adjusted herself with the other children quite nicely, and will occasionally discuss the fundamental reasons for her misconduct which seems to be largely based on a defiance of her own unjust mother.

The following additional technical observations may be of some value :—

The method at first was utilized only as a last resort, and is usually not continued after a contact has been established. The workers find that they have no difficulty in re-establishing their authority which they have temporarily relinquished to the child ; for, notwithstanding its momentary usurpation of the adult rôle, the child readily surrenders the latter in the face of the superior power, knowledge and experience of the worker, to whom he is quite willing to look for aid. As the method is now used, the worker really no longer ' plays sick ', but merely says that she is fatigued and lies down without any further comment. This obviates the objection which might be made to a deception of the child in the workers playing sick. Of course, the child is unconscious of the value of the material which he reveals through his projection in the rôle of mother or father, but nevertheless remembers quite well what he has expressed, and is henceforth usually willing to utilize this material in further talks with the worker. It might be objected that the child's resentment might cause future difficulties for the worker, but when this happens it must be overcome as the resistances of patients are met in the ordinary analytic situation. Unless such feelings of protest are allowed to come to the surface in the children, certainly there is no possibility of handling them ; and it has been the experience of the Child's Guidance Clinic that the protesting, unruly child is often less urgently in need of help than the furtive, clandestine individual who, because of his continence and reticence, slips through unnoticed in the group.

TWO BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYTIC THEORY

BY

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The following notes are intended to call attention to two regions on the borderline of psycho-analysis and biology, where the methods of the one science may throw light on the problems of the other. My best thanks are due to my friend, Dr. F. O. Stohr, for continual opportunity to consult psycho-analytic literature.

I. INFANTILE SEXUALITY

Freud, in the now classical *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* (second English edition, Washington, 1920, p. 50), distinguishes three phases of masturbatory activity in the development of sexual life. One of these occurs during the nursing period, the second at about the fourth year, and the third at puberty. It has long been known that the onrush of sexual development constituting puberty is associated with a maximum in the rate of bodily growth and the two are probably correlated physiologically.

Recent work ¹ on the rate of growth in man and other mammals has shown that there are three periods when the rate is at a maximum, and that in man these are: (1) just after birth; (2) between the third and the fifth years; and (3) about puberty. It seems therefore that each of the three phases distinguished by Freud is associated with a maximum in the growth rate. We can hardly doubt that some underlying physiological relation exists between them.

II. SADO MASOCHISM

In that highly speculative and daring work, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud has postulated two classes of instincts—*life instincts* associated with sexuality, and *death instincts* associated with the ego. In his discussion of the latter he suggests that the sadistic element in sexuality is derived from a masochistic death instinct, belonging to

¹ For further information on growth rate, see T. Brailsford Robertson, *The Chemical Basis of Growth and Senescence* (Lippincott, 1923). The theoretical discussion is highly speculative and requires further investigation.

the ego which has become associated with sex by way of narcissism, and then turned out on the object. It is doubtful if biologists will agree with these speculations on the nature and classifications of instincts, but the possibility of the presadistic origin of masochism raises questions of the highest interest.

Many papers have been written tracing sadism to a beginning in the oral stage of sexual organization of the infant. Anyone who has watched a cock copulating in a back garden chicken run will realize that such attempts, however interesting from the point of view of ontogeny, go nowhere in explaining phylogenetic origins.

In many rodents we find that the penis is a phantastically developed organ which may bear a considerable armature of horny spikes. These spikes are especially well developed in the hystricomorph series, to which the guinea-pig belongs.² Though these spines may help the male in obtaining a grip, or assist in the passage of the sperm into the Fallopian tubes, they are often so well developed and barbarous in appearance that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that their function, if any, is to give rise to painful stimuli during copulation. It may be mentioned in passing that many peoples, at various cultural levels, affix artificial contrivances carrying spikes, knobs, brushes of hair, etc., to the penis before copulation to enhance the pleasure of the woman.

The presence of these spines on the penes of the rodents is presumably unknown to their possessors, and they form no part of their normal aggressive mechanism. We cannot, therefore, consider the copulation of such an animal as any more sadistic than it would be if the spines were absent; nor can we compare their use to the behaviour of the cock, seizing the neck feathers of his love, designated sadistic above. It seems that we have here a set of structures which by masochistic stimulation of the female enable coitus to be successfully achieved.³

If we descend the animal kingdom to the Mollusca, we find a still more surprising case. The genitalia of many of the land snails contain a structure known as the 'love dart' (*spicula amoris* or *telum veneris*).

² Pocock, *Pr. Zool. Soc.*, 1922, I, pp. 365 *et seq.*

³ Havelock Ellis (*Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Analysis of the Sexual Impulse, Love and Pain*, p. 107) quotes from Cornevin the case of a stallion which was sexually excitable by the cracking of a whip, or occasionally by gentle application of it to its legs.

This is a calcareous weapon secreted by the epithelium of a glandular bag, the 'dart sac' which is everted during copulation. When the sac is everted the dart is pushed into the body of the other participant, inflicting a wound somewhere in the region of the genital orifice. Sadism in the sense of active cruel behaviour is out of the question, for the dart forms no part of the normal aggressive mechanism of the animal, nor can we suppose the latter to be very conscious of what it is doing.

Such clear-cut cases of masochistic stimulation, though rare in the animal kingdom, are sufficiently remote from each other to suggest a widespread and deep-seated possibility of sexual excitation by painful stimuli. This possibility we may examine from an evolutionary point of view. Both the mammalia and the pulmonate mollusca are ultimately derived from groups of animals living in the sea, and we may presume that the direct ancestors of both, in common with many of the lower vertebrates and molluscs, shed eggs into the water, where external fertilization occurred. Internal fertilization prefaced by copulation seems to have been evolved in the higher vertebrates in response to terrestrial conditions, though various intermediate conditions are found in the amphibia, which breed in fresh water. In the Gasteropod molluscs copulation is found in a great variety of higher forms.

The introduction of the penis into the genital orifice of the female is a somewhat violent act which we may suppose to give rise to noxious stimuli in many cases. Even where fertilization is external, as in the case of the frog, the grasp of the male round the female may well be painful. In these cases it is unfortunately impossible to distinguish this element in the mating act by mere observation. In the two cases discussed in detail above we appear to find the noxious stimulation separated out and developed, special organs for its infliction having been evolved. In the course of evolution it would seem that the infliction of pain which originally merely accompanied intromission accidentally, has become a part of the mechanism by which sexual excitation is brought about in the female. The original painful character may have been lost in this transformation. Such appears to be the case with some human masochists, and cases given by Havelock Ellis, for example (*op. cit.*, pp. 75-87) may be instructively compared with an experiment quoted by Pavlov (*Conditioned Reflexes*, Oxford, 1927, p. 29). A dog trained to give an alimentary reflex when a painful stimulus—a strong electric current—was applied

showed no symptoms of discomfort or pain at the application of the stimulus.

Finally, a word must be said about the origin of sadism. It has been pointed out that in the cases of masochism the behaviour of the male is not necessarily sadistic. Many authorities have regarded sadism as the expression of an impulse to mastery, while Havelock Ellis has insisted that pain rather than cruelty is the essential component, and so foreshadowed Freud's later theory that masochism is primary.

In the light of the foregoing discussion some intermediate hypothesis suggests itself. Sadism as known to man is a compound phenomenon, a fusion of an instinct of domination or aggression, such as is associated with sexual behaviour in the cock, and inverted masochism, which brings in the element of pain so prominent in the psychology of the human sadist.

SHORTER COMMUNICATIONS

FARTHINGALE: A SUGGESTED DERIVATION

In the course of some study of minor Elizabethan drama, I was led to look up the derivation of the word 'FARTHINGALE'. I found that authorities differ, and that while Skeat, for example, connects it with the idea of verdant, flourishing, introduced directly into England through the old French form 'verdugalle' (literally, provided with hoops) through the old Spanish 'verdugo' (a young shoot of a tree) from Latin 'viridis', green; Brewer, on the other hand, derives along quite different lines from the French 'vertu garde' (a guard for modesty), corrupted later into 'verdugade', and thence into 'farthingale'.¹

So much divergence indicates some uncertainty on the part of scholarship, and while the meanings in both derivations are appropriately significant of the purpose of a globular garment designed as covering for the female figure, neither etymology seemed fully convincing. I found myself hesitating especially over the possible conversion of 'gade' into 'gale', since no corresponding example of a similar language change occurred to me. But I naturally associated at once with 'nightingale', where 'gale' is admittedly Anglo-Saxon *galan*, to sing—connected, of course, with that group of cognate words, *gala*, *gallant*, *galliard*, etc.—for all of which the oldest known root is Gothic 'gailjan', to rejoice, to behave merrily or noisily.

So I turned up 'gale' in the dictionaries, and found the root origin given as Danish 'gal', meaning furious, used particularly of a furious storm of wind at sea, going back, says Skeat, to the older Icelandic 'gala', to enchant, since storms were raised by witches. This intrusion of the witch element leads into new territory which there is not time here to explore, but it seems clear that the Icelandic 'gala' and the Anglo-Saxon 'galan' must be connected, and that the predominant underlying idea in both is a gust of wind, or breath, in the form of storm or song.

¹ The farthingale was invented, it is said, by a Spanish princess in the fifteenth century. It was introduced into England, by way of the French Court, in the early sixteenth century, and became popular at a time when the immodesty of women's dress (particularly the obtrusive exposure of the breast) was calling for loud comment from divines and serious prose writers of the day. Cp. *Shakespeare's England*, Vol. II, p. 94.

And if that should be the significance of 'gale' in our word, we have to look newly at 'farthing', since by subtracting 'gale' we have reduced it to a probable present participle form with a root 'farth' or 'fart'. I recalled the various meanings of this word given in the New English Dictionary as in use in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: (1) to send forth as wind from the anus; (2) a sow's litter; (3) a ball of light pastry, a 'puff'; an interesting list psychologically, and one that immediately swells FARTHINGALE to vast proportions, turning it, in its fullest content, into one of those voluminously packed verbal portmanteaux that delighted the soul of our rotund and fragile nursery friend, Humpty Dumpty.

The supposition that the root of the word is 'fart', derived simply and directly from the Old English verb 'feortan', has the advantage of bringing it into line with the Scandinavian form 'fartigal', and of consolidating it as a compound noun, both parts of which are of Germanic origin. And if the supposition seem too hazardous, we may justifiably remember that the linguists themselves are often confessedly in doubt, doubts recently expressed by one of the foremost among them in language so apposite to the present theme that we cannot refrain from quoting it: 'Among etymologies found in dictionaries', says Professor Otto Jespersen, 'some are solid and firm as rocks, but . . . not a few are in a gaseous state, and blow here and there as the wind listeth. Some of them are no better than poisonous gases, from which may Heaven preserve us!' ²

Of the 'gaseous state' of FARTHINGALE there can be no doubt, and it is not difficult to understand how reverberations of sound and sense have been borne backwards and forwards on the winds of surmise between the obvious meaning of 'verdugade' and the socially unacceptable 'fart'; and how the decent ears of scholarship might well be attuned to catch the echoes, while missing the simple and primitive call note out of which the echoes were born. It is not necessary here to stress the underlying correspondence of the symbolism between 'young shoots of a tree' and the idea of 'flatus', and it is almost equally unnecessary to point out the strengthening of interchange that would result from a certain similarity of form between the two words. The root of the Old English verb 'feortan' appeared in Middle English as 'vert' (cp. the first line of the *Cuckoo Song*, dated about 1550: 'Bulluc sterteth, bucke verteth'), while the 'd' of

² *Language: its Nature, Development and Origin*, 1922, p. 307.

'verdugade' might well be responsible for 'fardingale' with a 'd', an English variant frequent from Elizabethan times onwards. It is moreover worth noting that this form of the word persisted dialectically as late as the nineteenth century in the word 'fardingbag', with its significant meaning of 'the second stomach of a cow'.³

Indeed, our hypothesis as to the origin of farthingale once accepted, we come upon a large number of words clinging naturally, and all unsuspecting of the etymologists, in close family relationship to the folds of its ample skirts. Of such is an arresting little group, spelt variously 'farse', 'farce', or 'fard', all concerned with the idea of *filling out* or *stuffing*, particularly applied to the stuffing of birds in connection with food for the table, which is interesting, not only because it links them with the 'puff pastry' accepted meaning of fart, but also, though perhaps fancifully, because birds are the only animals in creation that depend for their method of locomotion on the presence of air-stuffing in their 'feathered raiment'. The N.E.D. gives as one meaning for 'farse' or 'fard' (Latin: *fartura*, stuffing), 'to cram the stomach with food, to pack'; (cp. 'fardingbag' above, and also 'fardel' or 'farthel', meaning a little chest or receptacle into which things can be 'farded' or 'stuffed'). For the same word, which it derives however from a different source, from O.E. 'faran'—to go, it supplies the meaning of 'motion, rush, impetus; hence impetuosity, ardour'; while yet a third meaning, that of over-packing, smearing or painting—used generally contemptuously of ladies who seek to embellish natural defects—is given as 'of obscure origin'—an obscurity somewhat lightened by the juxtaposition of words in such a phrase as that used in Rutherford's *Letters* (1637), where he speaks of 'This farded and over-gilded world'.

Hamlet's oft-quoted 'Who would *fardels* bear?' is possibly even more interesting to our purpose, since it is apparently a cross link between the meaning of fart and verdugo; for 'fardel', a burden, was originally a burden of faggots or twigs, suggestive at once of 'the young shoots of a tree' and the hoops of the farthingale. One other curious illustration of the extended use of the meaning of fart must suffice, viz. the surprising definition given of it in Halliwell's *Dictionary of Archaic and Provincial Words*, 'a Portugal fig'. Between the words fart and fig no etymological relationship can be established, so that it

³ Cp. Miss Jackson's *Shropshire Wordbook*, 1879.

seems clear the connection here must be in the underlying symbolism.⁴ The origin of fig and its derivatives is still an unsolved puzzle, but it does not need the support of Tommasseo and other early dictionary-makers to convince us that the word 'had an indecent meaning'. The phrase 'I care not a fig' was invariably accompanied on the mediæval stage by that age-old gesture of derision and contempt, the insertion of the thumb in the mouth, or of the thumb between two fingers.⁵ The implication here involved receives interesting confirmation from the fact that in the East and West Indies the word 'fart' was popularly applied to a banana; the resemblance between a bunch of bananas and the fingers of a hand, between a banana, a thumb and a phallus is, of course, apparent, and is possibly accountable also for the Malay word for banana, '*pisang*', a form which, I believe, can be shown to be allied to Latin '*piscis*', fish, and its derivatives, with onomatopœic origin connected with an excretory process. But the way of onomatopœic origins craves wary walking, and we need not travel further to carry home a suspicion, if not a conviction, of the underlying relationship that existed between these many words, mostly in common use in Shakespeare's time, and nearly all, significantly enough, obsolete to-day.

A week or two after I had dismissed the problem of farthingale from my thoughts, both in connection with my work and in the course of my analysis, I dreamed the following dream:—

I thought that I was big with child, but though my figure was grotesquely large, I was aware that I was filled not with an unborn babe, but with empty air. I was, in effect, blown up like a bladder,⁶ so that I moved lightly, buoyantly, with the effortless ease of a vessel on the tide, as if the

'. . . winds of all the corners kiss'd your sails,
To make your vessel nimble'.

Cym., 2, 4, 28.

But although the wind (*gale*) idea was prevalent, as it were both internally and externally to myself, since as a vessel on the ocean, I kept up continuous movement, yet the movement itself had a sort of

⁴ The connecting link perhaps survives in the use of 'figgum'—a term for the conjurer's popular trick of spitting forth fire.

⁵ Cp. 'Behold next I see Contempt marching forth, giving me the fico with the thombe in his mouth'.—*Wits Miserie*, 1596.

⁶ Cp. 1 *Henry IV*, 2, 4, 353:—
Falstaff: 'A plague of sighing and grief! it blows a man up like a bladder'.

non-volitional, pleasure-giving, rhythmic quality, so that I felt myself to be also a boat chained to the side of a pier, gently rising and falling on the swell of the tide; more prosaically perhaps, I was also the great inflated silver fish, R.101, as I had seen it some days previously, nosing its rigid way through the invisible water of the air; but here again, the words 'tethered to its moorings' seemed to be present with distinctness in my dream.

Moreover, the scene through which I moved was crowded with hosts of smaller, insignificant phantom vessels, all behaving in the same way; the whole scene was watery and nebulous, yet at the same time gaudy and theatrical, so that it reached my waking mind as a kind of burlesque of the opening passage in *The Merchant of Venice*, where Salarino, seeking to comfort Antonio for his sadness at the suspected loss of his merchandise, says:—

'Your mind is tossing on the ocean;
There, where your argosies with portly sail,
Like signiors and rich burghers on the flood,
Or, as it were, the pageants of the sea,
Do overpeer the petty traffickers,
That curt'sy to them, do them reverence,
As they fly by them with their woven wings'.

M. of V., I, I, 8.

'The pageants of the sea' seemed peculiarly appropriate, for although I was proud of being an argosy, laden with costly merchandise, I was at the same time, like Antonio, 'sad' with the knowledge that in reality no treasure was there, and that the whole performance was in some sense a make-believe; more than that, I was aware that there was something extremely funny and festal (*gala*) about it all; like Titania and Oberon, I

'... laugh'd to see the sails conceive
And grow big-bellied with the wanton wind'.

M.N.D., 2, I, 128.

I swayed and courtesied and goose-stepped, as if I were parodying the foppish conceits of a *gallant*; I reared myself up into would-be dignified postures as though I were mimicking all the intricate steps of a *galliard*; and this, indeed, was all in keeping with the picture, for I was attired in court dress of the Elizabethan period, with all its characteristic eccentricity of size, so that below the tightly fitting pointed stomacher the outline of my inflated figure was veiled by a 'cart-wheel' farthin-

gale ; and I awoke to consciousness of that scene in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, where Julia is whimsically consulting her maid as to the pattern of the male attire she shall don in order the more easily to reach the presence of her lover :—

Lucetta : ' What fashion, madam, shall I make your breeches ?

Julia : That fits as well as—" Tell me, good my lord,
What compass will you wear your farthingale ? "
Why, even that fashion thou best lik'st, Lucetta.

Lucetta : You must needs have them with a codpiece, madam '.

Two Gent., 2, 7, 49.

It is admittedly easy for the ignorant to flounder in the morass of conjectural derivations, and I, neither etymologist nor psychologist, dare not dogmatize. But, like Mark Antony before me, when the sober reasonings of the scholarly Brutus had failed to convince, I can only say that—

' I speak not to *disprove* what Brutus spoke,
But here I am to speak what I do know '.

Happily there is no need to seek to disprove the ' verdant ' or the ' modesty guard ' suggestions of the scholars, but one may perhaps accept them as insecurely realized surface structures, built unknowingly on the foundations of all the deeper implications that underlie a combination of the words ' fart ' and ' gale '—implications in this case so ' farcically ' substantiated by the bladder-bauble fooling of that prince of jesters, the Antic Unconscious.

M. A. Cullis (London).

SYMBOL—METAPHOR

The differentiation between symbol and metaphor has been clearly expounded by Ernest Jones.¹ He explained also how it is that the same image can be employed in both a metaphorical and a symbolic sense. It is a common experience to find the same image serving at one and the same time in both functions. The following instance has, by association, some historical psycho-analytic interest.

A patient's analysis had been for some little time occupied with pregenital phantasies and experiences and his feminine passive attitude. On one occasion a recital of some additional phantasies was followed

¹ *Papers in Psycho-Analysis*, 3rd Edition. ' The Theory of Symbolism ', p. 154.

by a prolonged pause which was broken by the patient exclaiming 'Bottle-washer'. Then another pause and he went on, 'I don't know why that word came into my head; it doesn't seem to have any connection with what I have been talking or thinking about'. In the remainder of the session the bottle-washer was imaged as a lab. boy cleaning out flasks with a brush and the actual expression had been determined by an occurrence of the previous day. The lab. boy then became myself engaged in the task of cleaning out the filth from himself—he was full of it: dirt and distasteful thoughts which must be washed out. The lab. boy holds a very subordinate post in the laboratory, although he is useful enough in his way. The analyst's post was just about on a level with that of the boy. The bottle-washer is employed in the public-house and is engaged in a cheap and unskilled menial occupation. The term by extension is applied, as we know, in a derisory sense to anyone who is ready to do any kind of job, even a dirty job, for his employer—a hanger-on of the great. All these attributes applied to the relationship between the patient and his underling the analyst or bottle-washer. In so far the image was employed in its metaphorical meaning. But the bottle-washer of the image was occupied by putting his brush into the flask; the symbolic meaning of penis and vagina—(the flask of the image had a narrow neck and wider body)—were sufficiently obvious and corresponded to a wish fulfilment in phantasy. The analyst was thus an object of sexual desire to the passive-feminine side of the analysand (symbolic use) and an object of scorn for his low occupation, and of little use to the analysand (metaphor). A further symbolic meaning is traced through the analogy of the flask and its cleansing process with the urethral-excretory functions (laboratory-lavatory); pointing also to the cloacal phantasies of the analysand.

I have said that the term has an historic interest. When the expression came from the patient the analyst was himself rather startled, for his mind jumped back to a very similar expression (chimney-sweeping), used some forty-six years ago by that patient whose treatment by Breuer became the starting-point of Freud's work.

The similarity between the 'humorous' chimney-sweeping of Frl. Anna O . . .² and the bottle-washing of my patient is pretty obvious. Both are somewhat lowly occupations and have to do with

² *Studien über Hysterie*, von Dr. Jos. Breuer and Professor Dr. Sigm. Freud, 2nd Edition, 1909, p. 23.

cleansing processes ; brushes are inserted into hollow places, are moved about by the agent and removed. In both occupations something like dirt is removed (dirty water—soot). I will not remind the reader that no analysis of the term chimney-sweeping used by Frl. Anne O . . . was made and Freud reminds us that from the *Studien über Hysterie* one could not easily have guessed what significance sexuality played in the ætiology of the psycho-neuroses ; although, as Freud points out, anyone will now easily guess the real interpretation of her symptom-formation.³ I should add that my patient was not read in psycho-analytic literature and did not know German. That new words and terms can be used with the same symbolic connotation by different people and in different parts of the world without diffusion is known to us from earlier experiences, e.g. aeroplanes, Zeppelins, etc.

M. D. Eder (London).

PSYCHO-ANALYTIC INTERPRETATION OF TWO STATEMENTS FROM THE TALMUD

The Talmud, in discussing the deliverance of the Israelites from Egypt, makes two statements that are noteworthy because of their implication when viewed from the standpoint of modern psycho-analytic theory. In Tractate Sotah, 11b, we find that Rav Evyarah taught 'because of the virtuous women of that generation Israel was delivered from Egypt'. In Midrash Rabbah, Numbers, Chapter 3, we read 'because the Israelites kept away from prostitutes God delivered them from Egypt'.

The departure of the Israelites from Egypt may be regarded as a step forward in their racial and cultural evolution. From a race of slaves they became a race of freemen. That the Rabbis 'explained' this amelioration of the racial status of the Jews on the basis of their chastity will immediately call to mind Freud's views on the relation of sexual taboo to the rise of human culture.

Freud maintains that with the development of the taboos surrounding the sexual, and especially incestuous, desires of primitive man, the energy generated by the sexual instinct was deflected from its immediate goal (sublimation), giving rise to the multitude of human

³ Freud, *Collected Papers*, Vol. I. 'The Psycho-Analytic Movement', p. 293.

and social activities implied in the word culture. The ancient Rabbis, with their keen insight, may have intuitively sensed this mechanism of racial growth when they linked up the cultural emancipation of the Israelites with the inhibitions of their sexual life.

(3) Max Levin (Philadelphia).

BOOK REVIEWS

Critique of Love. By Fritz Wittels. (The Macaulay Company, New York, 1929. Pp. 317. Price \$3.50.)

The appearance of this book in America is a most fortunate contribution to the literature aiming to popularize psycho-analysis. Most books on this subject do not go beyond a mere statement of statistics on marriage and the love-life. They do not dare to tackle the scientific point of view thoroughly because of the implications. In this book the reader is, however, ingeniously introduced to fundamental material which leads to a comprehension of the causes of neuroses.

It is by no means a clinical book. The author himself calls it 'an original study in applied psycho-analysis'. The first chapter, 'Freud's Pathways', is an epitomized survey of the history of psycho-analysis. In the chapter on 'Sex Deviations' important data on the psychology of the love-life is indirectly presented. Dr. Wittels' complete discussion of all the possible outcomes of the sexual impulse suggests to the reader corrections for the deviations from the desirable outcomes. This is equally true of his treatment of the chapters on perversions, such as masked sadism, bisexuality, narcissism, etc. Since a knowledge of perversions postulates a knowledge of the physical zones on which the perversion is based, Dr. Wittels discusses the phases of libido organization.

Inasmuch as the book is intended for the general public, the chapter 'Parents and Children' is worthy of special mention. The discussion of the Œdipus complex as the nucleus of all neurosis is fourfold, namely, love and hate of the father and love and hate of the mother. The two illustrations used are Hamlet and Don Juan. Other members of the family, siblings, step-parents etc., are discussed in relation to the rôle they play in the development of the super-ego. The inhibited love of Wagner (Tristan), Rousseau, and Dante is presented in the chapter 'Le Grand Amour'. An entire chapter is devoted to the transformation of love into hate in 'Great Haters', and another chapter to love and the part it plays in marriage. The concluding chapter, 'The Child Woman', dealing with what is clinically known as psycho-sexual infantilism, is really a study of the character of the extreme feminine type of woman.

A. S. Lorand.

★

The Psychology of the Infant. By Siegfried Bernfeld. Translated by Rosetta Hurwitz. (Kegan Paul, 1929. Pp. xi + 309. Price 15s. net.)

This is one of the most important books on child psychology published in the English language in recent years. It offers no new facts, but it

gathers together all the more significant descriptive data of infant behaviour in the first year of life, as given to us by the familiar names of Preyer, Sully, Shinn, Darwin, Tracy, Baldwin, Stern, Claparède, Koffka, Bühler, and the more recent Continental observers, and builds them into a coherent whole on the basis of psycho-analytical theory. It thus compels the attention of both groups, the academic child psychologists and the working psycho-analyst. For the former, new significance is given to the familiar facts of infant history. The psychologists' store of descriptive data ceases to be a mere lucky-bag of disparate items, and falls into true growth patterns of psychological structure. And for the latter, the theoretical outcome of psycho-analytic work with adults and children is tested against the earliest observable facts of actual behaviour.

The date of original publication of the book (1925) precludes the more recent landmarks in theory, such as *Hemmung*, *Symptom und Angst*. The author refers to Rank's work on the trauma of birth, in order to reject the specific elements in Rank's views. In his discussion of instincts, Bernfeld deliberately sets on one side the grouping offered in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, since 'the life- and death-instincts are biological forces, they are beyond the conception of the individual'; and 'for understanding the child, it is more important to separate these two groups [i.e. the ego-instincts and the sexual instincts] than to relate them'. With this, of course, most working students of the concrete psychological history of the individual would still agree.

Bernfeld makes a detailed and acute analysis in relation to the Freudian theory of instincts, of the observable different movement-impulses of the new-born, of the various phases of development between birth and weaning of the specific instincts, and of their interplay in concrete phases of behaviour. The observable groups are: defence and discharge movements, the nutritional instinct, the sexual instinct, and visual pleasure; but these readily reduce to the theoretical grouping of the nutritional and sexual instincts.

The first progress comes about through (1) the conversion of anxiety into pleasure, (2) the differentiation of instinctual aims, and (3) the organization of (a) movements, to subserve first pleasure-gain and then mastery; and (b) of unorganized discharge phenomena into definite affects. 'Maturation of motor functions occurs in such a way that the organs become erotogenic through suitable libidinal cathexis, and that definite pleasure-giving movements whose structure is essentially innate are performed numerous times for the sake of this pleasure, and thus attain the effect of motor drill for these movement-melodies'.

The end of the first phase of development is reached at three months, when the head has become emancipated from the fright-reaction and discharge tendencies, and has become adapted to pleasure-gains in its new

biosphere. The infant now becomes a 'grasper' (as Sigismund and others had long noted), remaining so during the second and third quarters of the year, these together forming a unitary period of development, dominated by the complex 'instinct of mastery'.

In their first organization, both eye and hand serve the function of oral mastery; and within the phase of oral mastery lies the sub-phase of annihilation of things seen and touched. Later both eye and hand attain independence of oral aims, and serve rather for the gratification of the whole developing ego. 'The original use of object libido is in the service of mastery, of oral annihilation. . . . Projecting adult affects back, one would say that the grasper's "love" expresses itself in the forms of "hate" '.

With the onset of dentition and of the impulses of biting and chewing, this second phase comes to an end, the disappointment in the oral zone due to the pains of teething leading to its desexualization. Henceforth it becomes the primary carrier of hate and of the annihilation of objects.

These subjective changes, together with the actual loss of the breast, demand a further re-organization of the libido comparable in many respects to that occurring at birth. The differences between the 'trauma' of weaning and the true trauma of birth are discussed in detail, along with the problem of anxiety. And the significance of weaning in relation to the development of the body-ego, of the affective attitudes, and of perception and the relation to the outer world concludes the survey.

In view of the great interest and importance of this book for everyone concerned with infant psychology, it is hardly less than a tragedy that the English version is so badly written as to be almost unreadable. It is a long time since we read anything that so bemused our understanding and tried our temper. The effort of reading it is rather like walking over a ploughed field—the further one goes, the heavier one's feet get! And particularly is this so wherever the more difficult theory calls for the utmost clarity and incisiveness of presentation. We fear that there are few academic psychologists in England who will not credit the obscurity and lack of articulation of expression in this book to the theories themselves.

Susan Isaacs.



La Psicanalisi. Scienza Dell'io o Del Mistero-Problema Psicico. By Silvio Tissi. (Ulrico Hoepli, Milano, 1929. Pp. 262.)

The literature on psycho-analysis in Italian is still small, and we welcome this interesting addition to it. Three-fifths of the book are taken up with a very clear introductory account of psycho-analysis, the greater part of which is devoted to the subject of dreams and their interpretation. A chapter each is then given to a psycho-analytic study of Pirandello,

Shakespeare, Tolstoy and Bernard Shaw respectively. I think this is the first time the last-named gentleman has been honoured in this way; the study in question is a consideration of Vivie's neurosis in *Mrs. Warren's Profession*.

E. J.

★

Zur Psychoanalyse. By Professor Dr. E. Raimann. (Urban & Schwarzenberg, Berlin, Vienna, 1924.)

The author of this treatise is not appearing here for the first time as a critic of psycho-analysis. This book suffers from the same lack of objectivity as earlier and shorter criticisms by him have done. He asserts that Freud and psycho-analysis have not furnished science with a single useful point of view. If this is so, it is hard to understand why the writer thinks it necessary to devote a whole book to the subject. I shall refrain from considering his objections in detail, because at so many points his opposition manifests itself underneath his ostensibly objective arguments.

Abraham (Berlin).

★

The Neuroses. By Israel S. Wechsler, M.D. (W. B. Saunders Company, Ltd., London, 1929. Pp. 330. Price 21s.)

Dr. Wechsler has followed up his *Text-book of Clinical Neurology* by one devoted to the neuroses. In the present state of the medical curriculum, a text-book which will put before the student in a simple form the modern theory of the neuroses is very necessary.

A satisfactory feature of Dr. Wechsler's book is that, although he gives most modern views, he stresses throughout the psycho-analytic method and theory. Dr. Wechsler adopts the usual method of presentation of clinical medicine, dealing in separate chapters with the mechanisms, etiology, classification, clinical manifestations, diagnosis and treatment of the group of diseases under consideration. Like the great majority of text-books, this one suffers from over-simplification and its attendant evils. The pedagogic demand for definition has resulted in that type of error which it is least easy to nail down: the distortion arising from loss of context. There is no actual misrepresentation of psycho-analytical theory, and yet there is an unreality in many of his descriptions, which leaves a very unsatisfactory impression on anyone who has had clinical experience of the neuroses.

At the end of his book Dr. Wechsler gives a very good brief bibliography as a guide in their reading for students and general practitioners interested in the subject.

S. L. Yates.

Sleep and the Treatment of Its Disorders. By R. D. Gillespie, M.D., M.R.C.P., London. (Baillière, Tindall and Cox. Pp. 267. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

Dr. Gillespie's clinical classification of the methods of treatment of sleeplessness he advocates is sensible and valuable. He rightly condemns the view that sleeplessness is the only symptom to be considered in a sufferer, and that sleeplessness in itself makes for insanity, suicide, etc. But insomnia, like other symptoms which gain ascendancy, often requires adequate treatment in itself. Sleeplessness is not, however, always distressing or unwelcome; periods of mental alertness in some individuals are accompanied by lessened need of sleep, two or three hours being often sufficient for several weeks on end; in the same individual states of inactivity and lethargy are accompanied by increasing sleep—eight to ten hours or more.

Dr. Gillespie observes that the mental causes of insomnia are various. Clinically two main types may be recognized—one accompanied by not unpleasurable excitement, the insomnia due so frequently to sexual tension, and the other accompanied by restlessness and great displeasure, this form so frequently due to some feeling of unconscious guilt inhibiting sleep.

In the pathology of sleep the author deals very thoroughly with the major forms of morbid sleeplessness, but I think something might have been said about the sleepiness which is so common a symptom in the psychoneuroses—perhaps as common as insomnia in this condition. It has happened to the analyst to find his patient asleep during the greater part of the hour's treatment. Such patients awake from prolonged sleep quite unrefreshed and find in sleep a sure retirement from all activity.

The section on the treatment by drugs contains all that any practitioner could require—there is put on the market some new variety of the barbitone group nearly every month.

The last chapter on the theories of the nature of sleep is perhaps the most interesting and the least satisfactory. After reviewing the various psychological views the author concludes that sleep is in fact a positive process with characteristics of its own, discontinuous with those of mere rest, and those characteristics, according to Pawlow, are those of actual inhibition.

It seems fairly certain that sleep is not merely rest—for as the body and mind still function during sleep, all that is obtained by sleep could be obtained by lying in a quiet darkened room in the recumbent position.

If sleep in man a mere evolutionary disharmony like the body hair, Hollingsworth's view that sleep is an unnecessary stupor—that sleep is a neurosis deserves consideration. The psychological aspects of sleep are discussed rather summarily; the psycho-analytical school sees something

more in sleep than an analogy with the prenatal intra-uterine condition ; it sees a narcissistic withdrawal of the libido from the external world which does offer an explanation of many of the phenomena that Dr. Gillespie sets forth in his useful monograph.

★

M. D. Eder.

The Layman Looks at Doctors. By S. W. and J. T. Pierce. (Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1929. Pp. 251. Price \$2.00.)

This is a loosely written account of the experiences of a young woman who suffers from some form of functional nervous disorder shortly after her marriage. The description of her symptoms is too indefinite to warrant any attempt at a psychiatric nomenclature. However, the patient and her husband feel that she was thoroughly misunderstood by the various physicians who treated her successively in sanatoria by minimization, methodic brutality, encouragement, sex appeal, terminology, experimentation, efficiency and 'common sense', until she finally came under the care of the resourceful psycho-analyst by whom she claims to have been cured. She has apparently learned her lesson by rote of the mechanisms supposedly responsible for her depression and phobias, but any critical analyst, both from her account and also from the fact that she feels called upon to extol her cure, would undoubtedly entertain doubts about its reality. One is inclined to think that the patient suffered from a possibly self-limited attack of depression, and to consider her book as a testimonial of the unresolved transference to her latest doctor. While her jibes at the frailties, stupidities and foibles of her long list of medical attendants are amusing, even though at times apparently justifiable, the miracle of psycho-analysis is also overstated.

C. P. Oberndorf.

★

The New Psychology of the Unconscious. By C. W. Valentine, M.A., B.Sc., D.Phil. (London, Christophers, 1928. Pp. xiv + 162. Price 4s. 6d.)

When Ferenczi's *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis* ran out of print, the publishers, without consulting either the author or translator, re-issued the same book under the title of *Sex and Psycho-Analysis*. Professor Valentine is not quite so barefaced as this, but the present book is substantially the same—with an additional chapter—as his *Dreams and the Unconscious*, which, presumably, has also run out of print. In his preface he writes : ' I am glad to find that, after six years, there is little that seems to need correction '. Like the Bourbons, therefore, he has forgotten nothing and learnt nothing, and the criticisms of the blunders he committed in his first edition have left him unmoved. We have nothing further to say of the present volume, except to refer the reader to the review published in this JOURNAL (Vol. III, 1922, p. 77) of the first edition.

E. J.

Sisyphus, or The Limits of Psychology. By M. Jaeger. (Kegan Paul, London, 1929. Pp. 94. Price 2s. 6d.)

The general tenor of this readable little book may be indicated by the following quotation :—

‘ The possible twists in the maze of consciousness are endless and no psychologist is ever likely to find his way through them, however many trials and errors he may make. He may try to escape it, like Watson, by denying its existence, but few have the courage, or the blindness, for that counsel of despair. Yet the mere attempt to approach the problem directly brings a curious sense of weariness and repulsion—the intuition of futility. It is only the artist, edging towards the mystery, darting from tree to tree, catching glimpses instantly lost again, who can begin to shew us something of our own uniqueness ’ (p. 80).

‘ This uneasiness ’,

the author modestly says in another place,

‘ is perhaps worth analysis, if only in order that the experts may set about expelling it ’ (p. 7).

The first step of the ‘ expert ’, if he accepts the challenge, will probably be to investigate whether the ‘ uneasiness ’ and the ‘ sense of weariness and repulsion—the intuition of futility ’, are not subjectively determined phenomena of the author’s own mind ; whether, in fact, he is not afraid that psychology may fail because at bottom he hopes that it may fail—perhaps in order that we may preserve our own ‘ uniqueness ’ from the profaning process of analysis. Apart from this, the author’s doubts are chiefly concerned with two problems (between which he does not perhaps distinguish as clearly as he might do), i.e. (1) What special difficulties are imposed upon psychology by the fact that it investigates the very tool and weapon of all investigation ? (2) Do not all attempts at the application of psychology involve the assumption of disputable ethical assumptions ? Both problems it must be admitted are worthy of serious thought. The first has already been the subject of innumerable discussions in philosophical societies and periodicals. Perhaps the safest course for the psychologist, when confronted once again with the question (to which Mr. Jaeger does not add any new contribution), is to adopt a frankly pragmatic attitude and to point to the fact that psychology has made what real progress it has achieved by boldly ignoring epistemological conundrums, and by insisting that it is the business of the philosopher rather than of the psychologist himself to say just how these achievements have been possible, and what bearing they have upon the general theory of knowledge.

The charge involved in the second question has been less often heard (since applied psychology is itself new), and is certainly worthy of every

consideration. It is a charge which cannot be avoided. Thus, if Freud takes the 'primacy of the intellect', or Watson takes 'adaptability to environment', as goals towards which applied psychology should aim, it is of course necessary that we should remember that other goals are possible. In particular it is essential to take due account of the alloplastic as well as the autoplasic aspects of education and development. Human desires must be the ultimate criterion of what is good, but a victory of human desire over environment can only be achieved by an understanding of, and a conformity to, the ultimate laws of this environment. It is this that is meant when it is said that the reality principle is only the pleasure principle at a higher level.

J. C. F.

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Science and Personality. By William Brown, M.A., M.D.(Oxon.), D.Sc.(Lond.). With a Foreword by Sir Oliver Lodge. (Oxford University Press, 1929. Pp. 258. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

It is to be remarked of most volumes of collected papers and addresses that, however wide the range of the author's interest, in the long run some few tendencies or personal attitudes stand in relief if only by reason of their constant repetition in various guises. Indeed the fascination induced by 'drawing the coverts' for these individual stigmata is a legitimate recompense for the reviewer's labour. As against this satisfaction must be placed the legitimate state of exasperation induced by the discovery that a book with the definite, if somewhat comprehensive, title of *Science and Personality*, confesses itself in the Preface to be about the nature of religion in relation to science and philosophy, and ultimately proves to be a collection of papers on a variety of psychological topics, some of them of an extremely controversial nature. One is irresistibly reminded of the condition of a housewife's satchel on market day, when the more protuberant bulges of an irregular mass indicate the catholicity of her requirements. This is a thousand pities. There are very few in this country so qualified as Dr. Brown to write with authority on the relations of Religion and Philosophy to Psychology and (or) Science. But the upshot of this effort is that it is a disappointing book on the psychology of religion, a goodish book on the philosophical aspects of academic psychology, and a bad book on the controversial side of analytical psychology.

For the convenience of readers it may be said that the theory and practice of psycho-analysis is repeatedly referred to throughout the book, and that some chapters are practically exclusively concerned with exposition and criticism of psycho-analytic theory and practice; but it must be said at once that although Dr. Brown is well qualified to write on many aspects of psychology, he is evidently poorly qualified to write on psycho-

analysis. This does not imply that he has not read psycho-analytical literature ; there is evidence that he has read a good number of important contributions to this subject. There is definite evidence that he has been sufficiently interested to *commence* a personal analysis ; the fact is insisted upon in an emphatic footnote. And there is evidence that he practises a technique which, although totally distinct in all essentials from psycho-analytic technique, might be regarded by the uninstructed as having some resemblances to that technique : Dr. Brown indeed calls it ' deep analysis ', by which he means analysis of the deep layers of the mind. Nevertheless, the unfortunate fact remains that if we are to judge him by this book, he is not competent to pronounce upon psycho-analysis.

It is not to be imagined that the freedom of the Press is denied to those who merely read the literature of psycho-analysis ; they are entirely free to say what they like about it. Indeed many whose acquaintance with psycho-analysis is limited to general reading of its theoretical literature have succeeded in talking about it with a good deal of natural insight and common sense. But Dr. Brown does not base his claims to speak with authority merely on his general reading ; he claims the right to criticize on the ground that he has himself ' been analysed by a leading Freudian for several months involving ninety-two hours of analysis ', and it is definitely implied that when to this is added the fact that he has conducted prolonged ' analyses ' of a number of patients, he can speak with some authority. It is definitely implied that on the basis of analytical experience he has the right to make statements such as the following : ' We cannot without more ado accept Freudian interpretations *en bloc*. We need to be as empirical as possible in this matter. It is new work, and we must get new material if we are to make any advance in theory ' (p. 136).

The above sentence has been singled out because it is a typical example of Dr. Brown's method ; it must be said that though Dr. Brown occasionally sounds a little peevish in criticism, he is seldom, in this book at any rate, directly aggressive. For this reason alone the uninstructed reader is likely to have considerable sympathy with his attitude. It all sounds so very reasonable and natural. Here he is, an open-minded inquirer, ready to recognize the genius of Freud, willing to adopt whatever part of Freud's method he finds workable, accepting some conclusions but sceptical about others, envisaging new discoveries and anxious to play his part in exploration as free as possible from personal bias and theoretical preconception. This is definitely the view taken by Sir Oliver Lodge in his ' foreword ' to the book, when he declares handsomely that Dr. Brown is ' an open-minded investigator '. Of course Sir Oliver admits that at the time of writing he had not read the purely psychological sections of the book, but there is no reason to suppose that he would have altered his mind. Little wonder then if less distinguished students of philosophy and psychology

regard Dr. Brown as essentially a man of scientific method, one who has kept his feet and his head on the giddy and precarious paths of emotional investigation.

And yet ! Let us see. On p. 134 he expounds a fundamental part of the Freudian method by saying : ' The patient lies on a couch for an hour at a time, falls into a *passive mental state*, an uncritical *receptive* state of mind . . . ' (Reviewer's italics). On p. 168 he says, ' What *we* find in *psycho-analysis* is this—that when the patient has talked for a number of hours, *as soon as he lies on the couch, he passes into a dream-like definitely hypnotic state* ' (Reviewer's italics). Now there are four ways in which Dr. Brown could have arrived at this conclusion. He might have read about it somewhere ; he might have formed the view as the result of his own experience of his own method (deep analysis) ; he might have experienced this state in the personal analysis he commenced ; or he might have imagined it. If he is depending on hearsay evidence, his views evidently date from the now almost prehistoric times before psycho-analysis had found it necessary to free itself from all forms of hypnotic procedure. If his experience relates to his own method, then he has no right to talk of what ' we ' find in ' psycho-analysis ' ; and if his views are based on his experience of his own uncompleted analysis (though from the evidence contained in other paragraphs this does not seem to have been the case), we are entitled to ask why he did not complete this analysis before drawing general conclusions from it. Even if it had been the case, why generalize ? Surely even in his own methods of deep analysis he can observe that this ' passive ', ' receptive ' ' hypnotized ' attitude is the rarest of attitudes under conditions of free association. Indeed, if he cannot observe the variety of active, critical, non-receptive ' openings ' in his work, he is definitely open to the challenge that his deep analysis is only a camouflaged variety of suggestion in which the preliminary gambits of seemingly analytic detachment are employed to strengthen *rapproch*. True, certain hysterics and many schizoids behave somewhat in this way ; they may even combine seemingly passive with glaringly non-receptive attitudes by falling asleep. But in the first case, the seeming receptivity is already a heightened transference positive masking a stronger transference negative, and in the second there exists a narcissistic protective shield against the processes of association. It is sufficient to say that if any registered student of psycho-analysis doing control analyses at the Psycho-Analytic Clinic were to report that for ninety (or nine) hours his patient has been in a passive receptive state, he would go away from the control interview with whatever is the psycho-analytic equivalent of a flea in his ear.

It is essential to be clear on this point : if a critic openly advances intellectualistic grounds for his criticisms, he can be accorded dialectic honours on the field of discussion, but if he professes to speak as a tech-

nician, familiar with and trained in the method of investigation, it is incumbent on him to prove that he has been trained before his criticisms are considered on that level. He can still, it is true, be met on intellectualistic, philosophic or religious levels, but he cannot be considered a serious contributor to technical discussion. Dr. Brown openly states that he has good claims to be so considered, and it must be stated just as openly that he has not made these claims good.

What then is to be said about his intellectualistic views and criticisms? First of all there can be no doubt as to the very high order of Dr. Brown's intellectual attainments and training; it would appear that he writes lucidly and interestingly on practically any subject to which he turns his attention with the one important exception of psycho-analytical psychology. On this subject his writing shows distinct signs of patchiness; one is inclined to suspect that although he is widely read on psycho-analysis, he has never really assimilated what he has read, or else that he has definite inhibitions preventing such assimilation. At times he presents a fair digest of some particular aspect, and he seems to have grasped its significance, but at some other part of the book one has misgivings whether he really has grasped it. At one point he will talk as if he understood the rôle of the 'return of the repressed' in inducing symptom formation; at another he seems to suggest that repression is in itself the pathogenic factor. This may be simply a slipshod method of exposition, but it is certainly unfortunate in a book which on the whole is highly critical of Freudian theory. Another example: in spite of the two definite statements already quoted concerning the patient's attitude in analysis, Dr. Brown at another point talks quite freely of infantile repetitions, hostile phases, etc., etc. And yet it is clear that the whole idea of an analytic 'situation' or 'transference neurosis' with its essential repetitive function seems to have escaped him. He lays stress on the bad effects of 'chance experiences in the past', neglecting the more dynamic factor of instinctual frustration. The processes of regression, as distinct from the defensive functions of repression, are never clearly stated. Displacement at one point he understands; but he clearly neglects the influence of displacement on cognitive processes. At one moment he criticizes Freudian theory as too 'metaphorical'; at another he will launch a system of emotional dispositions arranged round a central object or 'master-sentiment'. At one point he will call for new discoveries, at another he will explain the persistence of amnesia as being due primarily to fear of failure. At one time he will speak of 'psycho-synthesis' as if it occurred automatically on analysis, at another as if it has to be induced and encouraged, at a third as if it were a preliminary to deeper religious feeling for God.

In fairness it should be said that some at any rate of the confusing impressions are due to the fact that the book is not a systematic treatise.

But this is a blemish that Dr. Brown has it in his power to remove. One hopes that in any future volumes he may publish on these subjects, he will discipline his impulses sufficiently to keep irrelevant material out of scientific discussion. One would listen with interest and respect to anything Dr. Brown had to say about the relations of religion to philosophy and science; one would listen with the same interest and respect to any systematic criticisms he might care to make of psycho-analytical theory. But it is impossible to acclaim as scientific a book in which the author jumbles together a number of naturally distinct issues, and in which he measures the empirical science of analytical psychology with the foot-rule of religious values, stopping every now and then to criticize findings, corroboration of which is rendered impossible for him by his own technical approach.

Edward Glover.

★

Clinical and Experimental Studies in Personality. By Morton Prince, M.D., LL.D. (Sci-Art Publishers, Cambridge, Mass., 1929. Pp. 559. Price \$5.00.)

This massive volume will serve as a monument to the distinguished author's pioneering work in psychopathology. With the exception of the book on *The Unconscious*, not one of his most successful efforts, all his principal writings are contained in it, including even the famous *Dissociation of a Personality*. Students of psychopathology will be grateful for having here this mass of work collected in such an accessible form, and the publication of the volume can only redound to Dr. Prince's credit. In the Preface he states in a dignified manner the grounds of his dissent from Freud's conclusions, though he gladly acknowledges the value his writings have been in calling more vigorous attention to the problems of psychopathology.

E. J.

★

Fundamentals of Objective Psychology. By John Frederick Dashiell. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1928. Pp. xviii + 588. Price 16s. net.)

This is one of the best statements of psychology from the behaviourist or 'objective' point of view which we have met. It is very solid, clearly written, and well documented; and it is less sweeping and truculent than most others of its outlook. In itself it is not of great interest to psychoanalysts, but anyone who wishes to see how things look from the 'objective' angle could not do better than turn to this volume.

The author's great virtue is that while he makes a valiant attempt to squeeze psychology into the 'objective' framework, he does not assert that this is simple and easy, nor that success has already crowned his

efforts. Nor does he so airily leave out of account great areas of important fact, as Watson does. Dashiell emphasizes, for instance, what he likes to call 'postural responses'; for, he says, whilst the phenomena he includes under this term 'may not be identical phenomena, and may not be even closely related in their true fundamental character', yet they will 'serve to remind the psychologist that what he has to deal with in the behaviour of man are not simply the short-lived, quickly operating reactions to stimuli, but also the long-lived, slowly changing modifications of his gross adjustments'. This seems to be a great advance on the crude 'stimulus-response' point of view.

But the author still finds it possible to make the old mistakes about sublimation which psycho-analysts are weary of correcting; and while he makes a stout-hearted attempt to express neurosis in terms of simple conflict, and conflict in terms of physiological set, he shows his uneasiness in the presence of the sort of facts with which psycho-analysts deal when he talks (p. 266) of 'clinical cases of behaviour that can be described and re-described in various manners so as to display any one of a wide assortment of such devices: "suppression", "projection", "balancing factors", "regression", "distraction devices", "identification", "displacement", "transference", and so on. What the reader needs to get clearly in mind is the fact that the frustration of a powerfully motivated line of behaviour (especially one not too greatly elaborated from its organic drive base) by some other motivated line of behaviour (especially one in the shape of a socialized habit) often leads to eccentric directions of activity by the individual . . .'. With these profound words of wisdom, he leaves the problem.

Susan Isaacs.



Pleasure and Instinct. By A. H. B. Allen. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method, Kegan Paul, London, 1930. Pp. 336. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

This book is a repudiation of the pessimistic philosophy which regards pleasure as a delusion and life as an unceasing attempt to escape from the 'unpleasure' of the needs and injuries to which the organism is always more or less exposed. Mr. Allen does not believe that these needs and injuries are necessarily unpleasant unless the conations to which they give rise are checked by external circumstances or internal inhibitions. And he thinks that pleasure is to be found not in the attainment of an end, or in the dissipation of a want, but in the successful striving towards these conditions. Thus for Mr. Allen unpleasure and pleasure are not characteristics of those situations which evoke or terminate a series of reactions, but accompaniments of the smooth or impeded functioning of such a series.

Mr. Allen illustrates his theory in detail in a review of what he considers to be the main instincts—the instinct of nutrition, of reproduction, of curiosity, of gregariousness and especially in the impulse to power. The book contains a few references to Freud, but makes little use of his discoveries.

R. Money-Kyrle.

★

Experiments with Handwriting. By Robert Saudek. (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1928. Pp. 393. Price 18s.)

Graphology has long occupied an anomalous position among the sciences and pseudo-sciences. Few people have doubted that handwriting depended in certain ways upon the mental condition and nature of the writer, but those who have studied the matter in a critical spirit were for the most part convinced that our knowledge of the precise nature of the dependence in question was extremely small. Mr. Saudek has endeavoured to convert graphology from a potential to an actual science by rigorous insistence upon stringent scientific method. In his own words he 'has set himself the task of accepting *none* of the graphological doctrines hitherto accepted which cannot be *proved*, either by systematic experiment or by statistical inquiry'. The present book aims at bringing together all the results of graphology that have passed this test and at supplementing these results with the fruits of the author's own twenty-six years of research in this field. Mr. Saudek thinks that the book 'offers the basis of a new exact science'. If this claim can be justified, its appearance constitutes an event of very considerable importance in the history of science and the book itself may well become a classic.

The present reviewer does not possess any expert knowledge of graphology, and it is always difficult to judge the value of work in a field of which one is ignorant. A careful study of the book has, however, convinced him that Mr. Saudek has at the very least made out a case for the most thorough investigation and testing of his conclusions. The book very strongly suggests, in particular, that, in the future, experimental graphology may prove to be one of the most important weapons in the armoury of the psychologist, and that, if he neglects to use it, the psychologist may be responsible for seriously retarding the progress of his science.

But Mr. Saudek's book also makes it clear that the mastery of graphological technique is no easy matter; on the contrary, the complication and variety of the factors that influence handwriting will evidently necessitate a prolonged and intensive course of training. The unsatisfactory results of graphology up to the present are largely due to unscientific method and to under-estimation of the difficulty and complexity of the tasks involved. Moreover, even the expert graphologist trained in the new methods requires much time and care for their application; there is little room in Mr.

Saudek's system for rapid and impressive judgements produced for the edification of drawing-room audiences. In his own words again, 'if the graphologist cannot find time to devote at least two hours to a single manuscript, and at least a full week (or, better still, fourteen half-days), to testing the identity of two or more manuscripts, he had better leave graphological judgements alone and content himself with amateur graphology. Then at least he and others will realize that he is practising an "art" and not a science, and he can cheerfully continue to perform his parlour tricks as an "interpreter" of handwriting'. The difficulties largely arise from the very considerable number of factors that have to be kept in mind. Thus, before we can evaluate a manuscript from the psychological point of view, we must ascertain whether it was written quickly or slowly, whether in the writer's native language or in some other tongue with which he is less familiar, whether the writer had reached graphic maturity, whether he suffered from any handicaps of a physiological (e.g. tremor) or physical nature (e.g. bad writing materials). Very often too the interpretation will vary according to the writing system which the writer learnt at school. The determination of the first point alone is quite a complicated matter, as we have to search for the possible presence of eight primary signs of rapid writing, eight primary signs of slow writing, four secondary signs of rapid writing and four secondary signs of slow writing.

In spite of this complexity of the subject-matter, Mr. Saudek has written an eminently clear and readable book—though of course it is a book that requires study and does not lend itself to skipping. Occasionally indeed, in its own restrained way, it is quite dramatic, as when we are asked to consider whether a farewell letter ostensibly written by a suicide, just before her death, is genuine or is a forgery committed by the young woman's husband; or, when studying a telegram written by Sir Edward Grey on the eve of the Great War, light is thrown on the conflicts in the mind of the statesman at a moment of extraordinary tension and responsibility.

Of the seven long chapters, the first (on the Development of the Graphic Faculty) is of exceptional importance to the educationist, though it abounds also in observations of psychological interest as when (to give just one example) we are told that ability in composition demands a certain contempt for the teacher, a capacity to fight one's way to self-assertion in spite of his possible criticisms. In some respects this indifference to the strictures of the teacher is liable to be greater when the education received is regarded as less important, hence the ability to 'gossip' on paper tends to be found chiefly in women who have been brought up with a view to marriage rather than a career (p. 43). In certain matters, psycho-analysts will be able to point to the probable co-operation of various unconscious factors, particularly of displacements of anal interests, as, for instance, in

the general attitude towards the task of filling up a blank sheet of paper, or in the pleasure which may be given by the act of dipping pen too freely in the ink, with subsequent liability to blots.

The middle chapters are devoted to more purely technical questions of graphology, though the psychological interest is never really absent. But in the last two chapters the psychological point of view is supreme. In Chapter VII the author is concerned with the graphological signs of honesty and dishonesty, and enumerates ten such signs, the combination of any four of which, in his opinion, justifies the diagnosis of dishonesty. An attempt to control the correctness of this diagnosis was made from seventy-three handwritings supplied by nineteen British firms. Out of these, dishonesty was diagnosed in fourteen cases, in all of which a confession of guilt or an actual conviction in a court of law had actually occurred. There was one case where a conviction had taken place though honesty had been diagnosed. Similar results have been achieved in other countries, and taken together undoubtedly constitute a very impressive body of evidence.

Chapter VIII deals with the Method of Characterological Analyses. The results are again of the greatest interest, though, dealing as is here the case, not with a single factor easily definable, such as dishonesty, but with a whole series of characteristics not easily defined or interrelated, the author is not able to present such brief and satisfactory proofs of the correctness of his conclusions. Indeed, there would seem to be a great field opened up in this department for the co-operation of the graphologist, psycho-analyst, and experimental psychologist; and it might be maintained that for purposes of scientific demonstration the author's results should have been presented at greater length (with full analytical and statistical details) in a series of papers rather than in a single chapter of a book. But as Mr. Saudek says elsewhere (p. 61) that expert investigators will be given access to the original statistical material on which all the conclusions of the book are based, it is not possible to grumble overmuch. We can only express once again the hope that psychologists will lose no time in studying and testing Mr. Saudek's methods and results.

The book ends with the application of the characterological methods to five examples, three of whom are well-known men, viz., Otto Weininger, Mussolini and Sir Edward Grey. At the conclusion of the text are some fairly elaborate notes, again largely concerned with psychological questions, and a useful glossary of graphological terms. The illustrative graphological material is contained in a supplement of sixty-three plates and thirteen pages of description—a convenient arrangement which permits the reader to have the examples under consideration always before him, even when the discussion occupies several pages of the main volume.

J. C. F.

Sex in Civilization. A Series of Essays, with an Introduction by Havelock Ellis. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. Pp. 719. Price 20s.)

This book is a sign of the times, showing as it does how widespread is the dawning realization that sexual problems are of great significance for civilization in general. It is written by thirty-two American writers, if we include Dr. Wittels, at present in America, under that heading. The tone of the book is distinctly feminist, and it is dedicated to a number of women, from Georges Sand to Isadora Duncan, 'who have led in the struggle for sex emancipation and a finer civilization'. The Preface is almost entirely taken up with the impetus to sexual psychology given by Freud, but the opinion is expressed that, important as his studies have been in respect of the individual, they are unhelpful for sociological problems.

As is customary in such books, the contributions are of unequal value, but we would call attention to a most excellent introduction by Havelock Ellis, a breezy article by Judge Lindsey on 'Wisdom for Parents' and a trenchant piece of propaganda by Margaret Sanger on 'The Civilizing Force of Birth Control'.

Of the thirty-two contributions, two are by psycho-analysts. There is a special section entitled 'Sex and Psycho-Analysis', which comprises the following five chapters: Narcissism by Fritz Wittels; The Theory of the Libido by Smith Ely Jelliffe; The Psycho-Analytic Approach by Bernard Glueck; The Psycho-Analysis of Asceticism by E. Boyd Barrett; and Freud's Theory of Sex, A Criticism by Abraham Myerson. It is unfortunate that the expository articles on psycho-analysis are for the most part distinctly mediocre, and would often leave a far from clear impression in the mind of the reader. One of them, in fact, by Dr. Boyd Barrett, for whom the title of 'a practising psycho-analyst in New York City' has been invented, has no bearing on psycho-analysis. The critical article is also very disappointing. It is true that few people are able to express temperately and objectively the difficulties in the way of accepting Freud's conclusions, but we should have thought it possible for the purposes of such a book to find someone who would show some understanding of the subject and would not feel the necessity of descending to personal abuse. It would be tedious to enumerate the quibbles and misunderstandings to be found in this chapter, but it is our duty to call attention to at least a few of the statements made. Dr. Myerson begins with the general accusations that Freud is given to 'suppressing those manifestations of reality which are to him irrelevant'; 'he cites the positive instances only, that is, those facts and cases which suit his purpose; the numberless cases which might refute his theories receive scant or contemptuous mention'. He finds it totally unnecessary to look for any psycho-analytic explanation of the amnesia of childhood. 'To return to the infant, his forgetting of

the first few years of his life runs parallel with the facts that his brain is small at this period, that association pathways are not yet fully laid down, so that he is not psychically integrated. There is not, as yet, the *I* of the fully-developed type which is to remember. The forgetting of the infant is based on the fact that his life is a series of experiences without enough co-ordinating energy to hold them together; that he spends the larger part of his time sleeping'.

Dr. Myerson waxes merry in the accustomed way over the concepts of oral and anal eroticism, asserting, as usual, that Freud has merely confounded sexuality with bodily pleasure in general. 'Diet and exercise are of far more fundamental importance in the understanding of constipation than a hypothetical anal eroticism'. As for muscle eroticism, Freud's statement that genital excitement first occurs in a number of persons during wrestling with playmates leads to the following *sequitur* on the part of the author: 'Thus, when two lions fight each other for a mate, they are not seeking sexual excitement from the female and to destroy the rival, but are really fighting one another for the homosexual excitement'.

Naturally the author contends for the narrowest conception of sexual love and is shocked at the idea of 'the tender feeling evoked by the small and the helpless, which is so prominent a feature of the psychic life of woman' being regarded as sexual. In fact, 'it is much more likely that the sexual feeling is a sub-variety of tender feeling than that tenderness is a variety of sexual feeling', though a moment's reflection on the biology of the sexual instinct might have taught him the contrary. His comment on the idea that children's night terrors in the absence of any danger are connected with love for the missing mother leads to the comment that 'it is stretching sexuality very far to believe that the rabbit running for his life before the dog is animated by an infantile attachment to his mother, especially if he is a rabbit, let us say, brought up in a laboratory without a mother whom he has ever known'.

Having disposed of Freud's libido theory, Dr. Myerson then ranges over what he calls the 'tangled skein of lustful love and murderous hate, transference, resistance, and the stock-in-trade of psycho-analysis'. 'Categorically one must state there is no free association method, that the psycho-analyst conditions most of the responses he gets, selecting those which suit his preconceived ideas'. 'Again, the largest part of the theory is derived from the analysis of hysterics who, as every clinician knows, lie very readily, are suggestible, and will take their cue from their physician in a mimetic way. This can be exemplified by the mistakes made by the eminent Charcot in his analysis of hysterical convulsions. His hysterics gave him exactly what he expected'. One sees again how Charcot's follies must have put back the scientific study of hysteria by at least twenty years.

E. J.
8

Havelock Ellis, Philosopher of Love. By Houston Peterson. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1929. Pp. 432. Price 18s.)

The wide circle to whom inspiration has flowed from Dr. Havelock Ellis will be grateful for such a thorough and illuminating biography as this, and Dr. Ellis himself may be congratulated on his latest biographer. The work is extraordinarily well done. Thanks to the accessibility of the material and the writer's tireless pursuit of it, we have here a much fuller and more detailed account of a human being's life than is at all customary in any biography. The mental struggles of the child, adolescent and man, are portrayed in unsparing intimacy, but with the most sympathetic insight. There can be few men living whose life is more worth studying and presenting to the public than Dr. Havelock Ellis's; as a thinker, a man of feeling and of culture, a scholar—in short, a philosopher in the best sense of the word—Dr. Ellis is pre-eminent among his contemporaries. His highly developed sense of serenity and gentleness have ensured for him the rare fate of never having made an enemy, and the number of those who regard him with devoted affection and respect is one of the encouraging features of our society.

This is not the place for us to attempt any estimate of Dr. Ellis's own achievements or personality; we are concerned only with this particular book, and more especially with its references to psycho-analysis. Even here we are hampered by the thought that this is not the most fitting occasion to descant on the connection between these two themes, the more so because a good deal was said on them in a recent review of Dr. Ellis's last book in this JOURNAL, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VII (Vol. IX, 1928, p. 480). The matter is in several ways a delicate one, and we could have wished that the author of this book, whatever may have been his personal opinion about Ellis and Freud, had taken the trouble to get at least the objective facts approximately correct. A common misrepresentation of Freud's relation to Charcot is in this connection particularly striking. Such matters have, however, little to do with the main theme, that of Dr. Havelock Ellis's life, and we have nothing but praise for the way in which the author has developed it.

E. J.

★

Biblical Anthropology Compared with and Illustrated by the Folklore of Europe and the Customs of Primitive Peoples. By H. J. D. Astley, M.A., Litt.D., F.R.Hist.S., F.R.A.I. (Oxford University Press, London: Humphrey Milford, 1929. Pp. 262. Price 12s 6d. net.)

This work, written by a theologian, appears to have been stimulated by the wish to adapt to the purposes of Christian teaching the data investigated by Frazer in his *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament*. It is, in short, a very

enlightened example of the Higher Criticism of which more was heard in the last century than has been in this. The author attempts to correlate the folk-lore beliefs that pervade the Old Testament, and also survive in the New, with the extensive anthropological data gathered from other races than the Jews. This necessarily does away with the old isolation of Hebrew religious writings as revelations that had no connection with the rest of mankind, and indeed the author stigmatises the view of the Bible as a verbally inspired narrative as naive and infantile. Modern psychology is not taken into consideration in the book, and the word 'phallic' is mentioned only once, to be immediately discounted. Nevertheless the book is a valuable and learned study full of material that can profitably be used by the psychologist.

E. J.

★

The Custom of Couvade. By Warren R. Dawson, F.R.S.E. (Manchester University Press, 1929. Pp. 118. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

This is a valuable collection of the principal data bearing on this interesting custom. The author discusses the various views, with the sole exception of the psycho-analytical one, that have been enunciated concerning its significance. He says: 'I cannot claim to have solved the problem of couvade, but at the same time I hope I have succeeded in clearing away some of the valueless *débris* that has hitherto encumbered the discussion'. The bibliography of 185 titles does not contain a single reference to any psycho-analytical writer on the subject.

E. J.

★

My First Two Thousand Years: The Autobiography of the Wandering Jew. By George Sylvester Viereck and Paul Eldridge. (The Macaulay Company, New York, 1928. Pp. 501. Price \$2.50.)

An ambitious attempt to depict 'a complete mental chart of civilized man' in terms of the imagined psycho-analysis of one of literature's most dramatic legendary figures—the Wandering Jew. His recollections, elicited under hypnosis, retell the story of the last two thousand years and comprise 'an erotic interpretation of history'. The authors of this book can rightly say: 'Technically . . . the recital of his tale presents almost insurmountable difficulties', for, in venturing to relate the experiences of their hero, they are confronted with the perplexing task of unfolding before the reader's eyes a panorama that would adequately portray the pageantry of twenty centuries. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the adventures of the eternal wanderer, and hence the historic pattern that forms their background, are represented as dominated by the sway of

a repetition-compulsion. This *motif* is expressed through the device of having many of the characters appear in successive reincarnations and necessitates the recurrence of types, themes and situations with but minor variations and modifications. Under such circumstances consummate skill is required to avoid becoming tiresomely repetitious. While the authors have not, in our opinion, entirely mastered this hazard, for the book does seem somewhat long drawn out, they have nevertheless treated a famous subject in an unusual manner, and so produced a striking work.

The Wandering Jew of Eugene Sue went his fearsome way alone, bowed down with remorse, dogged by the black death. The Ahasuerus of Viereck and Eldridge is, on the contrary, a gay Lothario who jauntily indulges in amour and intrigue as he treads the corridors of time. He learns quickly that laughter, to which his very name, Isaac, predisposes him, is to be his weapon in his struggle against the sentence that Christ has pronounced upon him. But despite laughter and power, the Wandering Jew of *My First Two Thousand Years* is also pursued by a dæmonic fate, albeit in a subtle form. Like a destiny compulsion, it moulds his experiences in recurrent shapes and brings them to similar ends. His machinations against Christianity, engendered by his hatred of Jesus, come to naught, for the descendants of Attila become converts, the Crescent fails to overtop the Cross, and Christendom survives the schism of the Reformation; his loves perish, leaving a succession of 'dreams and graves'; Salome, the 'Eternal Mother', the 'ultimate, unimaginable ideal', forever bewitching him, always eludes him.

During the troublous times of the World War the Wandering Jew chances to tarry at an abbey on Mount Athos. Here he permits Professor Basserman, a psychologist, Aubrey Lowell, the latter's analytically-minded friend, and Father Ambrose, the superior of the monastery, to probe the depths of his mind. The method of examination employed by this trio of investigators is only remotely reminiscent of psycho-analytic procedure, as it is actually conducted at the present day; Freud abandoned the use of hypnotism in psycho-analysis within a few years of the beginning of his discoveries and replaced it with the free association technique. While it may seem captious, in view of the privileges conferred by literary license, to object to the latitude that the authors allow themselves in depicting the psycho-analytic process, we feel that they might well have dispensed with such dramatic but fictive items as perspiring hypnotists, dictographs, chronometers and blood pressure gauges; it seems to us that a more faithful portrayal of the psycho-analytic method would have enhanced the worth of their book without impairing its imaginative qualities. Such inaccuracies of terminology as the interchangeable use of 'unconscious' and 'subconscious' and of 'delusion' and 'illusion' tend to mar a generally well-written book. This is especially true since the authors demonstrate

an appreciation of a number of psycho-analytical concepts, as, for example, ambivalence, constitutional bisexuality, the homosexuality of Don Juanism, motivated forgetting, the conditioning power of names, the repetition-compulsion, etc.

However, the defects of *My First Two Thousand Years*, both literary and technical, can be condoned considering the pages of colourful description, deft satire and graphic narrative it contains.

M. A. Meyer.

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY

ANNA FREUD, GENERAL SECRETARY

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Third Quarter, 1929

July 24, 1929. Special Meeting. About twenty-five Members and Associate Members were present, and the following guests: Dr. Katherine Jones, Mrs. Agar, Dr. Brierley, Dr. A. A. Brill, Colonel and Mrs. Berkeley-Hill, Mrs. Bryan, Dr. and Mrs. Coriat, Major Daly, Frau Déri, Dr. Eitingon, Dr. and Mrs. Ferenczi, Fräulein Anna Freud, Mrs. Flügel, Mrs. Glover, Mr. Herford, Mr. Isaacs, Dr. Jakobsen, Dr. Jekels, Dr. and Mrs. Laforgue, Dr. and Mrs. Pfeifer, Mrs. Riggall, Dr. Sachs, Dr. M. Schmideberg, Dr. and Mrs. Maxim Steiner, Mrs. Stoddart, Mr. Yates.

Dr. Glover took the chair and explained that the Meeting was convened to give the Society an opportunity of expressing its appreciation of Dr. Jones's arduous labours in the interest of psycho-analysis as a member of the Psycho-Analysis Committee of the British Medical Association. Reference was also made to his unremitting services to psycho-analysis in other fields, and in particular his capacity as President of the British Psycho-Analytical Society.

Complimentary reference having been made to the presence of Dr. Katherine Jones as guest, Dr. Glover presented Dr. Jones with a Presidential Chair, a gold pencil and a gold cigar-cutter, all suitably inscribed, and to Mrs. Jones a Chinese lacquer box of chocolates.

Dr. Jones, in thanking the Society, said he regarded the occasion as marking an important step in the relationship of psycho-analysis to the medical profession in particular and to the public at large. He had undertaken the work with a heavy heart, there being no prospect of any goal to be reached except the negative one of diminishing the probable harm of this meaningless 'inquiry'. It turned out, however, that tenacious fighting had resulted in a more positive achievement, namely, that for the first time an official national body of the medical profession had recognized psycho-analysis as a serious branch of science, an independent one on which they were not competent to pass judgement. This result could not fail to have repercussions in other countries also. Further, the fundamental distinction between psycho-analysts and pseudo-analysts had been recognized, as well as the qualifications established by membership of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. He expressed his thanks to

Dr. Glover for the able and unfailing help he had at all times afforded him throughout the fight.

The meeting then terminated, and an informal social gathering followed with light refreshments.

There were no other meetings during this quarter.

Obituary : Dr. C. R. A. Thacker.

Douglas Bryan,

Hon. Secretary.

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Fourth Quarter, 1929

October 2, 1929. Annual General Meeting. The following officers were elected : *President* : Dr. Ernest Jones ; *Secretary* : Dr. Douglas Bryan ; *Treasurer* : Dr. W. H. B. Stoddart ; *Members of Council* : Drs. Eder, Glover, Rickman and Mrs. Riviere ; *Librarian* : Miss Low ; *Training Committee* : Dr. Glover, Dr. Jones, Mrs. Klein, Dr. Payne, Dr. Rickman and Mrs. Riviere.

Dr. Jones raised the question of an amalgamation of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis with the Society, and moved the following resolution : ' Members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society practising psycho-analysis in London shall agree to become on election members of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis and also, provided the election is ratified by a majority vote of the medically qualified members of the Society, to become members of the Staff of the London Clinic of Psycho-Analysis. The latter shall treat at least one patient daily at the Clinic, or alternatively render an equivalent amount of service to the Institute, this to be determined by the Council of the Society '.

The following alterations in the Rules of the Society were proposed and carried : Rule 3.—For ' Honorary Secretary ' read ' two Honorary Secretaries ' ; Rule 5.—For ' Honorary Secretary and four other Members ' read ' two Honorary Secretaries and three other Members '.

On the proposal of Dr. Jones, Dr. Eitingon was unanimously elected an Honorary Member of the Society.

November 6, 1929. Business Meeting. Dr. Jones reported that in order to facilitate the re-organization of the Society and Institute, the Officers of the Society had sent in their resignations. Due notice having been given, it was decided to proceed to a new election forthwith. The following officers were elected : *President* : Dr. Ernest Jones ; *Scientific Secretary* : Dr. Edward Glover ; *Business Secretary* : Dr. Sylvia Payne ; *Treasurer* : Dr. Douglas Bryan.

Votes of thanks were passed to Dr. Stoddart for his work as Treasurer from the inception of the Society ; to Dr. Bryan for his work as General Secretary ; and to Dr. Rickman for his work as Secretary to the Institute.

Sylvia Payne,

Business Secretary.

SCIENTIFIC PROCEEDINGS

October 16, 1929. Dr. Eder: A preliminary communication on 'The Animosity of the Father to the Son'.

November 6, 1929. Dr. Yates: 'Psycho-Analytical Factors in Virginity and Ritual Defloration'. The chief motive underlying the valuation of virginity is the unconscious conviction that the virgin belongs to the father; the practice of ritual defloration an expression of this belief: the father (usually a substitute) initiates the bridal pair into sexual intercourse; virgin gives the father his due; at same time achieves partial fulfilment of incest-wish; husband receives father's sanction for incest and is relieved of anxiety and guilt.

November 20, 1929. Dr. Brierley: 'On the Unconscious Motivations of Attempted Abortion'. Clinical evidence showing that in one case the attempt was due to anxiety relating to an early Œdipus theft guilt-situation; phantasy that the child (father's penis, fæces, money) had been stolen from her mother's womb (bowel) and would be taken from the patient by force (cut out by her analyst) unless she got rid of it herself, i.e. expiated her guilt by abortion.

December 4, 1929. (a) Miss Searl: 'An Associative Connection between Teeth and Toes'. Nucleus of the ego is the mouth-nipple relationship; baby trying to put its toes in its mouth is omnipotently trying to recapture the distant nipple; teeth growing are for the baby the permanently attained and retained toe-nipples; they hurt in a degree corresponding in phantasy with the baby's own sadism.

(b) Miss Low: 'Preliminary Communication on the Significance and Effect of the Film on the Mind'. The theme of the film unimportant; appeal to the ucs probably lies in mechanism; important factors are: (1) magical creation, (2) omnipotence, (3) narcissistic appeal, (4) exclusive appeal to the visual, (5) distortion, (6) timelessness; these attributes identifiable with ucs and partake closely of the nature of the dream; other important factors are anal gratification and the fact that the film recreates the primal scene.

Edward Glover,
Scientific Secretary.

DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Fourth Quarter, 1929

October 26, 1929. (a) The meeting discussed Dr. van Ophuijsen's proposal that a Psycho-Analytical Institute should be founded at The Hague. At present more stress is being laid on exposition of the science of psycho-analysis to the medical profession and the laity than on the instruction of the future psycho-analysts. It is hoped that in the first quarter of 1930 a beginning may be made with a series of lectures which several University

Lecturers have offered to give. The lectures are to be held in a house of historic interest : that in which the Dutch philosopher, Spinoza, once lived.

(b) J. H. W. van Ophuijsen discussed part of Lytton Strachey's book, *Elizabeth and Essex*.

December 21, 1929. (a) A. Endtz : ' Thoughts suggested by Politzer's criticisms of Psycho-Analysis '. The speaker gave a survey of the new journal, *Revue de Psychologie concrète* and of the works of Politzer. Politzer's criticism differs fundamentally from the criticisms usually made of psycho-analysis, if only in that he accepts the importance of the sexual factor and the Œdipus complex. Politzer's criticism in relation to the unconscious must be rejected, and while Politzer's views on a concrete psychology could be accepted, one could not see in them any such revolutionary novelty as their author claimed for them.

(b) J. H. W. van Ophuijsen spoke on the difficulty of differentiating between obsessions, phobias and similar symptoms—a train of thought suggested by the case of a woman patient. Some phobias must probably come under the heading of anxiety-neurosis rather than that of obsessional neurosis, this being supported by a reference to the different regressions of the libido in the two forms of illness. Instead of classifying diseases under the present clinical headings, as is the practice to-day, it would be better to differentiate the individual cases according to the fixation-point of the libido.

A. Endtz,
Secretary.

FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Fourth Quarter, 1929

October 21, 1929. Dr. Ch. Odier (guest of the Society), presented a critical study of the book by Alexander and Staub, entitled *The Criminal and His Judges*.

Business Meeting : Dr. S. Nacht was elected an Honorary Member.

Dr. Pichon having resigned the secretaryship of the *Revue française de Psychanalyse*, Dr. Loewenstein was appointed to succeed him.

November 26, 1929. Dr. Laforgue : On Anxiety. Anxiety is susceptible of eroticization and may become a form of gratification of the unconscious, which will then seek after it.

Business Meeting : Dr. M. Cénac was elected an Honorary Member.

December 20, 1929. Dr. Flügel (Guest of the Society) : The symbolism of dress. The affective reactions relating to the custom of dress were considered.

Dr. R. Allendy,
Secretary.

HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Fourth Quarter, 1929

October 18, 1929. Dr. S. Pfeifer: (i) Caligula and the 'King of the Woods'.

Psycho-analytical comments on historical and political incidents, the connecting-link between which is the single locality 'Nemi'. Notes on ritual regicide; the 'fate'-neurosis of Caligula; the reason why he was obliged to slay the *rex nemorensis* and himself undergo the same fate; how similar historical situations have found solution in compromise (dual monarchy as a system of safeguarding), with the result that really every radical change of government has borne the marks of the parricide of ancient times.

(ii) 'Moccoli' (carnival-lights). 'The Roman Carnival': a chapter from Goethe's account of his travels. Reappearance of the same mental factors as were met with in the previous discussion. They are now interpreted through the regression to absurdity, which takes place during carnival.

November 8, 1929. Dr. S. Ferenczi: The principle of relaxation and neo-catharsis.

November 22, 1929. Dr. S. Ferenczi: A case of paranoid symptoms revealed in an autobiography.

December 6, 1929. Clinical communication. Dr. M. Bálint: The choice of a marriage-partner determined by the fixation of an infantile mode of gratification.

Courses of introductory lectures were arranged by the Training Committee as follows:

1. Dr. Hermann: Psycho-Analytical Psychology.
2. Dr. Bálint: Theory of Instincts.
3. Dr. Hollós: Interpretation of Dreams.

Dr. Imre Hermann,

Secretary.

SWISS PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Fourth Quarter, 1929

October 12, 1929. (a) Dr. Behn-Eschenburg: Impressions of the Psycho-Analytical Congress at Oxford. Advances in psycho-analysis.

(b) A report of the Tegel Psycho-Analytical Sanatorium was given.

Resignations: Dr. Levy (New York) and Dr. Blatter (Königsfelden).

November 2, 1929. Pfr. Dr. O. Pfister: Thoughts and phantasies induced by shock during danger of death. Analytic comments on an ex-service man's account of his experiences in the War. Analytic conclusions.

November 16, 1929. Direktor Dr. Kielholz (Königsfelden) : The mental background of dipsomania. The author has already written several papers on 'Dipsomania and Psycho-Analysis'. The present paper contains this new element : that it aims at linking up our psycho-analytic knowledge with what we know of psychiatry, psychopathology and the history of civilization and at summarizing the whole from a definite standpoint.

November 30, 1929. Dr. Blum : A psychiatric opinion, considered from the psycho-analytic point of view. (Discussion deferred.)

Business Meeting : Consideration of the first seven paragraphs of the new Statutes of the Society.

December 14, 1929. Direktor Dr. Répond (Malévoz) : A case of hysteria. The patient, an Englishwoman, who had spent several years at the Tuberculosis Sanatorium at Leysin with tubercular fistulæ on her (paralysed) left leg, was sent to Malévoz for psycho-analytic treatment, on account of her difficult character. After eight months of treatment not only the psychic but all the physical symptoms disappeared.

The three following evening lectures were given in the Bernouillanum at Basle (attendance 250-350).

1. Dr. Sarasin : Introductory Lecture.
2. Dr. Christoffel : Psycho-Analysis and Medicine.
3. Zulliger : Psycho-Analysis and Education.

The courses of lectures given regularly will be published as a special number of the *Zeitschrift für Kranken und Irrenpflege*, and will appear in book form.

Zulliger spoke on 'Psycho-Analytical Education' to the teachers of the First Zurich and Affoltern a/Albis Districts.

Hans Zulliger,
Secretary.

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